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Abstract 
 
This thesis presents a foreign policy decision-making analysis of Kazakhstan’s foreign 
relations in the initial post-independence period. The study applies a neoclassical realist 
theoretical framework in order to provide the understanding of Kazakhstan’s external behaviour. 
The thesis conceptually assumes that the integration of the presidential decision-making element 
in the analysis of the republic’s foreign policy is essential to account for Kazakhstan’s foreign 
strategies, which would otherwise appear to be anomalous from the deterministic perspective of 
the structural theories of international relations. The set objective of the work is to produce a 
theoretically informed historical narratives of Almaty’s policymaking during three episodes in 
the republic’s diplomatic history – the elaboration of a distinct balancing strategy; the 
relinquishment of the nuclear arsenal; and the Nagorno-Karabakh peace mission.  
The reconstruction of events behind the decisions made by president Nursultan 
Nazarbayev and his key advisors through the assessment of primary materials sourced from the 
archives of Kazakhstani foreign policy demonstrates that foreign decision-making process 
played a crucial role in the identification of national interests and development of appropriate 
policy responses in each of the episodes under examination. Chapter IV illustrates how the 
nation’s policymakers developed a unique balancing strategy to ascertain the country’s 
sovereignty and eliminate security risks under overwhelming geopolitical pressures that 
emanated from Russia and China. Chapter V discusses the episode when Nazarbayev was 
subjected to direct international pressure to surrender the inherited Soviet nuclear arsenal on the 
terms imposed by the USA, in response to which Nazarbayev devised a deliberately ambivalent 
and protracted strategy in regard to the republic’s nuclear status. Chapter VI reveals the 
adaptability of the republic’s policymaking to the changing international context as the 
regression of the Nagorno-Karabakh peace initiative demonstrates. The exposition of intricate 
policy planning and profound diplomatic endeavours reflected in archival documents reinforces 
the thesis’s premise about the non-deterministic nature of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy.  
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Introduction 
 
Metaphorically speaking, our republic’s spaceship has 
launched successfully. This gives confidence that our 
Kazakhstan, despite all the difficulties, will be able to 
elevate itself on the historical orbit and will occupy a decent 
place in the civilized world community. For this wonderful 
goal we live and work today.  
President of the Kazakh SSR Nursultan Nazarbayev,  
Speech at the ceremonial gathering on the occasion of the 
Republic’s Day, Almaty, 4 October 1991. 
 
 
Empirical and conceptual context of the research 
Imagine a nuclear-armed nation with a vast underpopulated territory, that shares disputed and 
scantily guarded borders with two global powers, internally deeply troubled with long-going 
economic and social crises, without an established political regime and institutionalized 
governmental apparatus, and a weak national identity of an ethnically diverse population. And 
having no developed strategy of dealing with the outside world that was itself undergoing 
fundamental changes in the aftermath of the Soviet Union’s collapse. This is the reality the 
leadership of the Republic of Kazakhstan faced on 16 December 1991, the day the nation, the 
last of the fifteen Union republics, reluctantly proclaimed its independence.1 Because of such a 
peculiar combination of historical and geopolitical circumstances under which Kazakhstan began 
to conduct its foreign policy, the republic’s behavioural model on the international arena was 
destined to be unique.2 
The foundation of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy model was grounded in these earlier years 
of independence when major strategic and civilizational choices were made. Kazakhstan’s leader 
– president Nursultan Nazarbayev and his associates had to think and act expediently and with 
                                                 
1 Hereafter, the thesis will use definitions “Kazakhstan,” “the republic,” and “Almaty” interchangeably to connote 
the Republic of Kazakhstan. Almaty was the capital of Kazakhstan until December 1997, when it was moved to 
Aqmola, later renamed Astana. Unless indicated otherwise, reference to Almaty indicates Kazakhstani policymaking 
in the studied historical period. 
2 Cohen and Harris define foreign policy as “a set of goals, directives or intentions, formulated by persons in official 
or authoritative positions, directed at some actor or condition in the environment beyond the sovereign nation state, 
for the purpose of affecting the target in the manner desired by the policymakers.” See Bernard C. Cohen, and Scott 
A. Harris, “Foreign Policy,” in Handbook of Political Science, eds. Fred I. Greenstein, and Nelson W. Polsby 
(Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., 1975), 385. 
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vision if they were to meet these exceptional challenges. Nazarbayev recalls the republic’s 
situation: 
The country fac[ed] all these sophisticated [foreign policy] problems without a single 
diplomatic mission abroad, without any even elementary foreign affairs strategy plans, not to 
mention foreign policy traditions, and with no qualified diplomatic personnel. The situation in 
which we found ourselves was not as much as absurd as it was distressing.3  
 
The agents of Kazakhstan’s entrance to the new international environment – Nazarbayev and his 
key foreign policy and security advisers – instituted an effective decision-making apparatus able 
to manage the overwhelming diplomatic and policymaking tasks imposed on the republic. 
Yesterday’s Union apparatchiks, whose personal and professional socialization happened in the 
Soviet corridors of power and whose worldviews were entirely moulded within the cold war 
paradigm, proved to be highly adaptable to the sudden international changes. The leadership was 
able to devise a prudent and pragmatic model of external behaviour that resulted in remarkable 
foreign policy achievements. To be sure, Kazakhstan’s diplomatic history was not a thorough 
success story, some compromises had to be made and some concessions had to be given. 
Nevertheless, in just a few years the republic had consolidated its statehood without antagonizing 
any of the local ethnicities, gained long-term political and military security guarantees of its 
independence from global nuclear powers, justly regulated border dispute with China, and 
became actively engaged in the affairs on the post-Soviet space.  
However, the greatest puzzle of the initial period of Kazakhstani foreign policy comes 
not from the republic’s remarkable ability to ascertain its national interests under pressing 
domestic and international conditions, but from its distinctive foreign policy behaviour that 
appears to be anomalous from the perspective of the mainstream systemic theories of 
international relations – Kenneth N. Waltz’s structural realism and its derivatives.4 Kazakhstan’s 
foreign policy record presents a researcher with a paradox where the leadership clearly had 
perceptions of the surrounding international environment as hostile and threatening (leadership’s 
                                                 
3 Nursultan Nazarbayev, Na poroge XXI veka. 2nd. ed. (Almaty: Atamura, 2003a), 192. 
4 This theoretical delineation, adopted in the thesis, follows Jennifer Sterling-Folker, “Realist Environment, Liberal 
Process, and Domestic-Level Variables,” International Studies Quarterly 41, no. 1 (1997): 2, n.2. 
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views generic to systemic theories), however, had not yet followed any predicted models of 
external behaviour conceptualized within the systemic theoretical framework. Two cases in the 
republic’s diplomatic history in particular confound systemic presumptions: Kazakhstan’s 
decision to denuclearize by accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1992 and 
realization of the unique foreign strategy vis-à-vis Russia and China that featured neither 
balancing nor bandwagoning actions with or against either power. 
The resolution of the nuclear dilemma by Almaty easily confuses the neorealist logic. 
Kazakhstan inherited from the USSR the fourth largest nuclear arsenal in the world. From the 
neorealist perspective this was an excellent historical chance for the state’s leadership to 
securitize the nation. Nuclear weapons would have provided Kazakhstan with almost absolute 
deterrence capacity – an opportunity particularly attractive given the sense of external 
vulnerability and unclear fate of conventional forces stationed in the republic. Nevertheless, 
instead of utilization of the abundant Soviet strategic and tactical nuclear arsenal for the purposes 
of internal balancing, the republic’s leadership opted to relinquish nuclear arms in exchange for 
security guarantees from several nuclear powers. Although other states also are known to have 
made decisions to denuclearize, Kazakhstan’s case of deliberate proclamation of non-nuclear 
status presents an interesting instance of defiance of the neorealist reasoning. 
Another theoretical predicament stems from the character of foreign policy strategy 
employed by Kazakhstan to secure itself from perceived Russian and Chinese hegemonic 
aspirations. Although this essentially survivalist stratagem is titled in the Kazakhstani official 
discourse in Russian language as the strategy of balancing (strategiia balansirovaniia), the 
empirical evidence suggests that it had little in common with the neorealist principles of external 
or internal balancing. A plethora of geostrategic and political challenges and constraints in 
bilateral relations with Kazakhstan’s two largest neighbours predisposed the republic’s 
leadership to develop a sense of susceptibility towards Moscow and Beijing. In the course of 
charting a foreign policy course, Almaty policymakers identified a number of specific threats to 
 3 
 
the republic’s sovereignty and territorial integrity emanating from the North and East, and 
devised a strategy that they believed was the only possible option under those circumstances.  As 
recalled by Murat Laumulin, a prominent Kazakhstani expert who participated in the foreign 
policy decision-making during the studied period: 
The internal and external politics of Kazakhstan in the first post-independence decade were 
formed in the rigidly determined conditions; often it was a choice between a lesser and a larger 
evil, between bad and worse. In the conditions of geopolitical, economic, and political chaos of 
the beginning of 1990s, the logic of survival and maintenance of stability forced Kazakhstan to 
create a behavioural model, which would allow resolving with the minimum loss those 
complex situations created by geopolitics and differently vectored interests of large powers.5 
 
 As it was unequivocally demonstrated with the signing of the Lisbon Protocol to the NPT 
treaty in 1992, Kazakhstan’s leadership did not attempt to employ internal balancing as an 
instrument to respond to the perceived security threats. Surprisingly, Almaty did not engage in 
external balancing either. Nazarbayev’s intra-regional cooperation initiatives in Central Asia did 
not constitute an attempt to form a defensive alliance against Russia and China, especially 
considering the participation of the region’s nations in the supra-regional collective security 
arrangement with Russia under the Collective Security Treaty signed in May 1992. The latter 
point, however, does not mean that Kazakhstan bandwagoned or “passed the buck” to Russia to 
manage the republic’s national interests. On the contrary, Russian hegemony was considered in 
Almaty to be no “lesser evil,” to articulate Laumulin’s metaphor, than China. 
These two cases effectively demonstrate that mainstream neorealist theories’ 
presumptions do not correlate with Kazakhstan’s external behaviour in the beginning of the 
1990s. Even though the logic of survival underpinned strategic foreign policy goals, the 
Kazakhstani leaders have opted for choices not derivable from systemic realism theorizing. 
Moreover, while Nazarbayev’s unilateral effort to reconcile peace in Nagorno-Karabakh in the 
summer-autumn 1992 could not be compared in its salience to such problems as the nuclear 
dilemma or the Chinese territorial peril, it may also attract scholarly curiosity. This foreign 
policy act was not imposed by systemic considerations of security or sovereignty. Nevertheless, 
                                                 
5 Laumulin, Tsentral’naia Aziia v Zarubezhnoi Politologii i Mirovoi Geopolitike. Vol.3. (Almaty: KISI, 2009), 257. 
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in the highly complicated internal and external circumstances the leadership in Almaty found 
itself in 1992, severely limited diplomatic resources were contributed to this peace initiative. The 
dynamics of this episode are also puzzling. Kazakhstan at first decided to help Azerbaijanians 
and Armenians to solve the Nagorno-Karabakh problem, but then quickly withdrew from the 
peace process. An examination of the leadership’s motives to join the international peace process 
and its reasoning to exit it without much progress have remained unexplained. 
The limited explanatory power of neorealism to account for these seemingly irrational 
Kazakhstani foreign policies is reflected in the lack in the existing literature of a single work 
attempting to systematically apply the neorealist paradigm to the study of the republic’s foreign 
relations. Although the importance of geopolitical systemic constraints is recognized in the 
manner of the Great Game narratives, the theoretical foundation under these studies is only 
constructed implicitly. An alternative approach taken by scholars is to rely on non-structural 
variables affecting the republic’s foreign policy while also accounting for geopolitical factors. In 
this regard, statehood consolidation or regime survival considerations are found to interplay with 
the external pressures resulting in the specific policy choices by the Kazakhstani leadership. At 
the same time, the introduction of domestic variables acts against the fundamental assumption of 
neorealism to view a state as a unitary and rational actor, operating in the interests of its own 
security and survival. 
From the positions of the existing literature on Kazakhstan, the republic’s foreign policy 
can be explained as a combination of mutually reinforcing international and domestic factors, 
which precondition and accentuate the structural deterministic logic behind the development of 
major foreign policy strategies and orientations. In discussions of Kazakhstan’s international 
affairs, the deterministic character of the nation’s foreign policy is imposed by virtue of its 
geostrategic location and domestic political considerations. The majority of Kazakhstan scholars 
have chosen this research avenue.6 Kazakhstani foreign policy is seldom viewed of from the 
                                                 
6 The literature on Kazakhstan’s foreign relations is reviewed in Chapter II. 
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agency’s perspective. The republic’s leaders are rarely endowed in the literature with the ability 
to devise strategies aimed at manipulating the strategic environment for the nation’s benefit; 
instead they are depicted, to use one metaphor, as “surrogates or fiduciaries for the well-being of 
the state and all of its citizens,” having to react to external pressures in a mechanistic fashion.7 
As observed by Goertz and Levy, “Structural explanations almost by definition downplay the 
importance of individuals. In the most extreme position the international or structural constraints 
are so strong that the leadership has no choice.”8 
Hitherto, the nature of the analysis of Almaty’s foreign policy has usually been implicit 
because this analysis is often embedded in the larger regional studies of Central Asian or 
domestic Kazakhstani politics. To be sure, Kazakhstan’s foreign relations have never been 
subjected to the examination within the foreign policy decision-making analysis tradition in 
which the foreign policy output is studied as the distinct dependent variable affected by the 
peculiarities of state’s policymaking processes and structures. As Sally N. Cummings comments: 
“few studies [of Central Asian states’ external relations] have as yet provided in-depth 
understandings of how elites make foreign policies and what sort of factors and processes go into 
that decision-making.”9 While it has been shown that the introduction of decision-making 
elements to the analysis may approximate a general understanding of a particular foreign policy 
choice of a state, thus far this approach has not been employed in the study of Kazakhstan and 
the decision-making element thus remained unexplored.10  
One possible reason for these shortcomings in the existing literature lays in the fact that 
Kazakhstan’s case bears several conceptual and methodological obstacles for a researcher. An 
                                                 
7 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, “Domestic Politics and International Relations,” International Studies Quarterly 46, no. 
1 (2002): 7. 
8 Gary Goertz, and Jack S. Levy, “Causal Explanation, Necessary Conditions, and Case Studies,” In Explaining War 
and Peace: Case Studies and Necessary Condition Counterfactuals, eds. Gary Goertz and Jack S. Levy (London: 
Routledge, 2007), 33. Emphasis in original. 
9 Cummings, Understanding Central Asia: Politics and Contested Transformations (New York: Routledge, 2012), 
60. 
10 For the overview of the foreign policy decision-making subfield see Alex Mintz, and Karl R. DeRouen, 
Understanding Foreign Policy Decision-Making (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), and Douglas 
Stuart, “Foreign Policy Decision-Making,” in The Oxford Handbook of International Relations, eds. Christian Reus-
Smit and Duncan Snidal (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 576-594. 
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initial issue is how does one analyze a foreign policy of a newly emerged state? The 
conceptualization of a state’s foreign policy seems to be a challenging task if the policy itself had 
just incepted. A foreign policy without pre-existing historical record leaves a researcher with no 
opportunity to introduce to the analysis some sort of reference framework based on temporal 
dyadic divisions. Notable works from the foreign policy analysis subfield implicitly or explicitly 
buttress their research on operational notions of continuity and change in the diplomatic history 
of a given state. For example, historical analogies drawn by American leaders from the “lessons 
of history” have been found to influence the decisions to go to war; in other works fundamental 
redirections in a nation’ foreign policy are due to the regime or leadership change or deliberate 
governmental strategies; whilst another study explored the dynamics of trust and mistrust 
developed by several generations of the US and Soviet leaders.11 In contrast to these research 
strategies, Kazakhstan’s short historical record lacks such necessary reference points as 
developed preconceptions of the leadership towards a specific foreign nation or changes of the 
political regime or ruling elites.12 While there have been attempts to analyze Kazakhstan’s 
foreign policy within the context of postcolonial studies, the applicability of this approach is left 
open to discussion due to dramatic differences in historical experiences and the political 
circumstances of under which independence was attained.13  
                                                 
11 Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992); K. J. Holsti, Why Nations Realign: Foreign Policy Restructuring 
in the Postwar World (London: Allen & Unwin, 1982), and  Jerel A Rosati, Joe D. Hagan, and Martin W. Sampson, 
Foreign Policy Restructuring: How Governments Respond to Global Change (Columbia, S.C.: University of South 
Carolina Press, 1994); Deborah W. Larson, Anatomy of Mistrust: U.S.-Soviet Relations During the Cold War 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000). 
12 The thesis’s solution of this problem is in contrasting and comparing particular episodes in history of foreign 
affairs of Kazakhstan. It is conceptually feasible to isolate separate episodes and reconstruct internal processes 
behind them if there is a specific timeframe and situational context. This approach makes it possible to analyze the 
interplay of international and domestic factors during specific historical periods. For example, Patrick Jude Haney 
uses the conceptually relevant term of “the empirical window” which refers to the “historical example of the 
strategies that presidents use to organize and manage a group of advisers and an empirical record of how the 
advisory groups do the work of making decisions.” See Haney, Organizing for Foreign Policy Crises: Presidents, 
Advisers, and the Management of Decision Making (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002), 1. 
13 For example, the postcolonial argument, as part of the explanation of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy, is put forward 
by Daniela Passolt, “Kazakhstan's Foreign Policy Towards Russia, China and Central Asia (1991-2001): 
International and Domestic Factors” (PhD diss., London School of Economics and Political Science, 2007). The 
assessment of the viability of her approach is given in Chapter II. 
 
 7 
 
 Furthermore, Kazakhstan’s brief history of existence as an independent state presents 
challenges for a foreign policy analysis research from a methodological point of view. The 
principal obstacle here is the deficiency of primary sources. The foreign policy of any state is 
usually an oblique empirical phenomenon due to its sensitivity and direct relevance to matters of 
national security. In Kazakhstan’s case the problem is aggravated by the difficulties in obtaining 
first-hand information about governmental decision-making. Hitherto, materials from the 
archives of Kazakhstani foreign policy have never been introduced to scholarly discussion on the 
subject matter. Certainly, the need for such information has not always been justified by the 
purposes of research agenda for a specific study. However, such documents as, for example, a 
foreign ministry analytical memorandum or minutes of a high-level negotiations could illuminate 
many intimate elements of policymaking, exposing leadership’s reasoning behind a particular 
foreign policy act or strategy, thus approximating the understanding of a foreign policy in 
general. Any focused research on Kazakhstani foreign policy that does not consult primary 
material would resemble a desk exercise prone to producing an interpretation obscured by 
imperfections generic to secondary sources. 
One distinguishable ramification of the limited scholarly discussion of Kazakhstan’s 
foreign affairs from a foreign policy analysis perspective is reflected in the ambiguity of the 
current understanding of Nazarbayev’s contribution to the policymaking, which leads to a certain 
empirical controversy. Although Nazarbayev’s role features prominently in the accounts of 
Kazakhstan’s politics, his psychological and decision-making milieus are for the most part left 
unexposed.14 This shortcoming blurs general understanding of Kazakhstani foreign 
policymaking. Without examining the presidential decision-making element it is impossible to 
draw a conceptual divide between Nursultan Nazarbayev and the Republic of Kazakhstan. 
Kazakhstan thus remains “black boxed” and it therefore becomes unnecessary to highlight the 
                                                 
14 For example, former Kazakhstani foreign minister in his memoirs presents a very general depiction of 
Nazarbayev’s work and deliberations. See Kassym-Zhomart Tokaev, Pod Stiagom Nezavisimosti. Ocherki o 
Vneshnei Politike Kazakhstana (Almaty: Bilim, 1997). The concept of decisional milieus in foreign policymaking 
was introduced by Harold Hance Sprout, and Margaret Tuttle Sprout, The Ecological Perspective on Human Affairs: 
With Special Reference to International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965). 
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president’s role, since Nazarbayev’s calculations and actions are seen as identical to those of the 
state. In what ways president’s personality, leadership style, or his weltanschauung have steered 
the course of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy remains unknown. 
More generally, in the studies of historical cases of strategies devised and realized by 
Kazakhstan in the 1990s it seems useful to include the variable of decision-making by president 
Nazarbayev and his advisors in order to make the foreign policy of the republic a more 
comprehensible phenomenon. Neoclassical realism asserts that, in instances of deviances 
between the perceived constraints and challenges imposed by the international environment on 
one causal end and nation’s foreign policy responses on the other, it is the state-level variables 
that intervene and distort the systemic signals.15 The attribution of this model to the puzzling 
episodes in the republic’s diplomatic history appears to be an analytically potent strategy since 
neoclassical theoretical variables on both ends of the causal link bear striking resemblance to the 
empirical evidence. Of a particular interest here is the Almaty’s presidential policymaking 
apparatus that was responsible for recognition and interpretation of threats to the nation’s 
interests and devising the appropriate foreign policy strategies for neutralizing the risks and 
maximizing the benefits for the young republic.  
 The examination of policymaking processes across different cases can additionally 
indicate agency behind foreign policy behaviour of the state and support the claim that this 
behaviour was not a mere reflexive reaction to systemic pressures. Kent Calder, in the discussion 
of Japan’s foreign economic policy, provides a useful definition of a reactive state as one where 
“the impetus to policy change is typically supplied by outside pressure, and that reaction prevails 
over strategy in the relatively narrow range of cases where the two come into conflict.”16 For 
Calder, a reactive state has two principal characteristics: first, the state is unable to pursue major 
                                                 
15 Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Steven E. Lobell, and Norrin M. Ripsman, “Introduction: Neoclassical Realism, the State, 
and Foreign Policy,” In Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, eds., Steven E Lobell, Norrin M. 
Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 1-42. 
16 Calder, “Japanese Foreign Economic Policy Formation: Explaining the Reactive State,” World Politics 40, no. 4 
(1988): 518. 
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independent policy initiatives when it has the power and national incentives to do so; second, it 
responses to outside pressures erratically, unsystematically, and usually incompletely.17  
 Based on this formulation, one can consider a hypothetical model of a foreign policy 
response. Had the leadership of a state acknowledged an issue to be worth paying attention and 
responding to, then the organizational manifestation of such a reaction would be the occurrence 
of some form of decision-making structure, tasked with identification of the issue and 
formulation of strategies to deal with it. Had these decision-making processes exhibited elements 
of careful calculations and complex policy planning, and the devised strategy been realized in a 
consistent manner, then this could have signalled that there was a certain measure of strategic 
intent present and the state was not just mechanistically (re)acting externally.  
 
 
Research objectives and contribution  
This thesis presents the first foreign policy decision-making analysis of Kazakhstan’s foreign 
affairs in the initial post-independence period. Awareness of the existing conceptual lacunas and 
methodological hurdles, manifestly reflected in the scholarly assessments of the republic’s 
foreign policy, encouraged the author to employ a specific research strategy integrating both 
international and domestic factors in a theoretically sound manner and to examine the empirical 
evidence with the assistance of primary sources.  
This study seeks to answer the research puzzle as to why Kazakhstan did not ally with or 
balance against any particular great power after independence? This question concerns specific 
choices made by the republic’s leadership in regard to the fate of the inherited Soviet nuclear 
arsenal, the logic behind elaboration and realization of a distinctive foreign policy strategy, and 
an inconsistent policy towards the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, all of which cannot be adequately 
explained by the system-level neorealist theories. The argument is advanced that the integration 
of the decision-making variable is necessary for building a plausible understanding of 
                                                 
17 Ibid. 
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Kazakhstan’s foreign behaviour in the 1990s. The underlying assumption is that the republic’s 
leadership foreign policy choices were not entirely (pre)determined by geopolitical factors and 
that an element of agency was present in the republic’s diplomatic record. Observations by 
Brooks and Wohlforth regarding the collapsing Soviet Union and Mikhail Gorbachev’s 
leadership strategy of managing the crisis seems appropriate: “Although the crisis that opens the 
policy window may be a necessary condition of change [of a strategy], the response is a creative, 
fundamentally intellectual act that switches history onto new rails and whose explanation 
requires specific models.”18 The thesis’s objective is therefore to expose the presidential 
decision-making processes and structures in order to understand how Nazarbayev’s 
policymaking had impacted a foreign policy output in each specific case it brings under 
examination. 
Guided by the general research goal of approximating a better understanding of the 
republic’s foreign policy this research contributes to the existing body of the literature on 
Kazakhstan’s politics on number of theoretical and empirical positions. First, this is an original 
attempt to construct a theoretically informed study of Kazakhstan’s foreign affairs that in a 
systematic manner examines the links between the independent variable – the international 
environment; the intervening variable – Nazarbayev’s foreign policymaking; and the dependent 
variable – the specific foreign policy strategy. Such an approach is an alternative to the existing 
literature that tends to be idiographic and descriptive in its accounts of the subject.19 
Furthermore, application of international relations theory premises to the instances of 
Kazakhstani foreign strategy benefits general theoretical research scholarship as it provides 
                                                 
18 Stephen Brooks, and William Wohlforth, “Power, Globalization, and the End of the Cold War: Reevaluating a 
Landmark Case for Ideas,” in Goertz and Levy, eds., Explaining War and Peace, 198. 
19 See, for example, Omurserik Kasenov, The main results of foreign policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan and its 
priorities (Almaty: KISI, 1994); Tokaev, Pod Stiagom, Kassym-Zhomart Tokaev, Vneshniaia Politika Kazakhstana 
v Usloviiakh Globalizatsii (Almaty: SAK, 2000); Konstantin Zatulin, Andrey Grozin, and Vitalii Khliupin, 
Natsional'naia Bezopasnost' Kazakhstana: Problemy i Perspektivy (Moscow: Institut Stran SNG, 1998); Andrei 
Retivykh, Ispytanie Nezavisimost’iu: Gepoliticheskaia strategia Respubliki Kazakhstan kak uslovie vizhyvaniia 
natsii i gosudarstva (Almaty: Gylym, 2004); Reuel R. Hanks, “‘Multivector Politics’ and Kazakhstan's Emerging 
Role as a Geo-Strategic Player in Central Asia,” Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 11, no. 3 (2009). The 
literature on Kazakhstan’s foreign affairs is further reviewed in Chapter II. 
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scholars with additional cases in the empirical universe when conceptual assumptions are tested 
and verified.  
Second, the utilization of foreign policy analysis methods in the examination of 
Kazakhstani foreign policy brings additional knowledge about inner workings of Almaty’s 
policymakers thus supplementing the plausibility of arguments made in favour of the 
significance of Nazarbayev’s role in development of the republic’s foreign posture.  
Third, this thesis introduces primary information from the archives of Kazakhstan’s 
foreign ministry and presidential administration, which have hitherto not been accessed and 
assessed by scholars. These archival documents made a substantial contribution to this research 
as they exposed motives, beliefs, and perceptions held by the leadership during various policy 
planning sessions, as well as Kazakhstan’s foreign policymaking process and structure in 
general. This empirical information will be useful for future research on Kazakhstani politics of 
the initial period of independence. 
Fourth, the extended fieldwork in the country provided the author with an opportunity to 
gather large amount of empirical materials through interviews with high-ranking policymakers 
(e.g. ex-foreign minister) and consultation of Russian language secondary sources. Here, the 
author’s intimate knowledge of the country in general and governmental policymaking in 
particular allowed a more insightful interpretation of the empirical evidence. The knowledgeable 
exposition of the Kazakhstani state apparatus’s decision-making practices can potentially benefit 
a wider community of scholars beyond the international relations school. 
 
Research methods and design 
 
Research approach 
This thesis aims to construct a plausible narrative of foreign policy decision-making processes 
and mechanisms that existed in Kazakhstan in 1991-1994.20 The study is underpinned by the 
                                                 
20 Narrative is understood here as “the organization of material in a chronologically sequential order, and the 
focusing of the content into a single coherent story, albeit with subplots.” See Lawrence Stone, The Past and the 
Present Revisited (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981), quoted in Jack S. Levy, “Too Important to Leave to 
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conceptual perspective framed in the previous section and foremost seeks to determine whether 
and how the presidential decision-making element mattered in the course of the history of the 
republic’s foreign relations. The nature of the thesis’s research question concerns the degree of 
agency as opposed to the degree of determinism in Kazakhstan’s actions in the international 
milieu so it necessarily entails an ontological implication pertaining to the agent-structure 
debate.21 To this end, Geoffrey Roberts advocates the usefulness of historical approach in 
identifying the role of agency in the creation of historical phenomena, in particular when it 
comes to “rational, purposive, intentional actions.”22 Roberts further notes the applicability of a 
historical narrative method to studies of foreign policies since this approach can provide a 
detailed account from the agency’s perspective: “the story of action in narrative exemplifies and 
demonstrates the power and autonomy of agency and the actual effects of structures on action,” 
so he finds it to be “the great strength and contribution of diplomatic history within IR.”23 More 
generally, several authors, both in the history and international relations domains, have 
advocated the use of the historical approach in order to yield theoretically meaningful results in 
studies of foreign policy.24 For example, Alexander L. George specifically states that blending of 
historical and political science approaches is needed to study how and why policymakers make 
their decisions in the conduct of foreign affairs for “it is necessary to study what goes on in the 
                                                                                                                                                             
the Other: History and Political Science in the Study of International Relations,” International Security 22, no. 1 
(1997): 27, n.15. 
21 As Christopher Hill notes on the interplay of actors and structures: “Foreign policymaking is a complex process of 
interaction between many actors, differentially embedded in a wide range of different structures. Their interaction is 
a dynamic process, leading to the constant evolution of both actors and structures.” See Hill, The Changing Politics 
of Foreign Policy (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003), 28. On the general agent-structure 
discussion see the seminal article by Alexander E. Wendt, “The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations 
Theory,” International Organization 41 (1987): 335-370; and Walter Carlsnaes, “The Agency-Structure Problem in 
Foreign Policy Analysis,” International Studies Quarterly 36, no. 3 (1992): 245-270. 
22 Roberts, “History, Theory and the Narrative Turn in IR,” Review of International Studies 32, no. 4 (2006): 708. 
23 Ibid, 711. 
24 See, for example, Colin Elman, and Miriam Fendius Elman, eds., Bridges and Boundaries: Historians, Political 
Scientists, and the Study of International Relations (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2001), and Hidemi Suganami, 
“Narrative Explanation and International Relations: Back to Basics,” Millennium - Journal of International 
Studies 37, no. 2 (2008): 327-356. 
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‘black box’ of decision-making and strategic interaction, and not simply make assumptions about 
them, as do rational choice and game theories.”25  
Thus, the research approach for this thesis will employ a cross-disciplinary perspective in 
a sense that it will be a theory informed empirical study of specific episodes in the history of 
Kazakhstan’s foreign policymaking. As such, this work will focus more on the “understanding” 
of the phenomenon in question, rather than on its “explanation.”26 Understanding in Ngaire 
Woods’s epistemological classification refers to the study of a historical case as a narrative, 
search for its meaning and appreciating its origins, evolution, and consequences, while also 
permitting to draw conclusions about the occurring causal patterns.27 Jack S. Levy argues for a 
similar view on a historical narrative, suggesting that the purpose of such research is in 
description, understanding, and interpreting historical events or episodes.28  
Constructing a narrative around the decision-making aspect and its effects over the 
republic’s foreign policy output is somewhat comparable in its purpose to the process-tracing 
technique that focuses on the examination of “the decision process whereby initial conditions are 
translated into outcomes.”29 King et al. also note that a close study of the decision-making 
process, facilitated by the process-tracing method, is useful because it allows differentiating 
causal mechanisms most plausibly at work in a particular case.30 The narrative approach 
facilitates reconstructing the Kazakhstani policymaking through expositions of individual, 
institutional, and organizational aspects of decision-making processes, as well as approximating 
                                                 
25 George, “Knowledge for Statecraft: The Challenge for Political Science and History,” International Security 22, 
no. 1 (1997): 44.  
26 Ngaire Woods, “The Use of Theory in the Study of International Relations,” in Explaining international relations 
since 1945, ed. Ngaire Woods (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 9-31. Woods draws on Hollis and Smith’s 
division of an “inside” story telling and “outside” explanation. See Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, Explaining and 
Understanding International Relations (Oxford: Clarendon, 1991). 
For Woods, the purpose of understanding is to capture meaning rather than its cause, while the concept of 
explanation is to rigorously assert that “change in x caused y,” Woods, “The Use of Theory,” 11. This 
epistemological divide reflects on a general debate between a historical approach and a natural scientific approach. 
27 Woods, “The Use of Theory,” 11.  
28 Jack S. Levy, “Explaining Events and Developing Theories: History, Political Science, and the Analysis of 
International Relations,” in Elman and Elman, eds., Bridges and Boundaries, 41. 
29 Alexander L. George, and Timothy J. McKeown, “Case Studies and Theories of Organizational Decision 
Making,” Advances in Information Processing in Organizations 2 (1985): 35, quoted in Gary King, Robert O. 
Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1994), 226. 
30 Ibid, 227. 
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a general understanding of the role of the foreign policymaking factor in the conduct of 
Kazakhstan’s international affairs. After all, a narrative is a “story that ideally is also an 
explanation of why the event occurred.”31 Certainly, causality in a chronological narrative can 
only be inferred and the sequence of events may have developed due to other factors than those 
presumed in the model. Nonetheless, a narrative appears to be an effective method to study how 
and under what conditions a particular historical episode evolved. 
 
Research design and case selection 
The events of history are a laboratory in which to test assumptions about the interrelations of 
variables.32 The Kazakhstani diplomatic record, albeit not very long in historical perspective, 
provides a researcher with a variety of events for examination. The research design is organized 
around three case studies of such episodes of foreign policymaking.33 The three episodes – the 
balancing strategy elaboration; the nuclear dilemma resolution; and the Nagorno-Karabakh peace 
mission – were selected because they had varying degrees of salience for Almaty’s 
policymakers. The events in Kazakhstan’s diplomatic history are chosen on the basis of the 
importance of the issue, in response to which a particular foreign policymaking process has 
evolved in each instance. Two episodes when the republic’s leadership dealt with existential, 
strategic matters are investigated along with the case where political and security stakes were 
significantly lower, if existent at all.  
In this regard a typology of decisional situations, developed by Charles F. Hermann, 
serves as an operationalization guide for differentiating between foreign policy issues depending 
on their salience for policymakers.34 Hermann’s typology ranges from crisis situations to 
administrative situations based on the following criteria: high or low threat to national values; 
                                                 
31 Gary Goertz, and Jack S. Levy, “Causal Explanation, Necessary Conditions, and Case Studies,” in Goertz and 
Levy, eds, Explaining War and Peace, 23.  
32 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, “The Benefits of a Social-Scientific Approach to Studying International Affairs,” in 
Explaining International Relations, ed. Ngaire Woods (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 53. 
33 “A case study is a detailed examination of an event (or series of events) which the analyst believes exhibits (or 
exhibit) the operation of some identified theoretical principle.” See Clyde J. Mitchell, “Case and situation analysis,” 
Sociological Review 31, no. 2 (1983): 192.  
34 Hermann, Crises in Foreign Policy: A Simulation Analysis (Indianapolis: Center of International Studies, 
Princeton University, 1969). 
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short or long time to make a decision; and, the extent of surprise or anticipation of a policy 
issue.35 Through application of the above criteria to the episodes of the Kazakhstani diplomatic 
history it is possible to render cases of nuclear disarmament and of the development of nation’s 
geopolitical strategy as the highest salience crisis decisional situations since they touched upon 
the existential matters for the republic; they were not and could not be anticipated (similarly as 
the collapse of the Soviet Union that brought these problems to existence was not anticipated); 
and because an immediate policy planning was required in both cases. Meanwhile, the Nagorno-
Karabakh peace initiative can be considered as a polar, administrative situation, wherein it was 
not a surprise development for Almaty and it did not pose a threat to the republic, although the 
timing for policymaking was short due to the fast deterioration of the situation on the ground in 
the conflicting region. The former two stand out as problems of equal salience. Their similarity 
allows for a measure of control when compared against the latter case of the Nagorno-Karabakh 
issue, which was deemed relatively less important by Nazarbayev.36  
 
Research instruments and data collection37  
 
Archival documents 
A research project dealing with a foreign policy of a country can be significantly enriched 
through the use of primary sources from this country.38 Primary sources indicate the original 
source material on a historical event, including all contemporary evidences about the event; 
                                                 
35 Depending on the configuration of the above criteria the foreign policy issue may represent a crisis situation, 
innovative situation, inertia situation, reflexive situation, deliberative situation, routinized situation, and 
administrative situation. Ibid, 415. 
36 The method of “controlled comparison” calls for comparison of “most similar” cases that are comparable in all 
respects except for the independent variable, whose variance may account for the cases having different outcomes 
on the dependent variable. Alexander L. George and A. Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the 
Social Sciences (Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 2005), 81. 
37 This section draws in large part from Deborah Welch Larson’s 2001 work “Sources and Methods in Cold War 
History: The Need for a New Theory-Based Archival Approach,” in Elman and Elman, eds., Bridges and 
Boundaries, 327-350. Her work is selected for its close correspondence with the research aim of this thesis. Another 
guide on the use of archival resources in foreign policy research is Marc Trachtenberg, The Craft of International 
History: A Guide to Method (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006).  
38 See George, “Knowledge for Statecraft”; also Larson, “Sources and Methods.”  
 16 
 
secondary sources refer to any other materials written in the subsequent time.39 In reference to 
primary sources Deborah Welch Larson presents compelling cases for the use of archival 
documents in identification of policymaking processes underlying historical events.40 Larson’s 
main argument is that the documentary evidence allows a researcher to examine the world 
through the eyes of policymakers and to reconstruct their calculations and deliberations.41 It is 
possible to expose the issues that most alarmed policymakers since it is often in the reaction to 
concerns and threats that many documents are produced. Such reconstructions can help to better 
understand how various factors continually influenced policy formation thus revealing causal 
mechanisms behind foreign policy decisions. 
In contrast to secondary sources, primary evidence provides a more veracious account of 
events: “private remarks are more revealing than ghostwritten speeches; and diaries are more 
reliable than memoirs written many years later.”42 Douglas Stuart notes: “One of the greatest 
challenges for scholars interested in systematic study of foreign policy decision-making is to 
distinguish between self-serving memoirs by former political insiders and reliable source of 
information about high-level decision-making.”43 To this end, memoranda and letters relatively 
accurately reflect policymakers’ perceptions and interpretations of the world around them that 
they had held at the time of writing, while not being affected by hindsight.44 Another point can 
be made that the study of official internal documents, which remained undisclosed for some time 
after being written, allows a researcher to possibly reveal what policymakers were really 
                                                 
39 Cameron G. Thies, “A Pragmatic Guide to Qualitative Historical Analysis in the Study of International 
Relations,” International Studies Perspectives 3, no. 4 (2002): 356. 
40 See Larson, Anatomy of Mistrust, 37-38; and “Sources and Methods,” 337-343. 
41 Larson encourages analysts to conduct their own archival research instead of referring solely to secondary historic 
accounts in order to mitigate the effects of selectivity and bias in historian’s works. See Larson, “Sources and 
Methods,” 337-343. Whereas this suggestion makes sense in reference to the US diplomatic history, professional 
historical monographs on Kazakhstani diplomatic history remain unwritten. 
42 Ibid, 338. 
43 Stuart, “Foreign Policy Decision-Making,” 578. 
44 Larson, “Sources and Methods,” 339-340. Consider also the following observation about Soviet leadership’s 
perceptions: “The fact that political actors during or after the event claim to have acted in response to changes in 
material pressures might conceivably reflect earlier changes in ways of thinking that led them to see these pressures 
in a new light. Or, even if their preferences did not change, Soviet decision-makers’ beliefs about the world may 
have changed in other ways that relatively quickly led them to reevaluate which material things really mattered to 
them.” See Brooks and Wohlforth, “Power, Globalization,” 227. 
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thinking on a subject matter and what ideas they were sharing with each other as compared to 
rhetoric and discussions on occasions when they were exposed to public.45 
Larson directs analysts at the type of documentation they should look for in search of 
primary sources contemporaneous to the policymaking episodes: “At the decision-making level, 
the causal mechanisms include beliefs, explanations, calculations, deductions, predictions, 
motivations which have observable indicators such as memos, speeches, and the minutes of 
meetings.”46 Kazakhstan’s foreign policymaking establishments produced official documents 
quite analogous to the American ones in Larson’s description. These are currently stored in the 
Archive of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan (Arkhiv Prezidenta Respubliki 
Kazakhstan-APRK), which was formed in 1994 on the basis of the Central State Archive of the 
Newest History and is located in Almaty.47 It stores documents sourced from the top state 
institutions of the Soviet and post-Soviet eras. The filing system used in the APRK is identical to 
the systems in Soviet and Russian archives, basic archival categories in Russian are Fond, Opis, 
Delo. The majority of archival material of the studied period is written in Russian, other 
documents are in Kazakh and various foreign languages. The following descriptions by Patricia 
Kennedy Grimsted are attributed to the archival terms used in Russia and correctly define the 
corresponding terms in the Kazakhstani archival system: 1) Fond designates an integral group of 
records from a single office or source, usually arranged as they were created in their office of 
origin; 2) Opis is a numbered hierarchical subdivisions within a fond that list all of the files or 
storage units; 3) Delo is a reference to a file or a storage unit.48  
The bulk of official documentation that relates to the Kazakhstani diplomatic history is 
stored in the following fonds: Fond 7 – the President of the Kazakh SSR; Fond 5N – the 
Apparatus of the President and the Cabinet of the Ministers of the Republic of Kazakhstan; Fond 
                                                 
45 Larson, Anatomy of Mistrust, 37. 
46 Larson, “Sources and Methods,” 335. 
47 For the reflections about the work of a foreign researcher in the APRK see Steven A. Barnes, “Hits and Misses in 
the Archives of Kazakhstan,” in Adventures in Russian Historical Research: Reminiscences of American Scholars 
from the Cold War to the Present, eds. Samuel H. Baron and Cathy A. Frierson (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2003), 
255-264. 
48 Grimsted, Archives of Russia Five Years After:”Purveyors of Sensations” or “Shadows Cast to the Past”? 
(Amsterdam: International Institute of Social History, 1997). 
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75N – the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Fond 166N – the Centre 
for Strategic Studies under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan. In addition, personal 
fonds of high-ranking diplomats Kassym-Zhomart Tokaev and Mikhail Isinaliev contain highly 
relevant information.49 In general, it is a relatively uncomplicated procedure to obtain permission 
to work in the APRK with only few necessary documents relating to the professional affiliation 
of a researcher and the research subject needing to be submitted to the Archive’s office.50 
 
Triangulation51 
Though documentary evidence from the archives is considered as a basis of empirical data for 
this thesis, it is advisable to corroborate the archival material with other primary and secondary 
sources. As Larson notes: “it is important to interpret documents within their historic, situational, 
and communication context. We need to understand the purpose of a document and the events 
leading up to it in order to interpret its meaning correctly.”52 Non-archival materials are helpful 
in establishing such context – after all, “you reach a judgment…the same way you make any 
historical judgment: namely, by looking at as much evidence as you can.”53 For this reason, the 
author of this thesis has also consulted contemporaneous news reports and public speeches, 
examined memoirs of politicians and conducted interviews with persons who held high and 
medium level positions in Almaty’s foreign policymaking establishments in the 1990s. 
Kazakhstanskaia Pravda and Egemen Qazaqstan are the two government newspapers, in 
Russian and Kazakh correspondingly, which have published official speeches, news releases, 
and commentaries. The Nexis UK service was used to source English-language news and 
                                                 
49 Russian letter N designates independence in Russian (Nezavisimost’) and indicates fonds of the post-Soviet 
period. Whereas holders of general admission cards are permitted to access official fonds, they need to secure 
permission to access personal fonds from the source person himself or, in case of his death, of his immediate 
relatives. This thesis contains documents from Mikhail Isinaliev’s personal fond (175NL), access to which was 
kindly granted by his widow, Mrs. Maia Isinalieva.  
50 For detailed information on access to the APRK see “Reading room rules,” APRK, accessed 5 June 2011, 
http://www.aprk.kz/en/general/reading-room. 
51 Triangulation is “a process of using multiple perceptions to clarify meaning, verifying the repeatability of an 
observation or interpretation.” Norman K. Denzin, and Yvonna S. Lincoln, Handbook of Qualitative Research 
(Thousand Oaks, Calif: Sage Publications, 2000), 443. This method actuates the use of different data sources and 
may involve both inter-method and intra-method triangulation of data. 
52 Larson, “Sources and Methods,” 343.  
53 Trachtenberg, Craft of International History, 155. 
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broadcasts. Such information acknowledged the open, public positions of the republic’s state 
bodies on specific foreign policy issues. The most voluminous collection of president 
Nazarbayev’s speeches from 1990 till present can be found online at his personal webpage under 
the rubric “The Chronicles of the Activities of the President,” which was set up in 2013.54 This 
collection made possible to content analyze president’s public declarations in order to identify 
which internal official documents, now stored in the archives, have been used in the preparation 
of these texts and correspondingly identify policy institutions which had prepared them. Because 
of the nascence of the independent Kazakhstan, memoirs and autobiographies have not yet 
become a popular genre and are generally scarce. Books by Nursultan Nazarbayev, Kassym-
Zhomart Tokaev, Mikhail Isinaliev, and Salim Kurmanguzhin are possibly the only few 
available memoirs of foreign policymakers in Kazakhstan at the time of writing.55 Fragmented 
recollections of other decision-makers of the time, occasionally found in media and other 
secondary sources, complemented the information from the abovementioned memoirs. Historical 
accounts of decision-makers contain many details important for reconstructing policymaking 
episodes; they can also reflect decision-maker’s views (at least public ones) on a particular 
international issue.  
 
Interviews 
Interviewing is an effective method for understanding the perceptions of participants of events or 
learning how participants come to attribute a particular meaning to a phenomenon or event.56 For 
this thesis, the interviews were arranged in a semi-standardized format where an interview is 
guided by the set of predetermined questions and topics but an interviewee has the opportunity to 
                                                 
54 See “The Chronicles of the Activities of the President,” Nursultan Nazarbayev’ personal website, 
http://personal.akorda.kz/ru/category/hronika_deyatelnosti. 
55 Nazarbayev, Na poroge XXI veka (Almaty: Oner, 1996), Epitsentr Mira (Astana: Elorda, 2001), Kriticheskoe 
Desiatiletie (Almaty: Atamura, 2003); Tokaev, Pod Stiagom,  Preodolenie (Almaty: SAK, 2003), Svet i Ten’ 
(Astana: Astana poligrafiia, 2007); Isinaliev, Zapiski Diplomata (Almaty: Atamura, 1998); Kurmanguzhin, 45 let na 
Diplomaticheskoi Sluzhbe (Almaty: Zhibek Zholy, 2003). 
56 Bruce L. Berg, Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences. 6th ed. (Boston, MA: Allyn and Bacon, 
2007), 97. 
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elaborate beyond given answers.57 Only written notes were taken at the interviews, as 
audio/video recording devices are usually not welcomed at tête-à-tête meetings in Kazakhstan. 
Interviewees were divided in two groups: one group consisted of persons (including several 
high-ranking officials of the presidential administration and the foreign ministry) who have 
either personally been involved in policymaking during the studied period or have worked in 
foreign policymaking bodies; the second group consisted of experts on Kazakhstan’s foreign 
affairs matters who have published extensively on the topic.58 Personal and professional 
acquaintance with prospective interviewees, career record in the president’s administration, and a 
doctoral affiliation with a well-known UK university have facilitated access to knowledgeable 
individuals. 
 
Participant observation 
An in-depth understanding of the state of affairs in the studied nation’s political establishments 
facilitates a more sophisticated interpretation and analysis of the obtained primary and secondary 
material. For example, George and Bennett’s dictum suggests: 
In studying the outputs of a complex policymaking system, the investigator is well advised to 
work with a sophisticated model or set of assumptions regarding ways in which different 
policies are made in that system. For example, which actors and agencies are the most 
influential in a particular issue are? To whom does the leader turn for critical information and 
advice on a given type of policy problem? How do status differences and power variables 
affect the behaviour of different advisers and participants in high-level policymaking?59  
 
However, given the sensitivity attached to policymaking practices in Kazakhstan this is a 
challenging task.60 To this end, the author’s personal experience of working in the analytical 
department of the presidential administration for one and a half years immediately prior to 
commencing doctoral study was utilized as a valuable additional research instrument similar in 
essence to the participant-observation technique. The participant-observer assumes different 
                                                 
57 Ibid, 93-95. 
58 In total 16 interviews were conducted. See Appendix I. 
59 George and Bennett, Case Studies, 100. 
60 The implications of treatment of the topic with caution are elaborated below. 
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roles within a case study situation and may participate in the events being studied.61 Although 
the author did not participate in the decision-making episodes under examination, the work 
experience in the top policymaking organization provided many insights about inner workings of 
the state. In particular, the author gained an insider’s knowledge about the unofficial political 
and bureaucratic hierarchies; formal and informal information and communication flows; 
operational and organizational norms and codes adopted in Kazakhstan. The practical familiarity 
with formal and informal processes and mechanisms relevant to foreign policymaking enhanced 
the author’s general understanding of the topic and allowed to assess archival documents in a 
more informed way. 
 
Challenges and limitations 
Note on reflexivity 
Considering the fact that the author comes from the studied region and has worked in the 
institutions which are examined in the thesis, certain perceptual biases have inevitably surfaced 
whilst undertaking this research and could have adversely affected the inquiry. This effect is 
because “a researcher’s background and position will affect what they choose to investigate, the 
angle of investigation, the methods judged most adequate for this purpose, the findings 
considered most appropriate, and the framing and communication of conclusions.”62 Therefore, 
in order to minimize the potential impact of the element of subjectivity it was important to 
acknowledge its presence and consider in what ways the author’s preconceptions could have 
affected the research.  
The author was born in the KazakhSSR and after the Union’s fall lived, was educated, 
and worked in the independent Kazakhstan for most of his life. Moreover, for several years the 
author was a state employee in governmental institutions, including the president’s 
administration, working on foreign policy and security analysis. Such circumstances of the 
                                                 
61 Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods (London: Sage, 2008), 111-112. 
62 Kirsti Malterud, “Qualitative Research: Standards, Challenges, and Guidelines,” Lancet 358, no. 9280 (2001): 
483-484. 
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author’s personal, academic, and professional socialization have left a particular imprint on his 
mentality and worldviews. Therefore, the subjectivity element could manifest at different stages 
of the work on this dissertation and consequently obscure the research. First, the inclination 
towards the inside-out perspective in approaching Kazakhstan’s foreign policy can be partially 
related to the author’s professional habit developed in the presidential administration, where 
policy analysis had to be made from the point of view of the republic’s interests. Second, the 
author’s sense of national self-identification with the young republic and patriotic sentiments 
could induce sympathetic or even apologetic normative treatment of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy 
record. Third, the author’s subconscious association with fellow countrymen in policymaking 
structures of the beginning of the 1990s and solidarity feelings with some of these senior 
colleagues, which had developed during work in the state institutions, could also affect the 
objectivity in assessment of their actions and deliberations. 
In addition to being cognizant about biases and preconceptions, in order to lessen their 
impact, the author sought to closely follow the methods of scientific inquiry and observe the 
principles of academic integrity. This was particularly important for selection of data on 
Kazakhstan’s foreign policy. With primary sources, all efforts were taken to access and integrate 
all relevant documents into the analysis. With secondary sources, the majority of the literature 
consulted in this dissertation was of the Western origin, which has provided for a more balanced 
and holistic assessment of the subject matter.  
 
Fieldwork challenges 
The main challenging and limiting factors of the fieldwork component arose from the fact that 
topics of foreign policy and governmental policymaking are considered to be sensitive in 
Kazakhstan and, much in the Soviet fashion of not disclosing information related to politics or 
security, are not always freely discussed in depth.63 As one interviewee, a former state employee, 
                                                 
63 In particular, collecting data on the nuclear disarmament episode was a challenging endeavour in terms of gaining 
primary information. 
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told the author: “if the West knows how decisions are arrived at in the republic then it becomes 
possible to influence these decisions.”64 A possible explanation of this situation is that most of 
the knowledgeable persons and actual participants of policymaking events have been 
professionally socialized in such organizations of the USSR governmental apparatus like the 
Kazakhstan Communist Party Central Committee or the Union foreign ministry, and continue to 
practice the Soviet bureaucratic culture of closeness, especially to the outsider affiliated with a 
foreign institution. 
Such treatment of the subject under examination resulted in several repercussions for data 
collection, oral testimonies in particular. First, some of the prospective interviewees have 
declined continuous requests for interviews stating a variety of reasons for refusal. The 
justifications for not being able to meet were never grounded on the sensitivity of the topic. 
Instead, such neutral reasons as schedule conflicts or cancelled trips on Astana-Almaty route 
were sounded. Second, many interviewees who have agreed to meet, particularly those who held 
high-ranking positions in Kazakhstan in the 1990s, would refrain from sharing a personal vision 
and interpretation of policy issues, and prefer to replicate the official positions and accounts of 
the events, or, occasionally, sharing the information with the provision that it will not be shared 
in any form, even anonymously. To overcome this suspiciousness the author explicitly presented 
the research project as an academic exercise, and not a journalist investigation.  
The sensitivity of the topic has also impaired the ease of access to primary information. 
For example, all versions of the official concepts of foreign policy of Kazakhstan, first endorsed 
in 1995, remain state secrets. Moreover, although the APRK provides an invaluable opportunity 
to work with the original state documentation, some reservations concerning accessibility and 
completeness of archival materials have to be made. In general, researchers encounter certain 
difficulties in gaining access to and working with government and personal documents, which 
relate to the initial period of the republic's independence and stored in the archive. Access may 
                                                 
64 High-ranking government official, name withheld by request, interview with author, Astana, 25 October 2011. 
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only be gained to the selected documents that do not remain classified as secret, for “official use 
only” (the stamp for such documents is the abbreviation in Russian DSP – dlia sluzhebnogo 
pol’zovaniia), or “not for publication in the open literature” (the stamp for such documents in 
Russian is ne podlezhit oglasheniiu).65 Although remaining accessible documents are relatively 
well systematized and the APRK’s staff is efficient in assisting researchers, many documents 
were not included in the files by sourcing government institutions. George and Bennett warn 
researchers about the degree of evidentiary value of archival documents and advise them that 
accessible documents may represent only a part of the whole picture.66 Often only selected 
documents from the entire “paper trail” relating to a policymaking episode are opened to the 
public. Moreover, the meaning of the content of the available documents can be intentionally 
distorted by their authors for various self-serving reasons.67 Marc Trachtenberg makes a similar 
remark:  
The most damaging material might not appear in the published diplomatic documents, no 
matter how important in historical terms. Key documents might be withdrawn before particular 
files are made available to the public. Or documents might be released in what is called 
‘sanitized’ (i.e., redacted) form. The heart of the problem here is that since we are interested 
above all in the government behaviour, we have to rely mainly on the sort of material that helps 
us understand why governments did what they did, namely, documents produced by, and thus 
controlled by, the governments themselves.68 
 
These observations, made largely in reference to the US and European archives, can be 
extrapolated to the situation with the Kazakhstani archives. Researchers who choose to study 
Kazakhstan’s diplomatic history are left with narrow and sometimes random selection of 
archival documents. For example, the author of the thesis often encountered a situation where a 
follow-up document and appendix, expected to be included in the same delo with the original 
                                                 
65 De facto any policy document produced in the president’s administration and not stored in the archive is at 
minimum kept to the standards of the DSP classification. For guidelines on restriction categories used to handle 
documents in Kazakhstan see “Formal and Informal Restrictive Information Categories in the FSU/Russian 
Federation,” Susan L. Maret, Federation of American Scientists, accessed 10 October 2013, 
http://www.fas.org/irp/world/russia/maret.pdf. 
66 George and Bennett, Case Studies, 99-105.  
Apart from the scarcity of documentary evidence, other authors raise the issue of nonverbal communication of key 
individuals that may steer the decision-making: “Silence on the part of a leader may be interpreted as consent by one 
member of a decisional unit and as lack of support by someone else in the group. The ‘real’ decision may be made 
after the meeting was adjourned, or it may have been made before the meeting even started.” See Stuart, “Foreign 
Policy Decision-Making,” 587. 
67 George and Bennett, Case Studies, 99-105. 
68 Trachtenberg, Craft of International History, 157. 
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document, was found in a different delo or even fond, or not found at all. It was therefore a 
necessary practice to cross-examine files sourced from different departments of the president’s 
administration and the foreign ministry. Meanwhile, until spring 2013, researchers in the APRK 
were not allowed to use copying devices or computers in the reading room, and could only take 
handwritten notes, which had to be checked in daily to a member of the staff. This rule lead to 
technical difficulties in processing what was often an undersystematized collection of documents 
from various fonds and delos. Considering abovementioned difficulties and a sheer volume of 
original documents, the work in the APRK comprised the major part of the field work for this 
thesis and was conducted for five months in 2012, and for five months in 2013.  
An important factor that facilitated the author’s access to both primary and secondary 
information was the relative temporal remoteness of the studied episodes. For example, more 
relevant archival documents would have been impossible to access in the APRK. De jure, a 15 
years non-access time period rule for the disclosure of government documents is enforced in the 
APRK. De facto, the “access embargo” is even longer – non-secret internal official documents 
are declassified at the end of a 15-20 year time period. As such, in spring 2013, only documents 
produced before 1995 in the foreign ministry and the president’s administration were available 
for general researchers. 
 
Research limitations 
To conclude, the amount of available primary information on the Kazakhstani foreign 
policymaking in the 1990s remains limited, rendering historical reconstructions to be somewhat 
fragmented.69 Currently, it seems impossible to reach the level of data saturation comparable to 
the US cases of Cuban missile crisis decision-making or the British Cabinet foreign policies 
                                                 
69 It is nearly impossible to obtain certain information, such as Nazarbayev's appointment log. This document would 
have supplemented the analysis of the president's advisory teams. Stalin's appointment log, for example, was used 
extensively in the historical literature. See Anatolii Chernobaev, Na prieme u Stalina: tetradi (zhurnaly) zapisei lits, 
priniatykh I.V. Stalinym 1924-1953 gg. (Moscow: Novii Chronograph, 2010).  
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during the 1940s.70 Even in cases where primary information seems to be sufficient and 
comprehensive it is not possible to reconstruct a fully accurate picture of the decision-making 
process. To be sure, such a goal often seems unattainable even for policymakers themselves. 
Recall John F. Kennedy’s statement: “The essence of ultimate decision remains impenetrable to 
the observer – often, indeed, to the decider himself….There will always be the dark and tangled 
stretches in the decision-making process – mysterious even to those who may be most intimately 
involved.”71 Therefore, this thesis does not entertain any ambition to make a full and detailed 
portrayal of policymaking episodes; instead it aims to explore theoretically relevant decisional 
patterns in order to forge an understanding of the role of presidential decision-making in the 
course of realization of the republic’s foreign strategy. 
 
Thesis outline 
The preceding section of the introductory chapter explained and justified research approach and 
design employed in the thesis. In particular, it explicated the rationale for integrating the 
historical narrative approach to a theory based study of foreign policymaking, explained 
selection criteria for cases, advocated the necessity to use primary resources, reported data 
collection methods, and discussed the research project’s limitations. 
The next chapter assesses the state of the current scholarly discussion of the phenomenon 
of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy in order to situate this research in a larger context of the growing 
body of literature on Kazakhstan. Given the limited amount of works devoted specifically to the 
topic, the chapter consults the broader literature that analyzes the republic’s foreign affairs from 
tangential perspectives, including regional matters and Innenpolitik factors. 
                                                 
70 While studying the latter subject, Christopher Hill commented: “The archives teem with relevant sources, both in 
the great store of public records and the private papers of innumerable former Cabinet ministers. The evolution of 
policy can often be studied on a day-by-day, even an hour-by-hour, basis.” See Hill, Cabinet Decisions on Foreign 
Policy: The British Experience, October1938-June1941 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), xvii. 
71 Graham T. Allison used Kennedy’s quotation as an epigraph that inspired the title of his work. 
See Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971). 
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Chapter III constructs theoretical guidelines for the thesis and develops an inquiry model 
in order to approach the main argument of this thesis, which holds that the Kazakhstani foreign 
policy was not solely (pre)determined by international systemic pressures and that domestic 
factors, particularly the presidential decision-making element, have to be incorporated in the 
understanding of the phenomenon. The chapter’s main objective is to find theoretical grounds to 
synthesize main conceptual presumptions of neoclassical realism with the presidential decision-
making component elaborated by the foreign policy analysis school.  
The focus then shifts to the presentation of empirical material gathered during the 
fieldwork in Kazakhstan. Chapter IV reveals the meaning and rationale used by Nazarbayev and 
his advisory team behind notions of multivectorism and balancing. In doing so, the chapter also 
enquires whether an argument commonly found in the secondary literature, that the republic’s 
foreign policy was driven by the defensive rationale, holds its merits. A subsequent section of the 
chapter follows a story of bureaucratic competition among foreign policymaking establishments 
that took place in 1993. The third section on Nazarbayev’s personal commitment to resolution of 
problems with China and diplomatic manoeuvring with Russia elucidates operational and 
analytical aspects of the president’s foreign policymaking.  
Chapter V examines nuclear decision-making in the December 1991 – May 1992 period. 
It reviews situational variables affecting Nazarbayev’s course of action and discusses policy 
options articulated during the period. Empirical evidence is examined against the premise that 
Nazarbayev’s evasive denuclearization policy, the product of group decision-making by 
president and his advisory team, was an intricate strategy aimed at maximizing the republic’s 
interests under pressing international conditions. The inference is primarily supported by the 
analysis of archival documents produced in Almaty during this episode. 
Chapter VI studies a small-scale, non-strategic foreign policy issue of the involvement of 
Kazakhstan in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolution process in 1992. It reconstructs the 
dynamic situational context for Almaty policymakers conditioned by the growing pressure from 
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the CSCE Minsk group. The chapter illuminates decision-making for a low-salience issue and 
examines if it is procedurally different from a process for high-salience issues. 
The concluding chapter discusses the thesis’s findings against the backdrop of the 
existing empirical material on Kazakhstan and theoretical frameworks designed to study 
countries’ foreign policies. This chapter draws generalizations about foreign policymaking 
apparatus of the republic on the basis of the materials from the case studies. It also assesses the 
accuracy of the estimates of other observers on Kazakhstani foreign policy in the light of the 
presented empirical evidence and evaluates the applicability of the neoclassical realist conceptual 
lens to the study of Kazakhstan. Some suggestions are made on possible future directions of the 
research on Kazakhstan and, more broadly, on politics of the post-Soviet Central Asia. 
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Chapter II: Conceptualization, operationalizaiton, and explanation of 
Kazakhstan’s foreign policy 
 
 
One established Kazakh scholar poses a question: “Well, multivectorism – is it a blessing or the 
forced necessity, a freewill choice or an astute strategy?”72 The answer, as elusive as it may 
come, is fundamental to understanding Kazakhstan’s foreign policy. In the existing literature on 
Central Asia and Kazakhstan there seems to be a consensus in conceiving Kazakhstan’s foreign 
policy as a rational and pragmatic strategy devised by state’s leadership as a reaction to the 
challenges imposed by international and domestic environments. This consensus in effect 
implies a “forced necessity” discourse. At the same time, although the phenomenon of 
Kazakhstan’s foreign policy has been the focus of research interest for as long as such a policy 
existed, there is a surprisingly low number of academic works that produce empirically detailed 
and theoretically grounded examinations of the subject.  
In general, the literature dealing exclusively with the analysis of Kazakhstani foreign 
policy is fragmented and scarce. Reuel R. Hanks, in a September 2009 article that examines the 
nature of Kazakhstan’s multivectorism, notes that he was unable to find a single scholarly work 
that would provide a detailed analysis of the evolution of multivectorism or asses it from the 
geopolitical viewpoint.73 A collateral indicator of the scarcity of sources on the republic’s 
foreign policy is virtual absence of a comprehensive literature review on the subject. While there 
are reviews on Central Asian security and geopolitics, debate on Kazakhstan’s foreign policy has 
not been thoroughly synthesized and analyzed.74 For example, a doctoral dissertation by Daniela 
Passolt on the republic’ foreign strategies towards Russia, China, and Central Asia does not 
include a separate assessment of the literature on Kazakhstan’s foreign policy.75 Secondary data 
on the subject is integrated into the body of the dissertation instead. The scarcity of the literature 
                                                 
72 Murat Laumulin, “Triumf mnogovektornosti,” Kontinent 15, no. 176 (2006): 25. 
73 Hanks, “‘Multi-Vector Politics’ and Kazakhstan's Emerging Role as a Geo-strategic Player in Central Asia,” 
Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 11, no. 3 (2009): 257. 
74 For general reviews of studies of regional geopolitics see Laumulin, Tsentral’naia Aziia. Vol.3; and Murat 
Laumulin, Tsentral’naia Aziia v Zarubezhnoi Politologii i Mirovoi Geopolitike. Vol. 1 (Almaty: KISI, 2005). 
75 Passolt, “Kazakhstan's Foreign Policy.” 
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is nonetheless also recognized by Passolt: “Due to the limited number of sources dealing with 
Kazakhstan's foreign policy, a large part of the data in this thesis was gathered from primary 
source materials such as government publications.”76 
Existing works are centred on several preconceptions that may entail unnecessary 
restrictive understandings of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy. Firstly, the majority of authors “black 
box” the issue in the neorealist tradition by treating Kazakhstan as a rational, unitary actor 
mechanistically responding to constraints in the international system. Thereby the republic’s 
policies are deemed as ideal responses to the challenges and opportunities imposed by the 
international environment. Under this view Kazakhstan has never initiated or pursued anomalous 
or flawed strategies. The republic’s foreign policy model has been optimal throughout and 
closely tracked the structural constraints and opportunities. Here, the conceptualization of 
Kazakhstan as a unitary actor implies that the republic is anthropomorphized in the analysis. 
Such an approach simplifies the explanation, as there is no need to examine the policymaking 
properties of the state.77 The second preconception, analytically interrelated with the previous, is 
that Kazakhstan, in formulating and implementing its foreign policy, is not perceived as an actor, 
but rather as an “acted upon” unit in a wider context of Central Asian regionalism and Great 
Game stratagems. Thirdly, a large volume of literature that does look below the state-unit level, 
explains the republic’s policy from the Innenpolitik perspectives on state-building, examining the 
processes of consolidation of national identity and statehood. This focus, although justifiable in 
many respects, leaves a reader with the idea that main determinants of Kazakhstan’s foreign 
policy are found domestically and that international considerations of the republic’s leadership 
have secondary importance. The Innenpolitik analyses also prevail in the studies of other Central 
                                                 
76 Ibid, 44. 
77 As John A. Vasquez warns: “It is obviously an anthropomorphic error to speak of a state’s perceptions, as in 
‘France perceived.’ One usually takes this to mean that the official foreign policy decisionmakers ‘perceived.’ 
However, it may be the case…that different domestic decisionmakers have different perceptions....This can result in 
a very idiographic analysis, and once one goes in that direction, then a potentially large body of ad hoc propositions 
is available to save an explanation from discrepant evidence.” See Vasquez, “Kuhn vs. Lakatos? The Case for 
Multiple Frames in Appraising IR Theory,” in Progress in International Relations Theory: Appraising the Field, 
eds. Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2003), 437. 
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Asian nations’ foreign policies as a brief assessment below will demonstrate. Fourthly, rare 
studies that do scheme foreign policymaking actors and institutions do not pass beyond a 
descriptive portrayal of governmental institutions and leave the question of how exactly the 
properties of the republic’s policymaking processes may affect specific foreign policy outputs 
underexplored.78 In general, with the exception of Passolt’s work,79 the integration of the 
policymaking variable into the analysis of Kazakhstan’s foreign relations has not been attempted 
in the existing literature thus far. Neither does there exist literature that examines, in detail, the 
structure and process of Kazakhstan’s presidential foreign policy decision-making by itself. 
Taking abovementioned points as a guide through the existing literature, this chapter 
follows the academic discussion on what constitutes Kazakhstan’s foreign policy – what is the 
scholarly consensus or debate on the policy’s rationale and aims; what international and 
domestic factors are believed to have impacted the most on the republic’s external strategies; in 
what instances the aspect of Nazarbayev’s foreign policymaking could have added the 
explanatory value to the analysis, yet has been left overlooked. 
 
Republic of Kazakhstan as a “black box”: structural perspectives and the Great Game 
narratives 
System-level interpretations of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy imply its reactive and deterministic 
nature. As such, structural models may provide plausible conceptual frameworks to study major 
foreign policy orientations of the republic. The neorealist logic explaining a state’s external 
behaviour underscores the importance of relative power capabilities under the conditions of the 
anarchical structure of the international system. The principal interrelated assumption is made 
that states put the highest premium on security matters since they, “at a minimum, seek their own 
                                                 
78 Omurserik Kasenov, “The Institutions and Conduct of the Foreign policy of the Postcommunist Kazakhstan,” in 
The Making of Foreign policy in Russia and the New States of Eurasia, eds. Adeed Dawisha and Karen Dawisha 
(Armonk: M.E.Sharpe, 1995), 263-285; Rafis Abazov, “Practice of Foreign Policymaking: The formation of post-
Soviet politics in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan,” NATO Research Fellowships Programme 1996-1998 
(1998), http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/96-98/abasov.pdf; and Foreign Policy Formation in Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan: Perceptions and Expert Assessments (Victoria, Australia: Contemporary Europe 
Research Centre, 2000); and Passolt, “Kazakhstan's Foreign Policy.” 
79 Passolt, “Kazakhstan's Foreign Policy.” 
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preservation and, at a maximum, drive for universal domination.”80 Therefore, structural models 
hold major explanatory power when foreign policies in question concern “high politics” – 
security, sovereignty, power and other elements of national interest. Seen this way, Kazakhstan’s 
foreign policy was predetermined by the need to search for opportunities to maximize its interest 
and to balance in order to ensure its survival in the hostile international environment formed in 
the post-cold war world. 
A great portion of the existing literature on Kazakhstan’s foreign policy has focused on 
precisely these fundamental national interests: sovereignty and security.81 The geostrategic 
location of Kazakhstan, which at the inception of independence found itself landlocked between 
Russia and China, is seen as the principal factor that could potentially threaten national interest. 
Omurserik Kasenov, one of Nazarbayev’s key advisers, who directly contributed to foreign 
policymaking in the 1990s, unambiguously described main strategic concerns of Kazakhstan: 
“At the apex of Kazakhstan's threat hierarchy are two geographically proximate states, Russia 
and China. Each possesses great economic and military potential, including nuclear weapons. If 
one of these states should put forward territorial claims on Kazakhstan, serious defence problems 
would arise.”82 Echoing Kasenov’s concerns, S. Frederick Starr elaborates on these “formidable 
security challenges” from Russia and “grave threats” from China that Kazakhstan faced in the 
                                                 
80 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., 1979), 118. 
81 See, for example, Kasenov, Main Results and “Institutions and Conduct”; Vitalii N. Khliupin, “Natsional’naia 
Bezopasnost’ i Geopoliticheskoe Polozhenie Respubliki Kazakhstan: Analiz Vneshnepoliticheskih Faktorov” (PhD 
diss., Kazakh National University, 1996); Nazarbayev, Na Poroge. 2nd. ed.; Tokaev, Pod Stiagom; Murat Laumulin, 
Kazakhstan v Sovremennikh Mezhdunarodnikh Otnosheniiakh: Bezopasnost’, Gepolitika, Politilogiia (Almaty: 
KISI, 1999); Marat Tazhin, “Natsional'naia bezopasnost' Kazakhstana: Novoe ponimanie, Novye Podkhody,” 
Analytic 1 (October, 2000): 7-10; Maulen Ashimbayev, Bezopasnost’ Kazakhstana na Sovremennom Etape. Stat’i, 
Interv’iu, Vistupleniia (Almaty: KISI, 2002); Erlan Karin and Burkhanov Kamal, Vneshniaia politika Kazakhstana: 
Vyrabotka novykh prioritetov (Almaty: APR, 2002); Robert Legvold, ed., Thinking Strategically: The Major 
Powers, Kazakhstan, and the Central Asian Nexus (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003); William C. Wohlforth, 
“Revisiting Balance of Power Theory in Central Eurasia,” in Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st 
Century, eds. Thazha V. Paul, James J. Wirtz, and Michel Fortmann (Stanford, California: Stanford University 
Press, 2004); Nargis Kassenova, “Kazakhstan's National Security: Conceptual and Operational aspects,” Central 
Asian Survey 24, no. 2 (2005): 151-164; Marat Shaikhutdinov, Geopolitika, Globalistika iTeoriia 
Natsional’noiBezopasnosti: Metodologicheskie i Prikladnye Aspekty (Pavlodar: ĖKO, 2005); S. Frederick Starr, 
“Kazakhstan’s Security Strategy: A Model for Central Asia?,” Central Asia Affairs 3, no. 15 (2006): 12-18; Svante 
E. Cornell, “Finding Balance: The Foreign Policies of Central Asia’s States,” in Domestic Political Change and 
Grand Strategy, eds. Ashley J. Tellis, Michael Wills, and Nick Bisley (Seattle, WA: National Bureau of Asian 
Research, 2007), 266-300; Hanks, “‘Multivector politics’”; and Gregory Gleason, “Russia and Central Asia’s 
Multivector Foreign Policies,” in After Putin's Russia: Past Imperfect, Future Uncertain, eds. Stephen K. Wegren 
and Dale R. Herspring (Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2010). 
82 Kasenov, “Institutions and Conduct,” 263. 
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1990s.83 In Starr’s observation, the northern neighbour presented a security problem because of 
the long un-delineated border; concentration of the Slavic majority population in the adjoining 
areas; a tradition of perceiving Kazakhstan as “an extension of Slavic heartland”; and anticipated 
Kremlin’s neo-imperial ambitions.84 Meanwhile the eastern neighbour caused Almaty’s distress 
because of the understanding in Kazakhstan that Beijing was concerned about possible secession 
moves of the large ethnic Kazakh and Turkic majority residing in bordering Xinjiang region; the 
recollections of the Sino-Soviet conflict; the Lob Nor nuclear tests; and the illegal immigration 
of Hans.85 Hence, if viewed from the structural perspective, the Russian and Chinese factors 
have been found to form the pillars of the international configuration exerting great pressures on 
the external behaviour of the republic in the 1990s. 
 The inherited nuclear arsenal, which was one of the largest in the world, had provoked 
interest of Washington in Kazakhstan, bringing “the United States in early as an important 
foreign actor in the country.”86 The US interference in Kazakhstan’s and, more broadly, in 
region’s affairs, prompted scholarly discussion of the revival of Sir Halford John Mackinder’s 
Great Game narratives of great powers’ competition over Central Asia.87 This is understandable 
since the Central Asian region constitutes the larger part of the Heartland, whilst it was argued 
by Mackinder that the one “who rules the Heartland commands the World.”88 In the new version 
of the Great Game the USA, China, and the Russian Federation have substituted the Russian and 
British empires as competitors for “influence, power, hegemony and profits.”89 
                                                 
83 Starr, “Kazakhstan’s Security Strategy,” 12. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Martha Brill Olcott, Kazakhstan: Unfulfilled Promise (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, 2002), 44. Kazakhstan’s nuclear policy is examined in detail in Chapter V. 
87 Sir Halford John Mackinder, “The Geographical Pivot of History,” Geographical Journal 23 (1904): 421–437; 
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From the New Great Game perspective Kazakhstan’s leadership had to practice “a 
triangulation exercise between the three great powers.”90 From this angle, Kazakhstan, being one 
of the five Central Asian fragments of the fallen USSR, was compelled together with four other 
regional states to adopt reactive policies to the emerging strategic challenges imposed by the new 
structural configuration of regional geopolitics. The need to maintain balance among interests of 
competing great powers was imprinted in all regional nations’ foreign policies.91 This kind of 
structural determinism of Central Asian nations is a usual theme in a substantive volume of the 
literature on the politics of Central Asia and regional security dynamics.92 The interrelated 
tendency here is to present regional states as objects of Great Powers’ games by taking an 
“outside-in” and “statist” approaches towards the study of regional security politics.93 In words 
of one American observer: “The Eurasian states have to adjust to the new rules of the game as 
the real balance of power in the region shifts.”94 The overall prevalence of the focus on 
overdeterministic influence of external factors in the regionalism literature on Central Asia led 
Stina Torjesen to conclude in 2007: 
Rather than calling Central Asia a ‘peripheral zone’ in a globalizing world, it seems more 
accurate to say that Central Asia is a peripheral zone in global academic security research. 
Little in-depth research or analysis has been conducted on intra-regional political and security 
issues in Central Asia. This lack, in turn, may have allowed analytical priority to be 
apportioned to more familiar factors, like the involvement of Russia and the US in the region.95 
 
Illustrative to this approach is a volume edited by Robert Legvold.96 Contributors 
analyzed security and geopolitical challenges that Kazakhstan and Central Asia may present 
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from the point of view of the external powers. For example, the Chinese perspective in Xing 
Guancheng’s chapter reads:  
Finally, while China recognizes Russia’s traditional strategic influence in the region and values 
its special role in maintaining stability there, it does not approve of Russia seeing Central Asia 
as its ‘back yard’. For both China and Russia, Kazakhstan, like Mongolia, now serves as a 
strategic buffer.97  
 
S. Neil McFarlane, examining in this volume the European strategy towards the region, writes 
that Kazakhstan incapacity to control its own borders and defend its territory made it “a focal 
point for external economic and political engagement in the region.”98 Although a chapter on 
Kazakhstan’s foreign policy towards the abovementioned Great Powers is also included, the 
overall logic of the volume is underpinned by the deterministic approach to Kazakhstan’s and 
other regional nations’ policies.99  
Naturally, the outside-in perspective makes the Great Game narrative fit well into the 
structural neorealist framework.100 Indeed, neorealism seems a useful theoretical framework to 
study both Central Asian regional security and Kazakhstan’s role in it. It provides explanatory 
grounds for the failure of security multilateralism in the region, since neither of the regional 
states have motivation to promote and develop multilateral security organizations in the absence 
of an immediate common external threat. The predominant role played by external powers in the 
establishment of regional security structures can also be explained from neorealist positions, 
where multilateral security organizations, created with the participation of external countries (be 
it China for the SCO or Russia for the CSTO), serve as Beijing’s and Moscow’s instruments to 
balance the US and European influence in the region and exert more power over regional 
countries. 
At the same time, the Great Game perspective has been criticized for this outside-in 
approach, primarily because it “neglects the considerable agency demonstrated by the Central 
                                                 
97 Guancheng, “China’s Foreign Policy Toward Kazakhstan,” in Legvold, ed., Thinking Strategically, 111. 
98 McFarlane, “European Strategy Toward Kazakhstan,” in Legvold, ed., Thinking Strategically, 142. 
99 Bulat Sultanov, and Leila Muzapparova, “Great Power Policies and Interests in Kazakhstan,” in Legvold, ed., 
Thinking Strategically, 187-216.  
100 Cummings, Understanding Central Asia, 158-159. 
 36 
 
Asian states in dealing with their geopolitical suitors.”101 One of the earliest critiques of the 
application of the Great Game analytical framework to the post-Soviet regional affairs was made 
by Roland Dannreuther, who warns that: 
At a more fundamental level, there was also the mistaken assumption that Central Asia was 
necessarily a strategic vacuum which had to be filled by some external foreign imperial power. 
In reality, the Central Asian states have been determined to be master of their own fates. They 
have strongly defended their rights to define the nature, timing and extent of their relations 
with the outside world. Their net has been cast widely and they have exhibited few prejudices, 
pragmatically judging any new relations for their prospective advantages.102 
 
Therefore, in Dannreuther’s assessment, it is important not to ignore “the independent identity 
and power of the Central Asian states,” which are found to “have proved to be adept at 
international diplomacy, balancing alliances and foreign relations in a carefully calibrated 
exercise to bolster their economic and political independence.”103 Meanwhile, the utilization of 
the Great Game framework can make a researcher discount the roles of the Central Asian states 
and to view their policies as simply reactions to great powers’ activities in the region, thus 
undermining the analytical power of the approach.104 Indeed, examining the utility of the Great 
Game perspective, Alexander Cooley observes that not only have the times changed since the 
confrontation between the British and Russian empires, thus allowing for the emergence of local 
sovereign states which can “neither be formally conquered nor dissolved by foreign powers,” but 
the whole concept seems “deeply blinding” as local elites were able to utilize the external actors’ 
interests in the region, playing them off one another in order to consolidate their political 
regimes and gain economic benefits.105 The unique regional structural configuration of post-
Soviet Central Asia, where there are three competitive great powers, allowed local leaders to 
“shrink their individual commitments to any one patron, weakening the overall control of these 
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objectively more powerful actors.”106 The understanding in which local leaderships are 
deploying specific strategies aimed at leveraging external pressures in order to maximize their 
own benefits allows treating Kazakhstan and other Central Asian states not as “passive pawns in 
the strategic manoeuvring of the great powers,” but rather, as Cooley continues, as “important 
actors in their own right.”107 Consider also Starr’s observation he made in the seminal article 
Rediscovering Central Asia:  
The challenge to their [Central Asian nations’] international partners is to treat the regional 
states as sovereign countries, not as culturally inert objects to be shoved around on a 
chessboard. It is not enough to view them simply as a ‘zone of [our] special interest,’ as 
Vladimir Putin’s government does; as a source of raw materials, as the Chinese do; or as a 
fuelling stop en route to Kabul, as the United States does. The better alternative is to 
acknowledge that somewhere in the DNA of these peoples is the capacity to manage great 
empires and even greater trading zones, to interact as equals with the other centres of world 
culture, and to use their unique geographical position to become a link and bridge between 
civilizations. Such an awareness will raise expectations on all sides, and encourage the region’s 
international partners to view it as more than the object of a geopolitical game.108 
 
Roy Allison’s works are notable exceptions in the line of primarily deterministic 
explanations of regional security politics.109 While accounting for external pressures exerted by 
great powers, Allison argues that regional leadership’s interests and strategies, emanating from 
these interests, had contributed to the regional dynamics as well. Allison’s work on regionalism 
explains the reasons for the failure of endemic regional multilateral security structures. Here the 
author examines how “the competitive dynamics between major powers in the security field” 
interplay with local leaders’ concerns regarding safeguarding national sovereignties.110 In his 
later work that assesses local elite’s motivation for forging regional structures, Allison probes the 
possibility of the existence of coordinated foreign policies of Central Asian states, seeking, 
through the participation in regional multilateral security organizations, to secure their domestic 
regimes and to insulate themselves from democratic pressures.111 Allison integrates domestic 
and international agendas, particularly through his focus on how “virtual regionalism” is, above 
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all, explained by the states’ goal of regime maintenance and survival. Allison’s works are 
uncommon example of the studies that allocate agency to local states and permit the possibility 
where “a great deal still depends on the political commitment of state leaders.”
an 
                                                
112  
An article by Annette Bohr also combines structural and domestic factors in the 
explanation of the failure of regional cooperation dynamics.113 The author first applies a 
neorealist perspective where Uzbekistan’s hegemonic aspirations caused regional nations to 
perceive it “as perhaps their greatest external threat” driving them to balance against Tashkent 
through engagement in different regional structures with the backing of outside actors, primarily 
Russia.114 Two phenomena matter from a domestic perspective. First, regional leaders’ 
inclination towards building nationalistic states precluded them from “the pooling of sovereignty 
and the formation of supranational structures.”115 Second, the nature of authoritarian political 
regimes led Central Asian presidents to be reluctant to enter any regional structures that might 
jeopardize their ability to rule their countries single-handedly. 
Cumming’s observation that the structural perspective has “obscured other sometimes 
more important and mainly domestically produced factors behind the content of the foreign 
policies of these states” suggests that the focused analysis of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy per se 
can produce a more holistic picture of the subject matter.116 At the same time, as Passolt notes, 
“the domestic component of Kazakh foreign policy and the linkage between systemic and 
domestic sources of foreign policy remain under-explored.”117 
Epistemologically, such an examination necessitates switching from structural conceptual 
frameworks to unit-level foreign policy analyses, which would allow for determining the 
elements of agency and intent in operation behind Kazakhstan’s political interactions vis-à-vis 
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great powers. Doing so would improve the understanding of the republic’ foreign policy 
behaviour. 
 
Foreign policy of Kazakhstan in the focus of analysis 
Passolt’s 2007 doctoral thesis is likely to be the most voluminous monograph devoted to analysis 
of Kazakhstani foreign policy in the English language to the date.118 Chronologically, it covers 
the first decade of independence from 1991 until 2001; thematically it examines Kazakhstan’s 
relations with Russia, China, and Central Asian neighbours. Passolt asks herself a rather broadly 
positioned research question: “What main international and domestic factors explain 
Kazakhstan's foreign policy with Russia, China, and Central Asia between 1991 and 2001?”119 
To reach an answer, Passolt starts from the operationalizaiton of Kazakhstan as a postcolonial 
state similar to Asian and African colonies freed from metropolitan rule in the 1960s and 1970s. 
This conceptual point of departure allows Passolt to position the research in the context of 
postcolonial theories in a part related to domestic determinants of a foreign policy and in the 
context of neorealist and liberalist schools in a part related to the behaviour of weaker states in 
the international system. 
Yet, addressing the subject from the postcolonial perspective may not necessarily be a 
viable approach. Other observers of Central Asian affairs consider the absence of anti-colonial 
fight  to be of principal importance.120 As summarized by Abazov:  
The [Central Asian] republics became independent not because of a long lasting national 
liberation struggle or a mass political movement, as happened in the Baltic republics, but due 
to a political occurrence, a short lasting political struggle between the centre and Republics, 
and an unexpected decision of the three Slavic States to dissolve the USSR.121  
 
Here, Bhavna Dave finds “the conditions in which a sense of nationhood was forged and 
independence was achieved” to be fundamental in distinguishing between postcolonial 
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experiences of African and Asian nations and the post-Communist experience of Central Asian 
countries.122 The latter “owe their present territorial framework and conception of nationhood to 
Soviet border demarcation and nation-building policies, which sought to eliminate the potential 
for national mobilization aimed at separate statehood.”123 Another principal difference Dave 
notes is the level of states’ internal development. Whereas the majority of postcolonial countries 
resembled “quasi-states or weak states, unable to transform their juridical statehood into an 
empirical reality,” the Central Asian countries possessed “strong economic and institutional 
infrastructure, a high degree of centralization and bureaucratization, a well-educated citizenry 
and possessed all the trappings and paraphernalia of statehood” as a result of development under 
the Soviet rule.124 Dannreuther, reminding that the independence was gained not as the result of 
“a popular anti-Russian uprising,” asserts that the rulers of the newly independent states of 
Central Asia were instinctively interested in “protecting rather than destroying the old links [with 
Moscow]” partly because of the structural dependencies from Russia and partly due to their 
subconscious habit of subordination to the “elder brother.”125 The circumstances of the “catapult 
to independence,” so dissimilar from the African and Asian experiences, are substantial and 
cannot be ignored if an attempt is made to position Central Asian countries in the postcolonial 
context.126 
Overlooking these reservations, Passolt develops a conceptual model of an analysis of 
Kazakhstan’s foreign policy based on the assumption that the main goal of a (postcolonial) 
foreign policy is to respond to domestic needs rather than to the needs of the external 
environment. Explicating the point, Passolt writes that a foreign policy should serve internal 
political purposes of a postcolonial leadership. Linking this premise to the post-Soviet 
Kazakhstan, Passolt presumes that the republic’s foreign policy should have been guided by the 
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four following principles: 1) foreign policy as a tool for the continuation of the revolution against 
colonial rule; 2) as an effort to establish the identity and integrity of the new state; 3) as a means 
to keep the in-group in power; and, 4) as means of reducing foreign influence at home.127 While 
she demonstrates in her work how the three last presumptions hold their merits, Passolt 
expectedly finds the first point not to be relevant, therefore at least partly undermining the 
strength of the overall argument – as she concludes that “at no point was 'anti-colonialism' an 
explicit element in Kazakhstan's foreign policy.”128 
Passolt’s empirical investigation of relations vis-à-vis Russia, China, and Central Asia 
lead her to the principal finding that Kazakhstan’s foreign policy is best comprehended by the 
application of: 1) realist theory in understanding the republic’s security links with Russia; 2) 
liberal theory in understanding the economic relations with China; and, 3) domestic-based 
theories in understanding of the country’s activities in the regional arena.129 
Passolt’s work is a welcome addition to the still slim body of literature on Kazakhstan’s 
foreign policy. She was able to find a unique conceptual angle that combined in its approach 
international and domestic variables, assessed through the employment of different theories of 
international relations and political science. Nevertheless, the chosen framework seems to 
involve certain drawbacks. One possible reservation can be made about this broadly set research 
puzzle is that it purports an ad hoc inclusion of many voluntarily selected variables that would 
seem suitable for an answer. Moreover, the author’s research design is admittedly reflecting this 
point. Passolt describes her research design in the following manner: 
The methodology chosen for the analysis in this thesis is not based on a set of strict variables 
and no single theory is selected as a conceptual framework. Because the utilization of simply 
one general concept is considered to fail ultimately to capture the complexities and specifics of 
Kazakh foreign policy, the thesis instead combines several different perspectives.130  
   
To produce an explanation, Passolt in a fairly patchwork fashion selects postcolonial 
studies as the source of domestically found explanations, a realist rationale to elucidate 
                                                 
127 Passolt, “Kazakhstan's Foreign Policy,” 251-260. 
128 Ibid, 253. 
129 Ibid, 266. 
130 Ibid, 16. 
 42 
 
Kazakhstan’s policies in the security area, and liberalist imperatives to account for the external 
economic policy. Given the scope of explanatory variables, Passolt expectedly concludes that 
neither domestic nor international factors along suffice in explaining Kazakhstan’s foreign 
policy: “The two environments interact with and influence one other and thereby constitute 
Kazakhstan's complex foreign policy context.”131 The voluntaristic employment of different 
theories applied to different cases leads the thesis to rely on idiosyncratic factors restricting the 
possibility of parsimonious generalizations of the findings.132 Passolt’s work is a well-researched 
paper containing a large volume of empirical material. However, the controversial research 
design, limitations of the “domestic” element pertaining to postcolonial theoretical premises and, 
as discussed below, the under-examined decision-making component certainly leave space for 
additional theoretical and empirical research on the topic.  
 
Multivectorism as an academic concept 
Passolt’s selection of case studies is illustrative of the geopolitical diversity of Kazakhstan’s 
foreign policy orientation, which has become the trademark of the republic’s foreign office. The 
locus communis for conceptualization and operationalization of such omnidirectional external 
behaviour is the principle of multivector foreign policy.133 Despite its ubiquity, the exact 
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formulations or explanations of the notion are rarely found in the literature. One of the few 
descriptions is provided by Gregory Gleason, who argues that this principle is generic to Central 
Asian countries and explains it thus: 
A multivector policy is a complex stratagem. In practice, multivector foreign policies are 
essentially risk-avoidant lines of action, emphasizing multiple partners, multiple dimensions, 
and multiple issues, and relying largely on diplomatic hedging against unreliability, threat, and 
hard-to-calculate advantage. Multivector foreign policies assign low importance to ideological 
considerations and high importance to instrumental alliances and calculated advantage.134 
 
The understanding of multivectorism as a policy based on non-ideological and pragmatic 
grounds with the principal goal of securing Kazakhstan’s interests is also found in Hanks, where: 
The character of government and internal policies of potential partners, and their geopolitical 
relationship with other states are not variables that direct or even inform the multivector 
approach. The basis of the relationship resides exclusively in the potential costs and benefits to 
Kazakhstan as an inter-state actor.135   
 
Gleason and Hanks therefore view the multivector strategy as essentially a (neo)realist policy to 
the extent it is motivated by national interests and a survival rationale. And while Hanks 
implicitly views the policy as deterministic: “the thrust of the discussion here is policy analysis 
in the context of Kazakhstan’s geopolitical challenges and goals,” Gleason states the underlying 
principle of the multivector policy explicitly, as “the idea of multivector relations, technocratic 
and clinical in its euphemistic expression of diplomatic relationships, is in actuality moved by a 
profound respect for historically based realism.”136  
In his analysis of Kazakhstani foreign policy Hanks highlights three major rationales for 
such strategy to be developed. First, the republic’s policy was seen as a means of balancing out 
Russia’s influence without alienating Kremlin: “The greatest challenge facing independent 
Kazakhstan since 1991 has been to articulate and implement a foreign policy that allows the 
country to escape the confines of the ‘Russian sphere’ as far as history and geography will 
permit, yet also maintain a functional relationship with the Russian Federation.”137 Secondly, in 
Hanks view, Nazarbayev used his foreign policy to consolidate the nation. Here, the author refers 
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to Cummings’ work and echoes her argument that Kazakhstan’s foreign policy was intended to 
promote a multi-ethnic identity, a task particularly important given the large Russian community 
living in the country and an immediate geographical proximity of this great power.138 Third, the 
republic needed diversification of its external economic relations. In a checklist fashion, where 
the perceived goals are compared against historical achievements, Hanks positively assesses the 
success of Kazakhstan’s diplomacy. In his view all major tasks were accomplished – Russian 
hegemony was circumvented; the nation did not fragment; economic diversification was secured; 
and international status as a key Central Asian nation was elevated. While successfully providing 
an extensive overview analysis of the evolution of the nation’s diplomacy, Hanks still lacks a 
precise formulation of the Kazakhstani multivector strategy. 
The difficulty in formulating the operational definition of multivector foreign policy 
comes from the fact that for many observers the concept lacks significance or peculiarity. 
Illustrative here is the Cummings’ review of the tous azimut foreign policy: 
In substance, Kazakhstan’s foreign policy direction has embraced multilateralism. First, it has 
aimed at co-operation with states in all directions....Second, simultaneously, the elite has 
emphasized relations with Russia over relations with other states, and has here prioritized their 
economic and military dimensions....Third, Kazakhstan has indicated its desire to join the 
international economic community, according high priority to economic security. Fourth, it has 
endeavoured to cast its security net more broadly, attempting to integrate itself in a number of 
security regimes, some regional, some global. Nazarbayev has signed major agreements with 
states in all directions.139  
 
Consider also Ariel Cohen’s rather broad formulation of the concept: “Since 1991, Kazakhstan’s 
‘multivector’ foreign policy has meant that Astana built bilateral relations with each geopolitical 
actor, and avoided sacrificing one vector for the sake of the other.”140 Kazakhstan’s multivector 
foreign policy thus becomes a list of all possible bilateral and multilateral vectors of the 
republic’s external affairs. Cummings is therefore correct in calling the multivector foreign 
policy a self-serving one.141 It is possible to add that such an omnidirectional foreign policy 
would in fact fit, with the correction to azimuth, virtually any contemporary state. On an 
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empirical note, Cummings recognizes this predicament, stating “A multivector foreign policy 
carries in-built contradictions…. Seeking multiple, often contradictory partners not only prevents 
a strong foreign policy direction but also dilutes the already weak Kazakhstani identity. The 
overall impression is that the country is floating between, rather than anchoring, East and 
West.”142  
Laumulin’s commentary is relevant here:  
For how long could we conduct a multivector foreign policy? Is there a need in it? Thinking 
rationally, the necessity in multivectorism as the foreign policy doctrine will disappear by itself 
as time will pass. This is because the policy of any established state is multivector by its 
nature.143  
 
The universality of the concept presented many scholars with similar operationalization 
problems. It can be noted that due to its ambiguity, the versatile concept of multivectorism is 
suitable for explaining a wide range of foreign policy choices Kazakhstan’s leadership has made 
both vis-à-vis external contingencies and at home. It is natural, then, that studies of foreign 
policy of the republic have hitherto often incorporated both system level and state level factors. 
 
Innenpolitik and foreign policies of the Central Asian states 
Cummings, in her discussion of the application of the neoclassical realist framework to the 
foreign policies of Central Asian states, constructs a cursory model of states’ external 
behaviours, attributing explanatory weight both to domestic and international variables.144 As 
such, Uzbekistan’s policy of self-reliance and Turkmenistan’s isolationism could possibly be 
explained by accounting for their bureaucratic politics, ideologies, and leaders’ psychological 
profiles.145 In a similar vein, Silk Road policies practiced by Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan appear 
not as security bandwagoning tools, but rather as the products of these countries’ geographical, 
economic, and cultural idiosyncrasies.146 As the literature assessed below in this chapter reveals, 
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a combination of Innenpolitik and structural explanations is a prominent feature of the studies of 
foreign policies of all regional nations. 
It is helpful to first consult the works on foreign policies of neighbouring Central Asian 
states with which Kazakhstan shared a common pre- and post-Soviet fate. As summarized by 
Gleason:  
The states had similar and in some cases common cultural traditions and shared a common 
lingua franca, the Russian language. All of the states had specialists trained in similar 
intellectual traditions and bureaucracies accustomed to working in similar ways. All of the 
states had economies specialized to the production of primary commodities. All of the five 
states underwent a wrenching withdrawal from the Soviet system of trade and commerce.147  
 
Of main interest here are the possibilities to explore links between external systemic factors and 
internal considerations as well as to determine which particular international and domestic 
factors were found by scholars to matter most for each regional nation. A comparative survey is 
also useful for this research methodologically, by learning how scholars have approached the 
subject matter, and empirically, by examining the ways Kazakhstan’s neighbours have conceived 
and implemented their international strategies.  
Among all other regional neighbours, Kyrgyzstan comes closest to Kazakhstan by merits 
of its relative ease of the political regime. The matters of regime survival and maintenance are 
therefore less manifest in its foreign policy agenda if compared to Uzbekistan and 
Turkmenistan.148 At the same time, the distinctiveness of Kyrgyzstan’s foreign policy and the 
dissimilarity of its Silk Road strategy from Kazakhstan’s Eurasian Bridge have to be noted. This 
difference lays in the fact that Kyrgyzstan, due to its small dimensions, has neither been 
subjected to the same amount of great powers’ pressure as its regional neighbours, nor has it 
been able to assertively project its interests in the international domain. Therefore, Kyrgyz 
                                                 
147 Gregory Gleason, “Foreign Policy and Domestic Reform in Central Asia,” Central Asian Survey 20, no. 2 (2001): 
168. 
148 The importance of political regimes to foreign policymaking has been noted elsewhere: “Not only does a 
particular regime indicate who can participate in decision making and with what degree of authority, but the 
structure of a regime determines in important ways the extent to which leaders' personalities and attitudes will 
impact on the decision.” See Philip D. Stewart, Margaret G. Hermann and Charles F. Hermann, “Modeling the 1973 
Soviet Decision to Support Egypt,” The American Political Science Review 83, no. 1 (1989): 38. 
 47 
 
leadership had an entirely different set of ideational and material considerations that steered its 
foreign policy. 
Thomas J. C. Wood depicts Kyrgyzstan as a small but resilient nation in his doctoral 
dissertation on the evolution of Kyrgyzstan foreign policy.149 The author conceptualizes 
Bishkek’s foreign relations as a policy of a small state. His main argument being that 
Kyrgyzstan’s foreign policy is an original product developed by Kyrgyz foreign policy 
establishment reflecting several principal points relevant to the republic’s development: the 
multi-ethnic composition of the state; the unwillingness of Kyrgyz elite to accept externally 
imposed ideologies (e.g. Pan-Turkism); and a general awareness of the place of the country in 
the geostrategic game between Russia, China and the USA. The original idea Wood defends is 
that Kyrgyzstan foreign policy has not been totally predetermined by the international 
geostrategic environment and domestic needs; in the author’s words, the republic “does possess a 
foreign policy.”150 Wood asserts that Kyrgyzstan, in conducting its international relations, was 
consistently following a deliberately elaborate and well thought-out strategy, and not merely 
responding to the contextual challenges arising before its leadership. The author also attempts to 
open the “black box” of policymaking and explores the decision-making apparatus of the 
country, whilst distilling elites’ modus operandi from the content of official policy papers. Wood 
then uses these findings to defend his point about the originality of Kyrgyz foreign policy. The 
uniqueness of the policy is signified for the author by the fact that it is rooted in the leadership’s 
worldview about Kyrgyzstan’s self-sufficient role and place: “It [foreign policy] is anchored not 
in American, Russian or Chinese influence, nor the phantasmagoric export ideologies of Pan-
Turkism or Pan-Islamism, but has a direct relationship to elite thinking about the construction of 
civic nationalism within Kyrgyzstan.”151 
On another dimensional extreme is the regional giant – the Republic of Uzbekistan. This 
state has been often viewed as Kazakhstan’s regional rival during and after the Soviet period due 
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to its central location, strong military and demographic potential, as well as Kunaev-Rashidov 
and Nazarbayev-Karimov personal rivalries. According to Leila Kazemi, who examines 
domestic factors in order to explain a peculiar nature of Uzbekistan’s foreign policy in the 1990s, 
the isolationist authoritarian regime endorsed by the Uzbek president Islam Karimov made it 
necessary to subordinate the nation’s foreign policy to the needs of regime survival.152 Kazemi 
argues that Uzbekistan’s external strategy “cannot be readily explained by traditional systems-
level theories of international relations” because forces at domestic level played a principal role 
in the evolution of Uzbek foreign policy.153 For Kazemi, Tashkent’s often inconsistent foreign 
policy vis-à-vis Russia, regional neighbours, and the West, could be understood in terms of the 
three “strategic pillars” indicated by Starr: pursuit of sovereignty, domestic political stability and 
economic reform.154 These state building goals, as perceived by Karimov, “have provided the 
basis for a wide and shifting set of cooperative and conflictual relationships with the outside 
world.”155 The consolidation and protection of sovereignty in many aspects was related to goals 
of diminishing Russian influence, diversification of external relations, and the creation of a 
strong military. Political stability was achieved by suppressing domestic secular and Islamic 
opposition. This, in turn, led to a greater involvement of Tashkent into the affairs of its 
immediate neighbours, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which were seen as the routes and sources of 
the import of the radical Islam. The need to eradicate the radical Islamic groups from Tajikistan 
prompted Uzbekistan to seek security cooperation with Russia. A heavy-handed suppression of 
political opposition also complicated Tashkent’s relations with the West, and in particular with 
the USA. Finally, the isolationist development model greatly impeded its economic relations 
with regional neighbours and foreign investors. Kazemi’s work ultimately shows how the logic 
behind many of Karimov’s foreign moves could be better understood if domestic variables are 
included in the explanation.  
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Turkmenistan’s “positive neutrality” is perhaps one the most peculiar foreign policy 
strategies found not only in Central Asia but also in the entire world. The concept of “positive 
neutrality” comes in striking contrast to Kazakhstan’s multivectorism due to the implicit 
isolationist nature of the former. Luca Anceschi presents a comparative analysis of the foreign 
policies of two of the “Central Asia’s most repressive political landscapes” – Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan.156 Through the analysis of both regimes’ successful efforts to monopolize the 
foreign policymaking apparatus, the author concludes that “the political priorities of the regimes 
became the forces driving the external policies implemented by Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan.”157 Of particular interest here is the author’s approach to the analysis of the extent to 
which the external environment had affected the two states’ foreign policies, given the presumed 
prominence of domestic political considerations. For Anceschi, Russia and USA, as “Great 
Powers,” have “exerted the most substantial influence on Central Asia since 1992.”158 This 
relationship is viewed from the prism of regimes’ perceptions on these two powers’ influence on 
domestic politics:  
In this context, a direct correlation has to be established between regime survival – intended 
here as the ensemble of regime responses to perceived stability threats – and the intensity of 
international support surrounding the Niyazov/Berdymukhammedov and Karimov regimes at 
various junctures.159  
 
Therefore, Anceschi argues, both Ashgabat and Tashkent sought to construct a strategy that 
would balance between excessive external influence and extreme international isolation. Thus, 
Anceschi’s central argument is that domestic imperatives, and regime survival in particular, have 
been instrumental in foreign policy development in both nations.  
Looking at the Turkmen foreign policy from the different conceptual angle, Sébastien 
Peyrouse argues that the republic’s foreign outlook depended on a single person who was 
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devising a foreign policy.160 The author contrasts chaotic relations of Ashgabat with Russia 
during the tenure of Niyazov, who wanted to counterbalance Moscow’s dominance in energy 
sector, with the critical turn in attitude towards Russia occurring “with the change of regime in 
Ashgabat” and a new ruler Berdymukhammedov coming to the presidency.161 
 The underlying tendency in the analyses of Central Asian countries is the allocation of 
causal weight to peculiar internal factors through reference to domestic political considerations 
of regional policymakers. In case of Kyrgyzstan, Wood argues that the local elite’s thinking 
about a special place the republic should take on the global map had contributed much to the 
formation of the nation’s foreign policy outlook.162 Karimov’s obsession with preservation of his 
authoritarian regime plays a definitive role in the case of Uzbekistan.163 Peyrouse’s observation 
of changes in Ashgabat’s behaviour correlative to the personalities in charge of policymaking 
exemplifies the domestic reasoning as well.164 Notwithstanding the importance of domestic 
factors, the foreign policies of these nations were found to be tracking, with varying degrees of 
conformity, the systemic pressures of great powers. And, whereas internal factors had varied 
across the region depending on the nature of political regime, all authors recognized the 
influence of the three external actors: Russia, China, and USA.  
Svante Cornell explores this interplay of the system and unit level variables and assumes 
that a political dilemma lies at the nexus of international and internal politics.165 This dilemma 
originated from the desire of regional leaders to balance against domination by Russia and China 
in their strategic relations with the world, while also seeking to ensure internal stability and 
regime security (the two latter tasks found to be perceived by elites as identical).166 In Cornell’s 
opinion, Moscow and Beijing clearly preferred not to interfere in internal political matters of the 
Central Asian states while maintaining an interest in minimizing the West’s influence and 
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welcoming such an attitude from the nations of the region.167 The West, in turn, provided a 
counter-balance against domination of the two immediate great powers while endangering the 
security of local non-democratic regimes.168  
Cornell furthers his analysis on the consequences of this dilemma for Kazakhstan and 
Uzbekistan. In Cornell’s view Tashkent’s inconsistent foreign policy record that oscillated 
between pro-Russian and pro-Western strategies stemmed from the interests of Karimov’s ruling 
regime, which at various junctures (particularly the spring 2005 Andijan events) steered the 
nation’s orientation counter to whichever external actor the regime perceived as threatening.169 
For Karimov, his personal political interests were that of the entire nation, thereby “this 
conflation of national and regime interests explains a great deal of Uzbek foreign policy in this 
period.”170 As a result, Tashkent developed a model of negative balancing, where the “pursuit of 
good relations with any one great power for Tashkent has come at the expense of relations with 
another.”171  
In Kazakhstan’s case the configuration of internal and external threat perception was 
completely different. The perception of an external threat emanating from the Russian factor was 
high among the Kazakhstani leadership: “The double threat of a bifurcated society and the 
Russian ‘shadow’ forced Kazakhstan to walk a tightrope to ensure survival and sovereignty.”172 
Kazakhstan was therefore determined to seek an alignment with Russia to avoid Moscow-
induced alienation. With time, a booming oil economy allowed Nazarbayev to raise confidence 
in the prospects of his regime’s sustainability as it “reduced frustration and apprehension among 
the ethnic Russian minority and weakened the increasingly marginalized political opposition.”173 
In turn, the growing economic capabilities and internal political stability provided grounds for a 
more confident external balancing act. A good political and economic record made it possible for 
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Nazarbayev to not perceive the USA as a source of a potential risk to his ruling. This 
discernment made Astana’s policy more flexible and accommodating, whereby “Kazakhstan […] 
built ties with the United States in tandem with, rather than at the expense of, ties with 
Russia.”174 The principal conclusion is drawn that it is the elites’ preferences that ultimately 
steered foreign outlooks of the two republics, as Cornell concludes:   
Domestic and foreign policies are interlinked to varying degrees in all of the states of Central 
Asia. The considerable economic interests and the perceptions of the aims of foreign powers of 
the various elite groups shape these groups’ priorities and the foreign policy decisions of the 
states themselves.175  
 
Tor Bukkvoll also studies the relationship between the external and the domestic milieus 
in Kazakhstan’s foreign policy course.176 The author examines this relationship from an angle of 
the personal interests of Nazarbayev. Bukkvoll challenges traditional systemic and unitary 
assessments of Kazakhstan’s external policies, where scholars have “taken a positively statist 
approach in analyzing this foreign policy, and basically ignored the self-interest of Nazarbayev 
himself or factions of the Kazakh elite as explanatory factors.”177 Bukkvoll contends that it is not 
sufficient to use these systemic theories, namely Realism, Liberalism, and Constructivism, to 
explain Kazakhstan foreign policy since all of them proceed from an assumption that a state’s 
foreign policies are driven (only) by national interests in the way these interests are identified by 
the policymaking elite. In contrast, the author argues, other scholars have elaborated on theories 
in which leaders’ desire to stay in power is the primary motivator for foreign policies in semi-
democratic or authoritarian states.178 In Bukkvoll’s assertion, this interest had a prevailing 
impact on Nazarbayev’s strategies towards Russia and USA. Whereas, in Bukkvoll’s 
interpretation, relations with Russia were driven by political regime preservation needs, relations 
with the USA can be explained through the prism of Nazarbayev’s aspirations for gaining 
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personal prestige for himself and the international status for Kazakhstan, where the international 
recognition reinforces Nazarbayev’s internal political standing as a wise independent statesman. 
As Bukkvoll argues, “Nazarbayev probably wants both to remain in power, and to be seen by 
himself and others as a respected international politicians and a symbol of independent political 
leadership.”179 Nonetheless, regime survival is the prime interest for Nazarbayev, according to 
Bukkvoll, noting that “there are few indications that Nazarbayev has ever been willing to risk his 
political survival for the pursuit of a foreign policy goal even if it would have served his desired 
image of great statesmanship.”180 
Bukkvoll draws a dynamic causal model where the influence of domestic factors on 
Nazarbayev’s policies vis-à-vis Russia and USA was indirect and conditioned by the context of 
relations with these external actors. Domestically, Bukkvoll distinguishes two groups that 
primarily influenced the republic’s foreign policy: the old bureaucratic nomenklatura and the 
Young Turks. The author argues that each of these groups have affected Kazakhstan’s foreign 
policy orientation depending on their intrinsic political and business interests. The nomenklatura 
were resenting closer links with the West, as they believed that the democratic norms of political 
and economic management could jeopardize their corruptive practices. Bukkvoll suggests 
“Nazarbayev would hardly be able to stay on as leader or even effectively rule the country if he 
got the entire bureaucratic nomenklatura against him.”181 Hence, for Bukkvoll, the nomenklatura 
had steered Almaty’s initial contacts with the USA in some way, as “continued nomenklatura 
support for Nazarbayev’s power has probably entailed some caution on his side in 
rapprochement with the USA.”182  
The Young Turks informed Nazarbayev’s balancing between Moscow and Washington 
because they were a viable alternative political force both in the eyes of the Russians and 
Americans. For example, if Nazarbayev was “to provoke Moscow by using close relations with 
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the USA as a balancer against Russian power in Central Asia” this could encourage Russia to 
support the Young Turks instead. 183 Therefore, awareness of this possible undesirable reaction 
of Moscow imposed certain constrains upon Nazarbayev in cooperating with the USA. Similar 
logic is reversely applied to the possible US reaction to closer relations with Russia, where the 
probable risk of the substitution of Nazarbayev with the Young Turks made him “more 
accommodative to USA interests.”184 
Internationally, according to Bukkvoll, Nazarbayev in the early 1990s relied heavily on 
Moscow both in terms of maintaining his power and ensuring the republic’s sovereignty. 
Furthering Olcott’s argument about Nazarbayev’s readiness to surrender sovereignty in exchange 
“for Kazakh domination of a territorially integral Kazakhstan,” Bukkvoll speculates that 
“Nazarbayev was willing to sell [to Russia] some of the independence of the Kazakh state in 
order secure the private interest of staying in power.”185 This reliance led Kazakhstan to seek 
close ties with its Northern neighbour. At the same time, Moscow’s support inflicted certain 
political and economic compromises on Nazarbayev. In Bukkvoll’s assessment, Russian 
corporate business could seize some control of the Kazakh energy sector thus depriving “him of 
his ability to pay for the elite support necessary to stay in power.”186 Different motives formed 
the basis of Nazarbayev’s relations with the USA, where the president’s main interests were to 
gain prestige and recognition for him and for the country. Bukkvoll contents that “in terms of 
prestige, seeking partnership with the US might enhance this both in Nazarbayev’s own eyes and 
in the eyes of others, because such a policy is likely to strengthen the image of independent 
political leadership.”187 The author’s key conclusion drawn from his inquiry is that 
“Nazarbayev’s ability to maintain power is dependent on his relations with both domestic and 
foreign actors, and that he has and continues to be interested in remaining in power.”188 
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Despite the fact that all four leaders of Central Asia have been pursuing similar tasks of 
regime consolidation and state-building, there were notable nuances in their external and internal 
environments, leading, as shown above, to varied foreign strategies. Cornell’s work in particular 
convincingly demonstrates how the differences in elites’ perceptions and worldviews, originating 
from differences from the identified environments, impact states’ foreign policies.189 
From the inception of independence Kazakhstan’s elite faced challenges of its own, both 
internationally and domestically. In contrast to Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, the zero-sum 
regime survival logic was not a principal domestic determinant for Kazakhstan. At the same time 
its geostrategic location and the Russian factor are found to have significantly affected the 
republic’s foreign policy outlook. The uniqueness of the latter aspect comes from the fact that 
Russia was exerting both an external geopolitical pressure and a pressure of a domestic kind 
through the presence of a large Slavic population. In the 1990s, this population was not only 
matching Kazakhs in numbers, but also, as Starr reminds, was concentrated in the regions 
adjoining Russia where it greatly outnumbered the Kazakhs.190 As assessed below, the Russian 
factor, straddling both domestic and international milieus in the case of Kazakhstan is the 
recurrent theme in research on the subject matter.  
 
Building a nation under Russia’s shadow 
Kazakhstan’s foreign policy is rarely treated as a thing in itself in a sense that it is usually 
embedded in explanations of larger phenomena of Kazakhstan’s post-independence 
development. In this sense, two interrelated factors loom large – the state-building processes and 
Russia’s external influence. The construction of a sovereign Kazakhstani nation-state is believed 
to be the principal concern for the Kazakhstani regime with all external policies being 
subordinated to this goal. Meanwhile, the Russian Federation, a primus inter pares,191 is 
considered to extend major constrains on the ways the Kazakhstani leadership perceived its 
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foreign choices due to its geostrategic importance and large Slavic population. At the same time, 
however, the overwhelming power of the great northern neighbour “does not imply that Russian 
foreign policy determines Central Asian foreign policies; even less so does Russia determine the 
internal politics of the Central Asian countries,” as Gleason observes.192 The relationship 
between the two factors appears to be non-linear. Russia remains important in both the external 
and internal domains, but does not directly steer the republic’s foreign strategy. Gleason adds: 
“Central Asian leaders determine their own objectives using their own resources and at their own 
direction, but they typically do so in relation to their expectations, fears, and hopes regarding 
Moscow’s designs.”193   
Cummings argues that national identity is a nexus between the international environment 
and a state’s interests through tracing the actual effect of the idea of Eurasianism on Kazakh-
Russian relations.194 This work is a convincing example of usefulness of integration of domestic 
and international variables to the understanding of the subject. The author highlights the 
importance of internal political factors, national identity construction in particular, and links 
them to foreign policy. The peculiarity of the ethnic composition of the state, particularly the 
presence of large ethnic Russian population, she argues, gave a domestic incentive for 
Kazakhstan to diversify its relations with outside powers in order to ensure stable state- and 
nation-building progress. The ruling regime sought domestic and international legitimization by 
promoting the self-proclaimed multilateral and multiethnic Eurasian identity of its population, 
which effectively backed multilateralism in the foreign policy. The subsequent articulation of the 
Kazakhstani nation concept has helped to further consolidate the population socially and 
politically, maintaining the reciprocal relationship between domestic and foreign policies.195 The 
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importance of this inquiry is not that it alternates the neorealist rationale discussed by Hanks 
(which it does not) but that it shows the impact of domestic politics over foreign politics.  
Olcott contends that Kazakhstan’s foreign policy orientation was greatly influenced by 
the vulnerability Nazarbayev was sensing from Russia due to the large Russian population, great 
military imbalance, and a landlocked position.196 Kazakhstan’s foreign policy was thus initially 
influenced by the president’s desire to solve this security dilemma without antagonizing Russia. 
Olcott claims that the salience of the problem was so high, that at the earlier stage of nation 
building Nazarbayev was even contemplating the likelihood of trading some sovereignty for 
Kazakh domination over a territorially integral country.197 The solution sought to the problem 
was the reintegration with Russia in a multilateral format. Nazarbayev advocated a multilateral 
format of relations over a bilateral one for a particular reason. Nazarbayev felt that a bilateral 
format gave Russia more leverage over Kazakhstan. Therefore initially he strongly supported an 
equal union among the post-Soviet states on the grounds of the falling Soviet Union.198 Then, 
according to Olcott, Nazarbayev successfully redefined the CIS by inclusion of all the ex-Soviet 
republics and not just the “Belovezhskaya troika.”199 Olcott argues further, “If Kazakhstan were 
still a part of a larger whole, then it would be less important to many of Kazakhstan’s citizens 
just how the new state defined itself.”200 The integration with Russia was also an instrument of 
consolidating the large Russian population. Here, Olcott makes an important point on the 
intersection of domestic and international impacts within the context of Kazakhstan’s relations 
vis-à-vis Russia: “Although president Nazarbayev understood that he had to maintain the support 
of the ethnic Kazakhs, he was also aware that Kazakhstan’s security depended upon the 
continued quiescence of the country’s large Russian population, as well as the more formal 
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support of Kazakhstan’s independence by Russia’s leaders.”201 By pursuing an integrationist 
policy Nazarbayev ensured public support of his presidency: “integration meant that those who 
were most disgruntled with Kazakhstan could still take comfort from their identification with the 
supranational entity that Nazarbayev hoped to form.”202  
Cummings’ constructivist and Olcott’s (neo)realist analyses of Kazakhstan’s foreign 
relations informed by the Russian factor both exemplify a “two-level game” framework where 
the republic’s leadership actions are attuned both by the domestic (large Russian minority) and 
international (Russia's interests) pressures and constrains.203 At the same time, if examined from 
a different conceptual angle, both authors underscore the importance of the republic’s leadership 
and its perceptions in their explanations. This point actually applies to all assessed works that 
touch upon Kazakhstan’s foreign policymaking. The literature on the topic implicitly or 
explicitly emphasizes the prominence of Nazarbayev’s or, more broadly, the ruling elite’s 
impact. As observed by Gleason: “the Central Asian states may be described as ‘top heavy’ in 
the sense that leadership predominates in the politics of the countries; the style and even 
psychological orientation of the leaders and their close entourages overshadow other factors.”204 
Analytically, then, the next step in the advancement of a comprehensive account of Kazakhstan’s 
foreign policy would be the investigation of how the policy is generated among the leadership. 
That is, through unpacking the “black box,” to illuminate how decisions were reached by 
Nazarbayev and his key advisers. 
  
Foreign policy decision-making process and structure in a glimpse 
Kasenov, who served in the beginning of 1990s as the advisor to president Nazarbayev for 
foreign policy and national security, and the head of the Centre for Strategic Studies (later 
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renamed Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies-KISI), was the first to plan out Nazarbayev’s 
decision-making apparatus.205 In Kasenov’s scheme the president was unambiguously the 
ultimate decision maker as he was “constitutionally and practically the one who [had] ‘supreme 
responsibility’ in foreign and defence matters and personally implement[ed] policy in these 
fields.”206 Apart from the president, policymaking authority was nested in the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, the President’s Apparatus (later transformed to the Administration of the 
President), and the Security Council. Here, the foreign ministry was in a privileged position as it 
provided the core of the foreign policy information and advice while the president’s apparatus 
mainly conducted organizational functions. Kasenov offers the following depiction of Almaty’s 
decision-making hierarchy: 
He [Nazarbayev] has his own foreign policymaking staff within the presidential apparatus to 
help him in conducting current, day-to-day foreign policy moves and activity. Of course, this 
staff relies on the foreign ministry and on other governmental bodies associated with foreign 
affairs.207 
 
The third principal institution, the Security Council, headed by the president, was in 
charge of handling all maters of national security. Its main purpose was the coordination of 
external and internal policies relating to state’s security and defence matters. At the same time 
Kasenov was sceptical about the Supreme Soviet’s influence on foreign policy agenda. This 
exclusion of the legislature is explained by the author as being due to the parliament’s political 
subservience to the president and lack of specialists on international affairs among the deputies’ 
corps. To illustrate the subordinated position of the Supreme Soviet, Kasenov notes that the 
accession to the NPT treaty was ratified in 1993 without any parliamentary debate.208 Kasenov’s 
Institute was also taking part in devising a foreign policy agenda by participating in “preparing, 
drafting, and evaluating the most important documents, programs, and moves in the areas of 
foreign policy and national security.”209 
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Kasenov draws a rather introductory portrayal of Kazakhstan’s foreign policymaking 
apparatus. His professional background did not allow him to elaborate on the subject, since he 
had access to confidential information, and certain legal restriction that applied as to what he 
could openly discuss, could possibly explain this fact. However, two remarks by Kasenov are 
noteworthy. First, the author notes the irregular and non-systemic character of foreign 
policymaking, suggesting that there was still an element of improvisation and ad hoc 
arrangements. Second, Kasenov claims that the “president is usually the key actor in the foreign 
policy decision-making process.”210 These two interrelated points imply that the policy process 
in the 1990s was not in fact as direct and bureaucratically organized as it may appear, leaving 
room for informal and behind the scenes decisional patterns.  
Rafis Abazov provides a more detailed analysis of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy decision-
making structures in two works.211 The author based his works on the results of the survey of 
local experts (scholars, journalists, students, diplomats, and parliamentary deputies) and follows 
the formation of foreign policymaking in the Central Asian states, where he draws a relatively 
comprehensive picture of earlier institutions and actors involved in the process.212  
Kazakhstan’s decision-makers were all part of the Soviet elite and this influenced 
organizational and ideational settings in which foreign policy was generated: “It is important to 
note that the experience of these [late Soviet] years positively influenced the establishing and 
functioning of the independent foreign policy institutions of the CAR [Central Asian Region] 
and accumulating the expertise.”213 Kazakhstan’s cadre training in diplomatic affairs under 
Soviet rule was the result of the Soviet foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze’s new policies 
which liberalized the republics’ international economic affairs and provided the opportunity for 
the Central Asians to occupy positions in the central apparatus of the Soviet foreign ministry and 
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211 These are: “Practice of Foreign Policymaking,” and Foreign Policy Formation. 
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diplomatic missions abroad, which were previously reserved only for diplomats from Slavic 
republics.214  
Ideationally, one of the positive effects was that the regional elites’ identity was more 
inclined towards technocratic political and economic views and much less to pan-Islamic or pan-
nationalist. The consequent ideas of the Eurasian Bridge or the Great Silk Road have taken 
prevalence as self-identification markers in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan respectively.215 Here, 
the discussion on the “model of development” greatly effected the course of the debate on the 
external orientation of Kazakhstan:  
The ‘model of development’ debate also became a useful tool in changing the self-identity of 
the Central Asians in the international arena and in preserving self-confidence in their painful 
dilemma of choosing between the Asia and Europe (within the Soviet Union they perceived 
themselves as the part of Europe).216  
 
Organizationally, the author observes that foreign policy decision-making configuration 
was in a larger part modelled after the Soviet one. For Abazov, there were three main institutions 
that played a major role in the process in Kazakhstan: 1) the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as an 
implementation body charged with everyday activities and coordination of the foreign missions’ 
work; 2) the International Department of the President’s Apparatus (ID AP), as another 
influential institutional actor; and, 3) the academia, as the third pillar of policy generation.217 
Abazov makes an intriguing assumption about Almaty inter-institutional processes. In his 
assertion, the foreign ministry and the International Department were competing with each other 
and the president himself encouraged this contestation.218 Another inference is made that the 
MFA did not possess enough expertise and was therefore incapable of generating policy advice 
without the assistance of academics.219 The high mobility between these three institutions 
created a “dynamic and democratic” policymaking environment: “There was quite an intensive 
exchange between the foreign policy experts from academic institutions and the government and 
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the president's foreign policymaking institutions.”220 Because the circle of policymakers was 
narrow and policy debates were encouraged, Abazov infers that the experts’ inputs affected the 
course of foreign policy to a considerable degree. However, as the author warns, the personaliti
of the president and the heads of the policymaking institutions had the most influen
policymaking.
es 
ce in 
                                                
221 
In his later work, Abazov elaborates on the interaction between different policymaking 
institutions and actors. He refers to the challenging policymaking environment where personnel 
and material resource deficiencies were complicated by the absence of any policy guidelines or 
principles whatsoever: “Moreover, since these republics were unprepared for independence, they 
did not have clearly formulated concepts of national interests, a fact that was aggravated further 
by the absence of historical precedents for their independent statehood, at least in modern 
times.”222 The author puts forward an argument that such a challenging policymaking context 
induced a collective decision-making culture with many domestic actors involved in policy 
formulation. Information collected from surveys allows Abazov to argue that the phenomenon of 
the collective formulation of foreign policy led to the situation where the foreign policy output 
came as a consequence of the interplay between the “internal political factors and…consensus 
between various actors,” rather than being “a direct reflection of external pressures and 
inputs.”223  
While an important point is made about the decentralization of policymaking, there seems 
to be a missing link in Abazov’s argument, where the author, on one hand, presumes that the 
fractured policymaking process at the level of the governmental experts and diplomats had 
impacted the policy output, and, on the other, concludes that decisions on foreign policy 
orientations were made by republic’s leaders. For example, Abazov writes on the nature of 
debates:  
 
220 Ibid 
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Debates [amongst the elite] were centred around a number of issues ranging from the priorities 
that the CAR [Central Asian Region states] should take in their bilateral and multilateral 
relations, to issues of security and what should be their responses to external and internal 
threats to the stability and independence of Central Asia.224  
 
At the same time he finds that the: 
Vulnerability to the Kremlin’s foreign policy, and the rise of Russian nationalism, have forced 
Central Asian leaders to seek a new security regime that would not rely solely upon Russian 
security guarantees, but would include guarantees from neighbouring states and some other 
important international players as well.225  
 
Here, it remains unclear how the policy debates were translated into the emanation of the new 
security regime, if they had at all. 
Without demonstration of how the region’s leaders’ foreign orientations, Nazarbayev’s 
specifically, were shaped by the internal debate among his diplomats, by showing, for example, 
which institution’s alternative was chosen by a leader and why, Abazov’s argument appears to be 
incomplete. The finding that “what seems to be the case is that various institutionalized groups 
and governments are competing for influence in the formation of foreign policy in this or that 
republic,”226 does not automatically infer that Kazakhstan’s foreign policy output was actually 
influenced by this competition in any way. This is especially so, given the assumed prevalence of 
the president’s decisional authority and leadership’s concern of the external threats.227 
Passolt links the foreign policy decision-making component with Kazakhstan’s policies 
toward Russia, China, and Central Asia.228 The author is interested in explaining how 
international and domestic context interplayed in producing the foreign policy: “How 
Kazakhstan dealt with these international constraints depended on how the issues were perceived 
and filtered through its leadership, concentrated in the hands of President Nazarbayev.”229  
Passolt further shows how the president “perceived and filtered” these external influences by 
sketching a general illustration of the Kazakhstani foreign policy decision-making apparatus, 
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borrowed in a large part from Abazov’s works.230 The principal conclusion the author makes 
from the “investigation into Kazakhstan's conduct of foreign policy” is that president 
Nazarbayev is the “dominant actor in foreign policymaking,” with all other actors and 
institutions not contributing much to the process.231  
To depict policymaking, Passolt “investigates the central foreign policy decision-making 
actors and institutions in terms of the legal framework in which they are anchored and their 
actual development.”232 Here, the reference is made to three main documents said to form a basis 
for a foreign policymaking process: 1) the Declaration on the State Sovereignty (titled by Passolt 
as the Declaration on State Independence), 25 October 1990; 2) the Declaration of Independence, 
16 December 1991; and, 3) the Constitution, 30 August 1995. Passolt refers to the third legal act, 
the Constitution of 1995, to describe the foreign policymaking structure in place for the period 
under examination (1991-2001), arguing, “Constitution is the key document that outlines the 
major foreign policy actors and institutions and their explicit responsibilities.”233 Naturally, 
Passolt cites constitutional passages on the principal role of the president who “decides on 
foreign goals, directions, and priorities, and adopts measures to implement them”; on the role of 
the Government that “develops measures for the conduct of foreign policy”; and on the role of 
the foreign ministry that “conducts foreign policy, implements decisions, and supervises the 
functioning of Kazakhstan's foreign embassies.”234 
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While the author does outline further some of the bureaucratic instances where foreign 
policymaking was conducted in the 1991-2001 period, like the Security Council (titled by 
Passolt as the National Security Council), or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Passolt overlooks 
other principal institutions, such as the International Department of the Apparatus of the 
President, the State Counsellor, or the Centre for Strategic Studies under the President. 
Moreover, Passolt’s illustration does not include such principal elements of decision-making 
process as a hierarchy of authority among the Kazakhstani leadership below the president, the 
level of formality of policymaking, or chains of command and execution.  
Such an underexposure of decision-making processes and structures may invoke certain 
aberrations. For example, at one point of the empirical investigation, Passolt comes to the 
questionable finding that foreign advisers made a principal contribution to the initial foreign 
policy agenda formulation:  
Immediately after independence, Kazakhstan lacked most of the essential foreign policy 
structures and it did not have competent personnel. As a consequence, Kazakhstan's leadership 
‘almost naturally’ developed a highly proactive, centralized foreign policy role assisted by 
foreign advisers. With the increasing development of institutions and the training of Kazakh 
foreign policy experts, the role of foreign advisers has declined.235  
 
Although the attribution of the postcolonial features of policymaking, such as the presence of 
foreign advisers, to Kazakhstan is understandable in the light of her thesis’s conceptual 
approach, this argument is not backed either by primary or secondary material in the body of 
Passolt’s dissertation.  
The principal reservation, however, must be made in relation to the explanatory value the 
section on the foreign policy decision-making holds in the light of the aim of Passolt’s research. 
It is unclear how the peculiarities of the Kazakhstani policymaking had affected Astana’s foreign 
policy in the studied period. In her work Passolt aims to prove that president’s perception of 
international constraints mattered to the foreign policy of the republic. However, without the 
detailed description of foreign policymaking mechanisms and processes, this goal seems 
unattainable. The principal argument followed is that Nazarbayev was the ultimate decision 
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maker in foreign matters with all other institutions subordinated to his office. Though this 
finding is a necessary operationalization precursor, it lacks a detailed analysis of a foreign policy 
processes. In particular, Passolt’s cases of Kazakhstan’s strategy toward Russia, China, and 
Central Asia are not followed by examinations of decision-making processes at times of 
elaboration of specific policies directed along these three vectors. A deeper study would have 
shown actors and institutions that might have had some input in a particular decision; the 
deliberations and arguments of the president himself and his closest advisers; or the activities, if 
any, of interest groups that lobbied a particular foreign policy orientation. Without this analysis, 
Passolt’s decision-making structure is still a “black box” where the president substitutes a state 
and seems to react to international and domestic factors in a robotic fashion. 
Empirical shortcomings noticeable in Bukkvoll’s article  also exemplify the need to 
examine the decision-making element in explanations of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy.236 As it is, 
Bukkvoll’s work remains a desk exercise that lacks primary data from the field, the need for 
which is necessitated by the paper’s argument. First, Bukkvoll’s central assertion is based on the 
assumption that Nazarbayev is dependent on interests groups around him and builds his foreign 
policy accordingly. At the same time, the author assumes that Nazarbayev is the ultimate foreign 
policy decision-maker: “foreign policy in Kazakhstan to an extreme degree is a one-man 
affair.”237 Therefore questions arise as to how and under what circumstances these groups’ 
international interests are transmitted into a foreign policy output. In Bukkvoll’s interpretation, 
the influence is indirect and based on Nazarbayev’s perception of perceptions and perception of 
intentions of various actors involved in policymaking. Here, a depiction of an actual decision-
making process through which Kazakhstan’s foreign policy orientation towards Russia and USA 
was formed would be quite helpful. Second, the author refers to assessments of a specific group 
of Kazakhstani and Russian commentators. To expose Nazarbayev’s interests and motives 
Bukkvoll cites only the hard-core critics of Nazarbayev’s regime (e.g. Akezhan Kazhegeldin or 
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Muzhamedzhan Adilov) whose analyses are based on their own significantly politicized 
speculations. Equally questionable is Bukkvoll’s reference to a testimony of an American 
businessman, from which the author makes far reaching inferences about Nazarbayev’s interests, 
writing: “If this source [testimony] is to be trusted, Nazarbayev is no stranger to personal gain 
from political decisions.”238 Again, since there is underlying assumption about the impact of 
Nazarbayev’s perceptions about possible reactions of various actors over foreign policy, a more 
viable reconstruction of Nazarbayev’s profile and worldview seems to be necessary to support 
the argument. 
Whereas the decision-making component has been examined to a relative degree in the 
current scholarship, it still seems conceptually and empirically possible to draw a more holistic 
depiction of policymaking processes in Kazakhstan and to integrate this component into the 
explanatory narrative in a more analytically sound manner. In particular, such elements as the 
nature of Nazarbayev’s interactions with his close associates, the dynamics of bureaucratic 
politics and policy debate, and the ruling elite’s personalities and worldviews appear to be 
underexplored. An interrelated point can be made that in the absence of primary information 
about what and how policy options and alternatives were discussed among policymakers any 
argument about their reflections of external or internal pressures remain speculative. Without 
such information, it cannot be convincingly demonstrated that the policymaking corps actually 
perceived a particular issue in the same manner as it was publicly discussed, and that a policy 
response correlated to the intended strategy and was not entirely informed by externally imposed 
constraints.239 
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Conclusion 
As argued in William Wohlforth’s assessment of the application of the balance of power theory 
to Central Asian politics, the answer to his argument as to why Kazakhstan had not balanced 
against, but had instead bandwagoned with Russia lies not in “a general theory,” but in “local 
history and politics.”240 This observation appropriately underlines the academic discussion of 
Kazakhstan’s foreign policy behaviour. Indeed, it can be concluded that there is a need to 
simultaneously consider systemic pressures exerted by the international system and to examine 
peculiarities of domestic affairs, leadership’s interests and policymaking processes. This will not 
only approximate a more insightful understanding of the nation’s foreign policy but would also 
allow recognition of the intended and complex nature of many of the republic’s strategies 
thereby allocating at least some agency to Kazakhstan. At the same time, without knowing the 
point and the mechanism at which external and internal structural factors refract through the 
policymaking apparatus of the republic, policy generation process remains “black boxed” and the 
argument in favour of the agency remains unsubstantiated.  
 
Straddling international and domestic factors in the explanation of the general phenomenon of 
Kazakhstan’s foreign policy seems to be a more conceptually challenging task than a 
conceptualization in this manner of specific foreign policy strategies (e.g. towards Russia) or 
focusing only on the one end of the causal chain (e.g. domestic politics). The neoclassical realist 
theory, discussed in detail in the following chapter, provides a researcher with the systematic 
conceptual framework linking both milieus. The analytical appeal of the application of the 
neoclassical realist theory to this study is reinforced by its epistemological capability for the 
integration of Nazarbayev’s foreign policymaking component, which, as it has been suggested in 
some of the works on Kazakhstan’s politics, has important explanatory power. 
 
                                                 
240 Wohlforth, “Revisiting Balance of Power,” 232. This thesis does not treat Kazakhstan’s policy towards Russia as 
bandwagoning, though. See, in particular, Chapter IV. 
 69 
 
Chapter III: Bridging neoclassical realism and foreign policy analysis 
 
The main argument of the thesis is that Kazakhstan’s foreign policy was not solely 
(pre)determined by the international structure and that unit-level factors, specifically the 
presidential decision-making element, have to be incorporated into the understanding of the 
phenomenon. Conceptually, this line of inquiry resonates with the central problem of 
neoclassical realism – how does the interplay of structural and domestic factors affect the foreign 
policy of a given state. The domestic variable in the focus of this work’s analysis is 
Nazarbayev’s foreign policy decision-making process and structure. This chapter will first 
discuss neoclassical realist theory and review the ways it allows the integration of the decision-
making variable into the framework. This discussion will be followed by the exploration of 
different approaches to the foreign policy decision-making analysis with the particular emphasis 
on the models of the presidential group decision-making. The conceptual framework applied in 
this thesis is developed in the concluding part of the chapter. 
 
Neoclassical realist framework 
Neoclassical realism is a considerably new theoretical addition to the field of international 
relations and to the foreign policy analysis school – it provides alternative readings of the 
mainstream systemic realism through the introduction of various domestic factors to the 
structural explanations of states’ behaviours on the international level. Gideon Rose coined the 
term, neoclassical realism, for this new theoretical approach in his review article Neoclassical 
Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy.241 Having reviewed several works which examined 
foreign policies of great powers in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Rose defined the 
theoretical model employed in these works as neoclassical realism and described the conceptual 
framework of this new model in the following way: 
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It explicitly incorporates both external and internal variables, updating and systematizing 
certain insights drawn from classical realist thought. It adherents argue that the scope and 
ambition of a country's foreign policy is driven first and foremost by its place in the 
international system and specifically by its relative material power capabilities. This is why 
they are realist. They argue further, however, that the impact of such power capabilities on 
foreign policy is indirect and complex, because systemic pressures must be translated through 
intervening variables at the unit level. This is why they are neoclassical.242  
 
Neoclassical realism finds its roots in empirical studies that aim to explain cases in the 
history of international relations when states pursued seemingly irrational or suboptimal foreign 
policies, which did not correspond to the imperatives of the international system. For example, 
one of the pioneers of the neoclassical realist approach, Aaron L. Friedberg, shows how Great 
Britain failed to respond to the relative power decline of the empire at the turn of the twentieth 
century due to the inadequate policymaking process by the “intellectually and bureaucratically” 
fragmented leadership.243 Randall L. Schweller explores the domestic factors behind states’ 
inability to rationally respond to the existing security threats in the international system.244 
Schweller calls this behaviour “underbalancing,” which occurs when a state “either misperceives 
the intentions of the rising power as more benign than they in fact are or, if it correctly perceives 
the threat, does not adopt prudent policies to protect itself for reasons of domestic politics.”245 
Such underbalancing behaviour is “directly contrary to the core prediction of structural realist 
school namely, that threatened states will balance against dangerous accumulations of power by 
forming alliances or building arms or both.”246 The author finds that whether a state balances 
properly or underbalances is largely determined by domestic political processes and less by 
systemic factors. Thomas J. Christensen studies the leadership’s attempts to mobilize national 
support for the realization of national security strategies.247 He argues that policymakers 
perceive strategic security threats more clearly than the general public. Thus, while leaders see 
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potential long-term risks in the international environment and try to mobilize “nation’s hum
and material resources behind security policy initiatives,” they are confronted with domestic 
political “hurdles to mobilization.”
an 
 
 
t of view:  
                                                
248 Policymakers utilize ideological instruments and even 
wage short-term conflicts to manipulate public opinion to overcome these hurdles and ensure
domestic support for costly long-term security strategies. Therefore, although some foreign 
policies may look deviant, a detailed study of the internal policymaking process may suggest that
the security policy was quite understandable from the leadership’s poin
By understanding the relationship between the international and domestic pressures leaders 
face in designing and implementing these sets of policies, we can sometimes expose a deeper 
rationale behind leaders’ decisions to create or prolong conflicts that might otherwise appear 
irrational or counterproductive.249 
 
Fareed Zakaria seeks to explain why did the USA not project its power abroad and expand in the 
years 1865-1889, when its economy was one of the strongest in the world.250 He is guided by the 
presumption that “a theory of foreign policy must not ignore domestic politics, national culture, 
and individual decision-makers.”251 Zakaria found in his case that the American political 
leadership’s perception of the state’s (governmental) ability to utilize national resources was 
more important than the leadership’s perception of the relative power of the USA internationally. 
Since the US executive was weak during the studied period, America’s relational economic 
power did not lead to US global expansion. 
 The logic of the abovementioned works underlines the principal neoclassical realist 
premise that the foreign policy of a state is necessarily the resultant of both external and internal 
factors – systemic constraints are channelled through domestic institutions of a state and the 
output of this process is a particular foreign policy or behavioural pattern that presents “a 
particular inconsistency in the basic realist model or a specific empirical puzzle.”252 Neoclassical 
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realism is thus useful in examinations of cases where “states do not respond ideally to their 
structural situations,” as Brian Rathbun writes, because it encourages a researcher to “find 
evidence of domestic politics and ideas distorting the decision-making process.”253 In this way, 
the neoclassical realist approach opens the “black box” of the unit (state) and thus identifies 
appropriate intervening variables that might influence a state’s foreign policy within the set 
structural parameters of the international system.  
The focus on explaining foreign policy is the distinguishing epistemological 
characteristic of neoclassical realism that sets it apart from the neorealist school – the former is 
the theory of foreign policy and not the theory of international relations. It has been explicitly 
stated that the latter is not directed to explain “why state X made a certain move last 
Tuesday.”254 Neorealism has a more general and parsimonious agenda to “describe the range of 
likely outcomes of actions and interactions of states within a given system and show how the 
range of expectations varies as systems change.”255 As to a foreign policy, neorealism explains 
“the constraints that confine all states,” perception of which “provides many clues to the 
expected reactions of states, but by itself the theory cannot explain those reactions.”256 Therefore 
in neorealism “much of the daily stuff of international relations is left to be accounted for by 
theories of foreign policy.”257  
Meanwhile, the neoclassical realist approach aims to achieve this exact objective – to 
understand, explain and predict the foreign policy behaviour of a state:  
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Theories of foreign policy answer the question: What will a state faced with these 
circumstances do? Predictions about aggregate state behaviour, such as the statement ‘states 
will balance against a threatening concentration of power,’ are not foreign-policy 
predictions.258 
 
While neoclassical realism asserts the primacy of the systemic factors, its utility for foreign 
policy analysis depends on the clarity of the systemic imperatives that states face.259 For a state, 
change in the relative power disposition sets the general parameters for the international 
behaviour, but cannot explain a “particular foreign policy or a specific historical event.”260 
Zakaria makes a similar presumption that neorealism cannot elucidate motives behind states’ 
international actions; it can only derive these motives from the systemic logic.261 On the 
contrary, a foreign policy theory, such as neoclassical realism, can provide detailed explanations 
as to “why different states, or the same state at different historical moments, have different 
intentions, goals, and preferences toward the outside world.”262 Benjamin O. Fordham notes that 
in contrast to both defensive and offensive neorealist assumptions about either aggressive or 
status quo security strategies of states these strategies represent only two out of a universe of 
alternative actual foreign policy orientations: “There have been pathologically aggressive 
regimes, suicidally passive ones, and virtually everything in between.”263 Similarly, it was noted 
that when, with the end of the Cold War, bipolarity was replaced with unipolarity, it was then 
necessary for the understanding of foreign policies of states to learn not only the “new 
configuration of power,” but also the “key security dilemma and perceptual variables that 
interact with polarity in shaping international alignments.”264 In short, neoclassical realism “fills 
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an explanatory gap” by identifying domestic mediating variables between systemic imperatives 
of structural realism and actual state behaviour.265 
The novelty of the neoclassical realist school that sets it apart from both neorealism and 
liberalist Innenpolitik is that it does not shift the causal weight to only one level of analysis, be it 
the international system or domestic factors, in explaining the foreign policy – it “locates causal 
properties at both the structural and unit levels.”266 Analytically, the structural imperatives of the 
international system enter the argument first, which is then supplemented and enhanced by the 
unit-level variables. However, it is the unit-level that is given the primary focus in neoclassical 
realism:  
The combination of environment and [domestic] process means that the systemic and the 
domestic can act as simultaneous independent variables in the realist argument. The anarchic 
environment remains primarily but indirectly causal, while [domestic] process remains 
secondarily but directly causal.267 
 
The causal link of neoclassical realism can be schemed this way: 
Figure 1.1: Neoclassical realist causal chain 
 
Structure/System condition or constraint (Independent variable)  Domestic institutions (Intervening variable) 
 Foreign policy act or behavioral pattern (Dependent variable) 
 
Systemic imperatives 
Neoclassical realism imports neorealist assumptions concerning the effect that the international 
structure exerts over states and about the ideal models of states’ behaviour in the international 
arena. For neoclassical realists, the primary modifiers of states’ foreign policies are the 
distribution of power in the international system, as well as the decision-makers’ perceptions of 
these relative power capabilities.268 This is the result of the anarchic nature of world politics in 
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which “states recognize that…there is no overarching authority to prevent others from using 
violence, or the threat of violence, to destroy or enslave them.”269  
Contrary to offensive and defensive realists, neoclassical realism finds such an 
international system to be “neither Hobbesian nor benign but murky and difficult to read.”270 
Such situation leads to the “pervasive uncertainty and potential threats” that is a common 
denominator applicable to all units in the international system.271 Therefore, states are compelled 
to be attentive to relative power distribution and their own material capabilities if they are to 
survive such anarchic conditions of international relations. Thus it is presumed that the aim of 
survival “is a prerequisite to achieving any goals that states may have, other than the goal of 
promoting their own disappearance as political entities.”272 The logic of survival in the anarchic 
international environment lies as “the ‘basis’ for the entire [systemic neorealist] theory and leads 
to all other realist assumptions, arguments, and predictions.”273 It is perfectly natural, then, for 
states to put a high premium on security that is seen as “the most important value in an anarchic 
international system.”274 Therefore, the foreign policy of a state in the conditions set by the 
anarchical structure of international system is premised on the need to search for strategies to 
maximize its security relative to other states. Seen this way, a state’s foreign policy choices will 
primarily be affected and guided by “military, economic, political and geographical factors” 
which, combined, result in “hierarchies of power and influence” in the international structure.275 
The power capabilities of a state and its relative position within the international system 
therefore have an enduring effect over states’ interests and motives, “making certain policy 
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options more attractive to them than others.”276 For example, it is expected for a weaker state to 
balance against more powerful states by entering into alliances with states of similar material 
capabilities, bandwagoning with more powerful states, or increasing their own military 
capabilities. However, neorealism, presuming the logic of survival and self-help behind state’s 
international actions, “is unconcerned with and cannot account for specific state responses to 
external stimuli, whether or not such responses are characteristic or anomalous, prudent or 
reckless,” and “additional assumptions about actors’ rationality in responding to the international 
system are necessary if we are to argue from the international distribution of capabilities to the 
security strategies of particular nation-states.”277 The presumed effect of the international system 
does not automatically tell what states will do, only what they are ought to do – the structure 
imposes a corridor of constraining and facilitating factors within which states can manoeuvre and 
act as they wish. 
 
Non-unitary and irrational state 
Neoclassical realism, being a theory of foreign policy, sets itself apart from the neorealist 
conception of a state as a rational unitary actor, whose policymakers accurately perceive the 
state’s position in the international system and choose foreign policies that correspond to this 
presumably objective perception. For neoclassical realists such “notion of a smoothly 
functioning mechanical transmission belt is inaccurate and misleading.”278 This divergence 
underpins two interrelated points of conceptual disagreement – the problem of rationality of 
states’ policymakers and foreign outputs produced by them, and the problem of “black boxing” 
the state and viewing it as a unitary actor. These problems stem from the perception that 
“anarchy is the driving factor in realism from which unitary actor and rationalism ‘assumptions’ 
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flow, and because anarchy is not determinative, nothing in neorealism leads us to expect the 
absence of domestic politics or ideas.”279  
The concept of rationality implies that a state pursues only those foreign policies that 
originate from the objective understanding of the anarchic international system “without 
illusions.”280 Under this concept states should be attentive to their international environments, 
count only on themselves, and be prepared to be socialized in the international system by 
imitating the successful practices of the most powerful nations in the system. As Waltz asserts, 
“those who do not help themselves, or who do so less effectively than others, will fail to prosper, 
will lay themselves open to dangers, will suffer. If some do relatively well, others will emulate 
them or fall by the wayside.”281 Here the notion of a strict situational determinism of a 
“straitjacket” and a “single exit” logic that leaves states with no freedom of choice since any 
action will only lead to the outcomes predicted by the theory comes to mind.282 When states do 
not act rationally then a foreign policy output is considered to suboptimal relative to some 
normative standard; neorealism predicts that in the long-run such states will be punished by the 
system and face “fatal results.”283 
As it was noted earlier, it is deviant cases in the history of international affairs when 
states acted irrationally, which are examined through the application of a neoclassical theoretical 
framework. Rose clearly argues that, although ultimately the systemic pressure will make states 
conform to the systemic requirements, actual states’ policies in a short- and medium-term do not 
track objective material constraints.284 Taliaferro et al. advance the point further: 
In the short run, anarchy gives states considerable latitude in defining their security interests, 
and the relative distribution of power merely sets parameters for grand strategy. The actual task 
of assessing power and the intentions of other states is fraught with difficulty. The calculations 
and perceptions of leaders can inhibit a timely and objectively efficient response or policy 
adaptation to shifts in the external environment.…Over the long run, however, regimes or 
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leaders who consistently fail to respond to systemic incentives put their state’s very survival at 
risk.285 
 
Neoclassical realist theory is therefore interested in providing plausible explanations of 
anomalous (from the systemic logic perspective) foreign policies and strategies ex ante of their 
punishment by the system in the long run. Noting the empirical difficulties of tracing long-term 
repercussion of the irrational foreign policy choices and operationalization of penalties imposed 
by the system, B. I. Finel makes a point that it is impossible to validate or invalidate an argument 
about the primacy of systemic constraints and opportunities that will manifest over other 
variables only in the long-run.286 Adam Quinn draws a similar general ontological observation: 
“After all, if a state can behave in contradiction of the imperatives of a supposedly selective 
system for an indefinite period without being forced to alter its policy or being overhauled by 
competitors, then what evidence is there that the systemic imperative actually exists?”287 
Therefore, non-optimal foreign policy responses, which go against the systematic imperatives, 
can be seen not as anomalous, but as regular, consistent and lasting patterns that cannot be 
expected to conform to systemic requirements over the long run.288 
Neoclassical realists do not view a state as a unitary actor and this assumption is at the 
core of the model that introduces unit-level variables. The model of a unitary state equates 
calculations and actions of individual or institutional decision-makers with interests of the state 
and, therefore, treats state’s policymaking bodies simply as the uniformed utilitarian instrument 
reflexively responsive to signals from the international system – hence the concepts of “black 
boxes” and “billiard balls.” States are treated as metaphorical actors endowed with goals and 
rationality; and scholars have largely “ignored what goes on behind state doors.”289 It is natural, 
then, that within the “black box” concept the causal impact of the unit-level variables is ignored 
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or denied.290 Contrary to this perception, neoclassical realism, while acknowledging the 
influence of the international system, concurrently recognizes the domestic variables below the 
unit-level of analysis. Neoclassical realism “begins with the premise that ideal state behaviour is 
that which conforms with the unitary actor and objectivity premises of neorealism but shows that 
when these conditions are not met empirically, domestic politics and ideas are the culprits.”291 
Therefore, it is the domestic processes and actors that derail states from the path of conformity to 
the imperatives of the international structure, as they are not unitary: 
States are complex entities that can be empirically demonstrated to be divided along political 
and bureaucratic lines. In addition, elite competition, public opinion, and historical lessons all 
play a demonstrable role in defining the policy process. Whether states behave as if they were 
unitary actors is not at issue. They may or they may not, and this issue will affect the empirical 
validity of theoretically derived predictions.292 
 
To rephrase Schweller, the less domestic factors, such as the policymaking process and 
internal polarity of a state, approximate a unitary actor, the less accurate are the realism 
predictions.293 Neoclassical realists rightly ask why is it that among presumably unitary and 
rational states there is a “variation in the foreign policies of the same state over time or across 
different states facing similar external constraints”?294 In a similar vein, Christensen and Snyder 
noted on cold war historical puzzles: “The behaviour of cold war policymakers has sometimes 
violated these [systemic] prescriptions, but we believe that this had more to do with perceptual or 
domestic political factors than with the structural properties of bipolarity.”295 
Neoclassical realist theory attempts to answer these questions by reaching below the 
systemic level explanations because “the loose structural factors of international politics – 
polarity, balance of power, long cycles, borders, regimes – may constrain individual choices, but 
they do not determine behaviour.”296 Agreeing with neorealists that the features of the 
international system and the relational parameters of a state establish the general contours of its 
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foreign policy, neoclassical realism presumes that domestic factors may have significant 
influence in distorting systemic pressures: 
[Neoclassical realism’s] theoretical insights have not contradicted the propositions of structural 
or classical realism but have instead complemented and extended them by specifying and 
further developing the non-structural arguments, causal processes, and linkages at the domestic 
and international levels implied by (structural) realist theories of balance of power and 
hegemonic rivalry.297  
 
 What exactly are those non-systemic factors that cause foreign policies to deviate from 
the presumed systemic imperatives? As posed by Taliaferro et al.: “How and under what 
circumstances will domestic factors impede states from pursuing the types of strategies predicted 
by balance of power theory and balance of threat theory?”298 Neoclassical realists find a wide 
selection of these factors. 
Friedberg’s study of the British decline led him to conclude that leader’s misperceptions 
and mistakes in calculating power capabilities of other nations combined with fragmented 
policymaking structure created the situation where the UK’s assessment of its own and relative 
power was not “the product of a single mind or agency” and the response was thus 
uncoordinated and inefficient.299 Schweller’s work concerned instances when states balanced or 
underbalanced against accumulated power in their international environment. Schweller found 
that states’ responses to these perceived external threats are subject to four intervening variables: 
1) decision-makers’ consensus about the external threat; 2) decision-making body’s internal 
solidity; 3) decision-makers’ sensibility to political pressure from opposition; and, 4) social 
cohesion.300 Christensen argues that the ability of a state to mobilize domestic political support 
for implementing “grand strategies” is essential for explaining state’s behaviour 
internationally.301 Zakaria finds that stronger the state’s ability to extract national resources and 
the more powerful the presidential executive is in comparison to the legislation, the more likely 
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it is that the USA will expand its interests internationally.302 These cases are instructive of how 
many unit-level variables can be integrated into foreign policy explanations within the 
neoclassical realist framework. At the same time, these works all are examples of how domestic 
factors serve a function of the intervening variable between the international context and the 
foreign policy output. Conceptualized this way,   
complex domestic political processes act as transmission belts that channel, mediate, and 
(re)direct policy outputs in response to external forces (primarily, changes in relative power). 
Hence, states often react differently to similar systemic pressures and opportunities, and their 
responses may be less motivated by systemic-level factors than domestic ones.303  
 
Norrin M. Ripsman’s analytical framework illustrates how this “transmission belt” works 
– how domestic political matters can influence the national security agenda of a state.304 The 
author makes a case for the involvement of interest groups, public opinion, media, and 
legislature in the foreign security policymaking process. He argues that these factors, often 
interlinked in domestic political processes, are found to influence strategic decisions made by the 
foreign policy executive.305 Domestic political actors may exert certain influence over a foreign 
policy executive because the latter 
is dominated, above all, by individuals who wish to retain their hold on power, and secondarily 
to pass their preferred policy agendas, they should be most receptive to influence from 
domestic actors who can provide or deny electoral support or, in non-democratic states, 
preserve the leader’s position or topple him/her.306  
 
At the same time, while a foreign policy executive possesses much of the information on 
the international level and is driven in its decisions by international constraints and incentives he 
is well aware of, the domestic actors, such as representatives of the legislature or other political 
groups, not directly involved in foreign affairs, are motivated mostly by domestic political 
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reasons, parochial interests, or even personal considerations.307 Given these presumptions, 
international systemic constraints are not necessarily translated directly into the national security 
strategies because these strategies may be shaped according to the interests of and as the result of 
the activities of these domestic actors. Such an effect, however, is lesser in crisis situations, 
“when the margin for error is minimal, the national security executive will have powerful 
incentives to ignore domestic political interests and formulate security policy with the overriding 
goal of securing the state.”308 The author further presumes a correlation between the influence of 
domestic actors over national security policy and the character of decision-making employed in a 
particular state – the more autonomous an environment is in which a foreign policy executive 
operates, the lesser the degree of influence domestic actors have.309 At the same time, Ripsman 
finds that even in instances where domestic factors can influence national security policies, these 
changes are usually minor, for as the national interests and national strategies are a prerogative 
of a foreign policy executive; domestic actors may only change the “timing and style” of security 
policies.310 Therefore, a state’s interests and strategies are principally shaped by the international 
systemic environment in which a given state operates, and only tactically adjusted by domestic 
political forces.311 Nevertheless, the impact of domestic politics is asserted and tangible.  
Contrary to the situation with systemic variables, neoclassical realists do not converge on 
a single domestic factor that has causal primacy. As Zakaria suggests, “one can locate the reason 
for national preferences at any level of analysis.”312 Here, domestic political settings, national 
cultural, or individual decision-makers’ preferences play a role.313 Students of neoclassical 
realism suggest the possibility of introducing various unit-level variables into the theory: 
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political culture, nature of the regime, executive and legislative divide; partisan politics, public 
opinion, media, bureaucratic politics, interests groups, strong and weak state apparatus 
dichotomies; state-society relations; regime’s interests that run contrary to the state interest; 
small-group dynamics; leadership’s perception and misperception; and domestic political 
sentiments.314 Given the diversity of domestic factors, Robert Gilpin’ observation is pertinent 
here: “It is impossible to formulate in a systematic and exhaustive fashion the domestic 
determinants of the foreign policies of the states.”315 
 
Decision-making variable  
The importance of the decision-making variable is implicitly recognized in neoclassical realism. 
Seen in such a way, this variable may play a role in a foreign policy formation mainly in 
instances when a state’s political configuration may widen or narrow the range of opportunities 
for acting internationally. What is left overlooked, however, is the way the process and the 
format of the decision-making itself can influence the foreign policy of a state. In particular, the 
neoclassical realist discussions of foreign policymaking variables do not focus on the roles of 
presidents and their advisory structures. Despite the findings that, as will be shown below, 
presidential policymaking has elsewhere been found to be a crucial component in foreign policy 
output, in neoclassical realism the presidents’ roles are attenuated within the broader contexts of 
state apparatuses’ policymaking. Shiping Tang explicitly criticizes the theory for this conceptual 
lacuna:  
Although neoclassical realists unanimously emphasize the role of policymaking executives, the 
role of leaders has been mostly missing from the discussion. Yet, there is no doubt that 
individual decision-maker traits, especially their personality and worldview, have all impacted 
their decisions. After all, it is leaders that construct threat, debate and decide strategies, and 
order mobilizations.316 
 
 The importance of the involvement of a state’s leadership in foreign policy output 
through the (mis)perception of challenges and opportunities of the international environment and 
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devising appropriate policy responses is presumed in neoclassical realism: “State leaders or the 
FPE [foreign policy executives] occupy critical positions in the administration, and are 
responsible for long-term grand strategic planning, including the identification of changes in the 
global or regional balance of power.”317 However, examinations of actual decisional and 
cognitive processes of information interpretation, analysis and strategy elaboration by leaders are 
omitted from the neoclassical realist agenda. 
For example, Christensen presumes that “leaders misperceive the distribution of 
capabilities, they may stand aside at crucial junctures in a conflict, overreact to insignificant 
threats, or even assist the wrong side in a war” and that “leaders mistake stronger states for 
weaker ones, they may even join the side of the mighty, thereby behaving more like 
bandwagoners than balancers.”318 However, Christensen’s work does not aim at exploring 
decisional processes of how these misperceptions and mistakes occur in leaders’ minds – 
leaders’ beliefs are taken as given. Consider Christensen’s accounts of Soviet and Western 
leaders’ miscalculations before the Second World War:  
Actually, Stalin apparently misperceived the European security environment on both counts. 
Not only did he (falsely) believe that defence had the advantage in the western theatre but also 
he believed that Britain and France combined were much more powerful than Germany.319  
 
Additionally: 
As early as spring 1938, British analysts made one thing very clear in their strategic 
assessments: French defence mattered to Britain, even if Belgium fell. Britain wanted France to 
extend its defences from north-eastern France, where the formal Maginot Line ended, to the 
sea.320  
  
Here, the leadership’s perceptions about the surrounding strategic environment are 
conceptualized as products of either single or collective minds exogenously introduced to the 
analysis and not related to the internal policymaking processes.  
Meanwhile, Schweller recalls that what matters in foreign policy analysis are not only 
elite’s calculations of “cost and risk” but also which elites' preferences and perceptions dominate 
                                                 
317 Lobell, “Threat Assessment,” 46.  
318 Thomas J. Christensen, “Perceptions and Alliances in Europe, 1865-1940,” International Organization 51, no. 1 
(1997): 68. 
319 Ibid, 92. 
320 Ibid, 86. 
 85 
 
through the policymaking process.321 Similarly, Fordham notes: “We cannot know whether a 
particular international event or condition constitutes a threat, an opportunity, or an irrelevancy 
until we know who was selected to enter the ranks of the state leaders charged with making 
decisions about these matters.”322 Moreover, strategic choices are found to be made because they 
make sense to political actors not only with reference to the international environment contexts 
but also with reference to the domestic policymaking process contexts.323 This resonates with 
Rose’s general argument that in “the neoclassical realist world leaders can be constrained by 
both international and domestic politics.”324 Rose’s point on domestic politics should not be 
limited analytically to the nature of political regime or executive-legislature divide in the state 
under investigation; it may well suggest a broader research agenda, including analyses of the 
policymaking processes at the top levels of leadership. 
Since the neoclassical realist paradigm implicitly provides for the importance of decision-
making process as the domestic determinant of a state’s foreign policy, it seems useful to 
synthesize it with the conceptual constructs from the foreign policy decision-making analysis 
subfield. In fact, proponents of neoclassical realism encourage such an epistemological strategy: 
“[neorealist] theory must be cross-fertilized with other theories before it will make determinate 
predictions at the foreign policy level.”325 Foreign policymaking structures and processes can 
serve as important domestic modifiers of foreign policy which can possibly lead to outcomes 
divergent from systemic prescriptions. This suggests that an examination of these processes can 
produce closer and more detailed explanations of historical cases within the neoclassical realist 
analytical framework.  
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Foreign policy decision-making perspective 
Foreign policy decision-making is an approach to explain a state’s foreign policy from the 
perspectives which are different to systemic theories. This approach is more concerned not with 
the question of what kind of a foreign policy a state pursues, but rather with the questions of how 
and why a state has made a specific policy choice.326 More specifically, it seeks to explain how a 
specific foreign policy choice was arrived at by the individual, group, or organizational agents 
involved in the decisional process.327 Hence, the foreign policy analysis subfield unpacks the 
“black box” of a state and explores the various unit-level variables and their effect over a foreign 
policy outcome. Pioneers of the foreign policy decision-making analysis subfield, Snyder et al., 
provide the following operational formula: 
It is also one of our basic choices to define the state as its official decision-makers – those 
whose authoritative acts are, to all intents and purposes, the acts of the state. State action is the 
action taken by those acting in the name of the state. Hence, the state is its decision-makers. 
State X as actor is translated into its decision-makers as actors. It is also one of our basic 
choices to take as our prime analytical objective the re-creation of the ‘world’ of the decision-
makers as they view it. The manner in which they define situations becomes another way of 
saying how the state oriented to action and why.328 
 
This principal postulation reflects the neoclassical realist premise that the state is not a unitary 
and rational actor whose behaviour can satisfactorily be explained through reference to the 
systemic context. Viewed this way, a primary generator of a foreign policy can be a nation's 
leader, cabinets of bureaucrats charged with developing a foreign policy course, or the inner 
circle of a president’s trusted advisers who ensemble a group dealing with all security and 
strategic matters of a state.329 
In the study of US foreign policy, Graham T. Allison challenged the assumption that 
states should be treated as rational unitary actors, demonstrating that factors below the state level 
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may have a profound effect over a foreign policy outcome.330 Allison created an analytical 
framework within which he simultaneously applied three different perspectives or “conceptual 
lenses” through which to examine Soviet and US decision-making during the Cuban Missile 
Crisis. In addition to the Rational Actor model, Allison advanced two alternative readings of this 
historic event – the Bureaucratic Politics model and the Organizational Politics model. His case 
attempted to provide explanations for the following questions: 1) why did the USSR decide to 
install missiles in Cuba; 2) why did the USA impose a naval blockade as a response; and, 3) why 
did Soviets pulled back and dismantled missile sites? 
The concept of rationality underpinning the Rational Actor model implies that a 
government acting in the name of the state pursues foreign policies deemed to maximize its 
interests and with presumed perfect situational knowledge. It “consists of showing what goal the 
government was pursing when it acted and how the action was a reasonable choice, given the 
nation’s objective.”331 According to this model, the Soviets installed nuclear missiles in Cuba to 
overcome a shortage of ICBMs and to gain strategic nuclear advantage in the Cold War rivalry. 
The Americans decided to blockade the island because Kennedy and his advisers believed this 
move would be a signal to Nikita Khrushchev, compelling him to react, but not allowing the 
situation escalate to the level of direct military confrontation. The withdrawal of nuclear missiles 
was the result of the Soviets’ belief that America’s realistic attack on Cuba could instigate a 
nuclear war, which Khrushchev did not want to start over such cause as offshore nuclear 
missiles. There were, however, many moments in the Soviet and American behaviour that could 
not be understood from the rational actor model’s perspective. Thus, two more “conceptual 
lenses” are employed to the case study. 
The Organizational Process model (Model II) treats foreign policy decision-making as a 
routine process of application of pre-set policy solutions to dealing with incoming foreign policy 
issues. Within such a process, governmental institutions follow what is called standard operation 
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procedures, where a new foreign policy issue is matched with a foreign policy solution that has 
been already applied to a similar issue before. The focus of attention is therefore “the 
organizational structures, procedures and repertories.”332 Here, a foreign policy decision is made 
not by one centralized authority, but is the resultant of outputs of many organizations that each 
have their own logic and standards. Allison uses this model to explain why the Soviets did not 
camouflage Soviet military installations from U-2 surveillance planes. Since the military units 
responsible for building bases had previously worked only on the Soviet territory they did not 
have a procedure for disguising a base – units “had no routine for camouflage, having never 
camouflaged construction activity in the Soviet Union.”333 Meanwhile, the US Air Force and US 
Navy operational capabilities shifted Kennedy’s decision in favour of naval blockade rather than 
air strikes. As for the Soviet leadership, the absence of contingency planning led to the decision 
to withdraw missiles from the island. 
The governmental politics model (Model III) focuses on the way decision-making body’s 
composition and hierarchy impacts a foreign policy decision. Here, a foreign policy is viewed as 
the result of “pulling and hauling” between bureaucracies and their representatives who each 
have their own interests and vision:  
To explain why a particular formal governmental decision was made, or why one pattern of 
governmental behaviour emerged, it is necessary to identify the games and players, to display 
the coalitions, bargains, and compromises, and to convey some fell for the confusion.334 
 
This perceptual lens allows Allison to explain Khrushchev’s desire to place missiles in Cuba by 
reference to the internal political debate in the Soviet Union whereby the First Secretary 
Khrushchev wanted to strengthen his position in the CPSU Central Committee by this act. For 
Kennedy, upcoming congressional elections led him to be inclined towards a more decisive 
response to the Soviet’s move. Meanwhile, the internal debate in the ad hoc group of presidential 
advisers, the Executive Committee of the National Security Council, which took place shortly 
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after CIA’s humiliation in the Bay of Pigs fiasco, convinced Kennedy to impose a naval 
blockade instead of air strikes.  
The importance of Allison’s study is that it theoretically and empirically demonstrates 
that a full account of a foreign policy can only be achieved by combining the analysis of various 
domestic actors since the notion of a state as a rational “black box” will not always suffice in 
explaining all details of a historical case in question. 
The bureaucratic politics model, as portrayed by Allison, focuses on the way decision-
making organization and structure impacts a foreign policy decision. The fundamental 
assumption of the bureaucratic politics model can be formulated through the Miles’ law: “where 
you stand depends on where you sit.”335 Here, decision-makers representing or heading bureaus 
have institutional affiliations with their respective organizations and will pursue the policy that 
protects and advances the agency’s interest, that not always coincides with the perceived national 
interests. Therefore bureaucracies, as decision-making bodies, are viewed as “hierarchical 
organizations that jealously protect their own turf by controlling policy in their area of 
expertise.”336 The bureaucratic politics model similar to Allison's was elaborated by Morton 
Halperin et.al., who argue that a bureaucracy’s mission, capability, influence, and essence are the 
main institutional interests underlying the interactions of different US federal agencies and 
determining their impact on foreign policy formulation and implementation.337 As summarized 
by Rosati and Scott:  
Governmental politics describes a policymaking process that is neither centralized under the 
president nor rational, but rather is based on a pluralistic policymaking environment where 
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power is diffused and the process revolves around political competition and compromise 
among the policymakers.338  
 
In Rosati’s view, the nature of the bureaucratic politics depends on the interplay of the 
decision-making structure (the level of the involvement of the highest ranking authorities) and 
the decision-making context (the level of criticality of the foreign policy issue).339 Rosati 
concludes that bureaucratic politics are most likely to have explanatory power if a foreign policy 
issue is of moderate importance, making the top decision makers' involvement low and, 
correspondingly, more mid-level bureaucrats taking charge of a given foreign policy.340 
However, Preston and Hart suggest that it is possible to attribute bureaupolitics to any level of 
decision-making and any situational context.341 As an example, they refer to Allison’s account of 
CIA and US Air Force leaderships’ bureaucratic struggle of who would pilot the U-2 that led to 
the delay in the US discovery of Soviet installations and intensification of the situation for 
Kennedy as the result.342 
 Allison’s description of the bureaucratic political struggle in the ExComm and its 
consequent impact on US decisions during the event pinpoint the role that small group decision-
making may play in foreign policy generation. Irving L. Janis conducted the first study of small 
group decision-making in relation to foreign policy outcomes through the concept of 
“groupthink” – which is a “deterioration of mental efficiency, reality testing and moral judgment 
that results from in-group pressures.”343 Janis argued that decision-making in small cohesive 
groups is detrimental to the quality of a foreign policy. According to Janis, such groups will 
inevitably produce poor decisions because the inclination towards maintenance of group 
uniformity and concurrence induces uncritical thinking thereby making an alternative (even if 
possibly better) policy choice become unnecessary, overlooked or purposefully rejected. 
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Meanwhile, Hart et al. disagree with evaluating any instances of group decision-making in such 
an uncomplimentary manner, they state that: “It seems eminently reasonable...to treat groupthink 
as a contingent phenomenon, rather than as a general property of foreign policy decision-making 
in high-level groups,” arguing that group decision-making has many variations apart from 
“groupthink.”344  
Whereas it is possible to observe cases when foreign policy decisions were reached by a 
small group of policymakers at the top (e.g. Politburo or COBR committee), it is empirically 
difficult to differentiate between instances when the group decision-making prevailed, or a single 
powerful person overran the entire policymaking process. In the latter case, this invites the 
analytical focus to be shifted onto the individual properties of a leader. Indeed, as Hermann and 
Hagan comment on the importance of leaders for the foreign policymaking goes:  
Leaders define states' international and domestic constraints. Based on their perceptions and 
interpretations, they build expectations, plan strategies, and urge actions on their governments 
that conform to their judgments about what is possible and likely to maintain them in their 
positions.345 
 
Although this is a viable perspective on decision-making, at the same time Burke and Greenstein 
rightly remark that any leader (president) is not alone in making policy choices and that “the 
properties of the president's principal associates can be as significant as his own strengths 
and weaknesses.”346 
 
Presidential foreign policymaking 
The presidential foreign policymaking perspective serves as a nexus between small group and 
leader’s policymaking. As George formulates: “Together, a president and his advisers can be 
said to form a group (or groups) in the sense that they engage in continuing, at least partly 
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structured, task-oriented relationships with each other.”347 In particular political systems and 
under certain conditions, the presidential advisory group becomes the “authoritative decision 
unit” that makes foreign policy choices and initiates foreign policy actions.348 A president’s 
advisory group is usually comprised by the members of the presidential administration and 
any other individuals inside and outside the state bureaucracy whom a president chooses to 
consult with.349 An examination of the group foreign policymaking adds much to the 
understanding of international behaviour of a state in circumstances when an advisory group is at 
the “apex of the policymaking process” and when such a group produces “crucial, formative 
policy decisions that shape significant part of a country's foreign policy.”350 Indeed, there is a 
large volume of literature that studies crucial foreign policy episodes in the history of states, 
especially the history of the USA, that focuses on decision-making in presidential advisory teams 
and other types of small decision groups with a leading role for the chief state executive.351 The 
empirical evidence suggests that, depending on the political structure of a state and situational 
circumstances, these advisory groups can take different forms and pursue different tasks. Such 
groups may be in place to constantly work on all matters of foreign and defence policy (e.g. 
Politburo in the USSR), they can be organized ad hoc to deal specifically with a particular 
foreign policy issue (e.g. ExComm in the US), or they can be engaged only during particular 
types of international situations (e.g. COBR committee in the UK). 
 Renshon and Renshon, in the discussion of strategic policymaking by presidents and their 
advisory teams raise important questions: “Which agencies or individuals will be involved in the 
decision-making process, and in what ways? Will individuals simply speak their minds, or will 
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they have predefined 'roles'?”352 George, analyzing the format of interactions between the 
president and his advisers, outlines the following purposes of the presidential advisory groups: 
the president uses advisers for information and advice, thus satisfying his cognitive needs before 
a decision is made; the emotional support is gained by the president from advisers so that the 
psychological burden of making important decisions with long-reaching consequences is shared; 
the understanding and support for whatever policy decision is made is mutually important for 
the president as a recipient, and for advisers, as they are ensured that their views are solicited and 
considered by their leader; the political legitimacy of a foreign policy decision is increased if 
such a decision was made collectively and responsibility is shared by properly constituted 
officials.353 
Expanding George’s classification of the functions of advisory groups, Hart et al. make 
an exhaustive overview of the range of possible roles and tasks, which various decision-making 
groups may perform in the foreign policymaking process.354 From the typology they develop, 
four group decision-making roles can be attributed specifically to the presidential advisory 
groups.  
1. A notion of a group as a “think tank” encompasses high-level policymaking advisory 
groups and committees, which produce policy solutions on a wide range of 
international issues on both regular and ad hoc bases. The main purpose of such 
groups or teams is to collectively process information and elaborate policy options. 
The “think tank” metaphor underscores collective decision-making, which is found to 
be “demonstrably superior” to individual decision-making, especially in dealing with 
novel, complex, and unstructured problems. 
2. A “command centre” group is a well-defined small-scale unit at the top of the state 
apparatus that has the ultimate decisional authority to make strategic foreign policy 
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choices and to control their implementation by the state bureaucracy. Such groups are 
usually observable when a high-salience foreign problem, such as international crisis, 
emerges. In these cases, decisional authority contracts at the highest level of the state 
apparatus. In presidential systems a “command centre” is a small group of the 
president’s key advisers who gather both in formal and informal meetings and assist 
the president in arriving at decisions, and subsequently realize them in practice. 
3. A group as a “sanctuary” unit is formed to provide social and emotional support to 
the leader who has to make fateful decisions, such as, for example, going to war, 
entering into a disarmament treaty, or joining alliances. These decisions are often a 
choice between equally unattractive alternatives that lead to immediate repercussions 
and criticism. A close circle of the president’s most trusted associates and advisers 
who have similar worldviews, values and beliefs, often serve as a sanctuary from the 
overwhelming pressures and responsibilities he faces. The existence of such group 
may not be known to general public as the president often meets with his innermost 
associates unofficially.  
4. A group as a “smokescreen” is the formal, official decision-making forum that the 
leader uses to legitimize decisions he has come to in other informal groups and 
settings. This is also useful for concealing actual policymaking processes at the 
highest level of state bureaucracy.355  
Deriving from this typology different functional patterns that decision-making groups 
demonstrate, Hart et al. conclude that in the empirical reality, which is found to be 
ambiguous and fuzzy, one such group can perform different functions simultaneously. That 
is, both “think tank” and “sanctuary” roles may be fulfilled by the same team of president’s 
advisers working on a particular issue.356 
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 Patrick Haney provides a more generic understanding of the presidential advisory group's 
function, which is to assists the president in processing information and provide him with advice 
and analysis.357 Therefore, what decision the president will make, to a certain extent depends on 
the type of advice he receives from his advisers. In instances when a president has formal or 
informal political authority to guide foreign relations of a state, the impact of the advisory group 
on the foreign policy outcome is noticeable. As noted by George: “all executives rely to some 
extent on a relatively small number of advisers and staff to ferret out information, make 
suggestions, develop and appraise policy options, and to monitor the implementation of 
decisions taken.”358 At the same time, the president’s personality and leadership style impact the 
structure of the advisory team, the roles of the advisers, the nature of debate and information 
processing, and the overall quality of decisions made.359 Here, the internal dynamics of the 
presidential advisory group is the primary focus of analysis because to “understand foreign 
policy choices, one needs to study the process by which they are made.”360 As Stern and 
Sundelius contend:  
When groups make consequential decisions or when executives depend heavily upon groups 
for information and advice, small variations in group interaction – assumptions left 
unchallenged, questions unasked or ignored, dissenters excluded – can have dramatic effects on 
the choices made (or not made) and, indirectly, even upon ‘the fate of nations’.361  
 
Generalizations of intrinsic commonalities and differences in structures and procedural 
dynamics of advisory groups allow for the rendering of a typology of their formats. George's 
typology remains a basic classification scheme that determines and differentiates the types of the 
presidential advisory systems.362 The author built upon Richard Johnson's three basic models of 
presidential administration management – formalistic, collegial, and competitive models of 
                                                 
357 Haney, Organizing for Foreign Policy Crises, 2. 
358 George, Presidential Decisionmaking, 98. 
359 Thomas Preston, “’Following the Leader’: The Impact of US Presidential Style upon Advisory Group Dynamics, 
Structure, and Decision,” in Hart, Stern, Sundelius, eds., Beyond Groupthink, 197. 
360 Hart, Stern, Sundelius, “Foreign Policy-Making at the Top,” 6. 
361 Eric K. Stern, and Sundelius Bengt, “Understanding Small Group Decisions in Foreign Policy: Process Diagnosis 
and Research Procedure,” in Hart, Stern, Sundelius, eds., Beyond Groupthink, 123. 
362 George, Presidential Decisionmaking. 
 96 
 
decision-making – and applied them to the foreign policymaking.363 The formalistic model 
represents a hierarchical and strongly structured advisory group with the president on top – 
“well-defined procedures, hierarchical lines of communication, and a structured staff system” 
can be observed in such groups.364 Bargaining and open conflict is discouraged in such groups; 
policy advice is screened and channelled to the president by his official staff. Contrary to that 
model, the competitive model is conductive to the “open and uninhibited expression of diverse 
opinions, analysis, and advice.”365 The president here is in the centre of the information flow, 
which he receives from multiple sources, the structure of the advisory group is ambiguous, and 
jurisdictions are overlapping. In such groups advisers have the incentive and possibility to pursue 
their own vision, which may lead to conflict and the production of contradictory advice. The 
advisory system modelled as collegial has the president in the centre of information flow as well, 
however here teamwork in encouraged, not a competition as in the previous model. The collegial 
system attempts to implement the best practices of both formalistic and competitive models by 
trying to benefit from diversity and competition while avoiding parochialism. At the same time, 
stress on collegiality and teamwork helps to prevent infighting and bargaining among 
policymakers.  
 Haney bases his study of crisis decision-making by American presidents on these three 
models of advisory group. He follows historical cases of crisis policymaking and specifically 
looks at the ways the presidents have organized they advisory groups during crisis:  
The project goes beyond noting that, for example, Eisenhower organized the White House in a 
‘formalistic’ manner. It explores what happens inside the White House when a crisis begins. 
How does Eisenhower structure and manage a group of advisers for decision-making during a 
crisis?366 
 
Haney treats models elaborated by George as ideal and abstract, while acknowledging the 
possible deviations from such ideal types. Thus, hybrids of these advisory models are deemed 
possible. He has revealed that, for example, Eisenhower employed a hybrid of the formalistic 
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and competitive models, while Johnson’s advisory group was a hybrid of formalistic and 
collegial models.367 In other words, there are deviations from George’s ideal models – such that 
these models “overlap, [and] share certain characteristics.”368 
The variance in types of the advisory groups may be detected not only across presidential 
administrations but also during the term of the same president.369 Haney shows how presidents 
have adapted to foreign policy crises by means of making special arrangements in regard to the 
ways their advisory systems processes and structures were set up. In his study, Haney was able 
to trace instances when American presidents have actually changed the format of their advisory 
groups. The author concluded “there is no single model for decision-making that works at all 
times, for all crises, for all presidents.”370  
Following the same logic of contingency of the presidential policymaking style, David 
Mitchell reveals changes in Bill Clinton's advisory group dynamics during two foreign policy 
episodes – a trade agreement with China and the Bosnian conflict.371 Unlike Haney, Mitchell 
shows that the format of the presidential advisory group can change as well during non-crisis 
situations. As Mitchell stipulated in his earlier work on the temporal consistency of advisory 
group format: 
There is the possibility that as the issue begins to evolve the needs of the president may change 
or the external environment may be altered, forcing a change. At the outset when an early 
position is being formulated, a president may start out with a more formal system, for example, 
but as events unfold and the president's attention increases and the need for quick decision-
making becomes paramount, the president might change to an informal system.372 
 
 Although in this instance Mitchell refers to changes in the advisory structure 
corresponding to changes in the circumstances related to one particular issue, the same logic 
about changing systemic conditions or a president's attention can be applied to different issues 
that a particular leader is facing during the course of his presidency. In his later study of 
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Clinton’s foreign policymaking Mitchell presumes that the style of presidential management of 
his advisory group was influenced by a wider range of types of the foreign policy issues a state 
confronts.373 The specific variable introduced by Mitchell is the salience of the issue, which he 
links to the domestic or international contexts of the problems Clinton had faced. Whereas the 
agreement with China was a high-salience issue for Clinton due to domestic political 
considerations, the Bosnian conflict was not an immediate focus of the president, which led 
Mitchell to hypothesise that the president had organized his advisory team differently in these 
two instances: “If a variance in management style can be found for these cases, then we can, with 
greater certainty, expect that presidents will alter their management style when confronted with 
other foreign policy issues that are different in terms of context.”374 Although Mitchell was 
unable to verify his work’s hypothesis, he did detect a variance in policymaking dynamics that 
came from the difference in the level of Clinton’s engagement in decision-making in each case. 
When the president was personally involved, the group resembled a collegial style of decision-
making, and when he delegated his authority to his advisers and was only making a final 
decision, the process approximated a formal group decision-making.375 
Both Haney and Mitchell make an important assumption that the same foreign policy 
advisory team, comprised of the same members and led by the same president, can experience a 
change in a mode and format of interactions when it is dealing with different types of foreign 
policy issues. Depending of the situation they face, presidents decide in what format they want 
the advisory group to be organized and function. If we follow the logic of Haney’s and 
Mitchell’s works then it would be safe to presume that under specific circumstances presidents 
want to have information, advice and analysis organized one way, under other circumstances the 
other way; and this results in the changed management style of their advisory groups. Thus, 
George’s presumption that the president’s leadership style is constant and influences the 
decision-making structure only in one predictable way has to be challenged. It may be 
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theoretically possible to trace episodes when the variety of foreign policy issues that a nation is 
dealing with may lead to the variety of models of advisory groups mobilized during each 
episode. 
 
Conceptual framework 
The analysis of presidential policymaking seems to be one of the possible directions to integrate 
decisional links between the international system and foreign policy outputs within the 
neoclassical realist tradition. For example, Finel, calling for the integration of domestic-level 
variables to the (neo)realist explanations, argues that policymaking processes should be studied 
in more detail in order to link both ends of the causal chain: 
Even when decision makers seem to be acting in response to ‘realist’ incentives and 
constraints, we cannot demonstrate causality. Realists can examine domestic politics to find 
evidence of systemic pressures at work, but without a theory of foreign policy linking systemic 
incentives with foreign policy outcomes, this qualitative work provides a very weak test since 
all sorts of domestic processes might, post hoc, be considered evidence of response to changing 
systemic incentives.376 
 
Such a theory of foreign policy, which Finel calls “functional realism,” should integrate 
all variables in one sequential causal argument. In his theoretical model, the transmission belt 
that converts systemic imperatives to foreign policy outputs is not a set of some idiosyncratic 
factors in operation in a particular case study, but is a systemic process integrated to the 
explanation in the consistent and generalizable manner across cases. The explanation of a foreign 
policy should therefore examine how the state perceives systemic incentives, how these 
incentives affect policymaking processes, and how these processes impact a foreign policy 
output.377 The identification of policymaking processes emerged in response to a foreign policy 
problem should be analytically the first step in Finel’s model: “By asking, for example, how 
rising power might affect domestic coalitions, we might be able to provide tightly reasoned 
hypotheses about domestic processes that would allow for rigorous qualitative studies.”378 Finel 
presents a simplified example of how his theory can be operationalized. Growing relative power 
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capabilities of a state may increase the strategic opportunities available to this state as it now can 
exercise greater influence and control over the international system. This increased influence 
may bring more potential benefits to domestic elites who are in charge of policymaking. 
Therefore, Finel argues, the control of policymaking process should be increasingly tightened 
and centralized in states that experience growth in their relative power, since elites in these states 
would have an incentive to project a state’s power to gain more benefits from the international 
system. Hence, change in relative power distribution simultaneously leads to change in domestic 
policymaking process and converts in a self-reinforcing manner to the foreign policy behaviour 
of the state. 
Finel’s assumptions run parallel to Jennifer Sterling-Folker’s finding that domestic 
processes appear to be a dependent variable in the systemic realist theory.379 Sterling-Folker’s 
argument suggests that the foreign policy analysis should at some stage focus on how domestic 
policymaking processes become transformed by the systemic environment:  
Choices are not selected because they are objectively more rational, but because they make 
sense to actors given their contexts. Domestic process is such a context, but it does not exist in 
a vacuum. It is, instead, a context within a context, acting as a causal variable within a given 
environment. The anarchic environment encompasses all processes and exerts pressures on 
them, yet because domestic processes will engender their own interests and behaviours over 
time, their attributes will affect the choices actors make as they attempt to deal with the 
pressures of anarchy.380  
 
Both Finel’s and Sterling-Folker’s contentions about the need to, at first, treat the 
policymaking process as a variable dependent on the international structure and then to trace the 
impact of the former on foreign policy outcomes, resembles the logic of James N. Rosenau's 
concept of the “issue area,” which suggests that the character of the foreign policymaking 
process transforms depending on the particular international issue policymakers face.381 In 
William C. Potter’s interpretation of Rosenau’s concept: “different categories of issues are 
assumed to evoke the participation in the decision-making process of different numbers of 
actors, who vary in their motivation and ability to act as well as in their readiness to engage in 
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political bargaining and compromise.”382 Hence, presidential decision-making, incorporated into 
the neoclassical realist theory in the manner by which policymaking component is not only 
analyzed for its impact on the final foreign policy output, but also for its adaptation to a 
particular international situation, can provide a more detailed and conceptually integrated 
explanation of a foreign policy along the entire causal sequence.  
The application of a neoclassical realist framework that straddles structural imperatives 
with policymaking variable to this empirical study therefore produces a three-fold research 
agenda. First, there is a need to study the way Kazakhstan’s leadership had identified and 
interpreted the specific systemic pressures or constraints with which it has become confronted. 
Strategic considerations of national interests, relative power, security and strategic threat in the 
ways they were perceived by policymakers enter the discussion. The next step is to examine how 
Nazarbayev responded to these perceived systemic imperatives in terms of the erection or 
transformation of the procedural and organizational settings of his advisory group. This task 
suggests a detailed investigation of policymaking structures and processes, for example, 
determining whether bureaucratic politics mattered, or assessing a particular manner in which 
Nazarbayev preferred to manage his advisory team. The final task is to examine how systemic 
factors were internalized by the republic’s policymaking apparatus, through examining strategies 
that were created to deal with particular international issues. Of a particular interest at this stage 
are the policy alternatives and options first discussed and then chosen by the Kazakhstani 
leadership as they may illuminate the internal dynamics of the policymaking processes and 
hierarchy of the policymaking apparatus. Combined, answers to these questions can produce a 
plausible account of why and how a particular foreign policy had been initiated and implemented 
and, more broadly, approximate the understanding of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy behaviour 
along some historical continuum.383 
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The nature of research tasks framed by this conceptual framework invites the use of 
multiple foreign policy decision-making analysis perspectives. The principal argument of the 
thesis concerning the agency-driven Kazakhstani foreign policy will be assessed through the 
exploration and cross-comparison of Nazarbayev’s policymaking in advisory groups in place 
during the three selected cases in the diplomatic history of the republic. The exploration of a 
particular role a presidential advisory group had fulfilled in each case according to the 
classification by Hart et al. – “think tank”; “command centre”; “sanctuary”; “smokescreen” – 
will improve the understanding of how Almaty dealt with international constraints. The 
investigation of Nazarbayev’s preferred format of advisory teams mobilized to handle each 
specific international issue along the lines of George’s archetypical models of presidential 
advisory groups – formal, collegial, and competitive – will additionally illuminate the republic’s 
decision-making processes and structures, as well as elucidate Nazarbayev’s own role as a 
foreign policymaker. Furthermore, the possible variance in ways president Nazarbayev had 
structured and managed his advisory group and in the roles these groups performed during each 
episode should additionally support the argument that Kazakhstan’s foreign policies were, at 
least to some extent, generated internally by the republic’s leadership, rather than entirely 
externally imposed by foreign powers. Modifications of the policymaking apparatus in reaction 
to different international issues could be indicative of the fact that Kazakhstan’s leadership had 
carefully planned its foreign policy responses to these issues and thus at least some measure of 
strategic intent and agency was present. 
 
It so far has been established that the effect over foreign policy can be attributed both to the 
systemic incentives and the decision-making process through which these incentives are 
translated into a foreign policy output. Thus, a detailed examination of policymaking during a 
particular historical episode should assist in rendering factors of primary and secondary 
                                                                                                                                                             
of individual countries.” See Wivel, “Explaining Why State X Made a Certain Move Last Tuesday: The Promise 
and Limitations of Realist Foreign Policy Analysis,” Journal of International Relations and Development 8, no. 4 
(2005): 374. 
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importance. The next three chapters will examine empirical evidence in order to reveal decision-
making practices employed by Almaty policymakers in the 1990s. 
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Chapter IV: The evolution of the foreign policy and institutionalization of the 
policymaking apparatus 
 
Life rarely gives such chances. Diplomats present here 
today are on the threshold of destiny. Maybe one day 
chronographers will remember those who created a 
diplomatic service of the independent Kazakhstan. 
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan Kassym-Zhomart Tokaev, Keynote Speech 
at the Ministerial Collegium, Almaty, 8 February 
1994. 
 
Commencing Kazakhstan’s foreign policy ab initio was a challenging and demanding task that 
the republic’s leadership had to manage under critical internal and uncertain external 
circumstances. Certainly, Kazakhstan’s foreign policymakers had envisioned some contours of 
the republic’s international politics even before the republic became independent. They were 
able to gain intermittent diplomatic exposure during the transitional period between the country’s 
sovereignty and independence.384 Yet, in December 1991, when Kazakhstan proclaimed itself 
independent, Nazarbayev and other high-ranking authorities faced an entirely different totality of 
foreign policy issues (and now without Moscow’s backing). From the vantage point of 
Kazakhstan’s policymakers, the situation was critical, as they believed that statehood itself was 
jeopardized by the new international context. Kazakhstan’s vulnerable geostrategic position at 
the juncture of China and Russia, and immediate political and security risks emanating from 
                                                 
384 Kazakhstan’s sovereignty within the USSR was declared on 25 October 1990. Kazakhstan’s independence was 
proclaimed on 16 December 1991. The right to practice a foreign policy by sovereign republics within the USSR 
was planned to be included in the provisions of the “Treaty on the Union of the Sovereign States” that never came to 
life. For the draft text of the Treaty see Kazakhstanskaia Pravda, 28 June 1991. 
Interestingly, the first letter of Nazarbayev as the President of the Kazakh SSR to US State Secretary James A. 
Baker was sent as early as March 1991, and via the republic’s own diplomatic channels. The letter reads: “I confirm 
the willingness of the Kazakh SSR to expand and deepen political, economic, humanitarian, and cultural links with 
the USA”; the handwritten remark on the letter states: “communicated via Kazakh SSR’s MFA channels (peredano 
po kanalam MID KazSSR).” APRK, f. 7, op. 1, d. 402, l. 5. 
As noted earlier, in Abazov’s opinion, the socialization of Kazakhstani party leaders and, even though limited, work 
experience of few Kazakh diplomats in the Soviet foreign ministry’s central apparatus and missions abroad had 
ensured a more sustainable formation of foreign policy practices. See Abazov, “Practice of Foreign Policymaking,” 
39. Gleason also notes this: “These leaders [Central Asian presidents] relied for advice and assistance upon high 
officials whose careers had been built on the Soviet ladder of advancement. These individuals likewise relied upon 
Soviet-era line-level officials and middle managers to manage the affairs of the bureaucracies.” See Gleason, 
“Foreign Policy and Domestic Reform,” 16. 
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these overwhelmingly powerful neighbours prompted the republic’s leadership to develop strong 
existential sentiments that were consequently reflected in policy planning. 
As a policy response to these new developments president Nazarbayev and his associates 
soon elaborated a peculiar foreign policy behavioural model believed to be an effective strategy 
to defend national interests at the time. This model was subsequently labelled a multivector 
foreign policy and became a motto in the republic’s course of foreign affairs. In practice, 
however, the underlying principle of multivectorism was the strategy of balancing between great 
powers and not an omnidirectional orientation of the country, as it is often described or implied. 
As Starr observes:  
Linking these three pillars (Russia, China, and USA) is the concept of balance, the 
achievement of which at any point in time is the main tactical challenge.…It is a strategy and 
not simply a fog of high-flow rhetoric. It provides clear goals and first principles for action, yet 
allows of diverse tactical solutions.385 
 
This principle of balancing (but not multivectorism) was indeed explicitly manifest in policy 
papers and strategic concepts contemporaneous to the initial period of Kazakhstan’s 
independence. 
The ability of different governmental institutions to produce prudent and consolidated 
foreign affairs strategy may come as a surprise given the under-institutionalization and 
ambiguity of policymaking in the beginning of the 1990s. At this stage, the roles of 
policymaking actors were diffused and their functions often overlapped. Despite these 
challenging operational circumstances Almaty policymakers were able to collectively contribute 
to Nazarbayev’s efforts to chart the pragmatic external affairs course, while retaining unanimity 
in their worldviews and policy orientations. 
Foreign policy establishments, however, did not demonstrate this consentience when the 
hierarchy of policymaking organizations was concerned. In 1993, the MFA and the ID AP 
engaged in a bitter turf war between each other that only the president could put to an end. 
Nazarbayev’s interference in the bureaucratic confrontation between the foreign ministry and the 
                                                 
385 Starr, “Kazakhstan’s Security Strategy,”14. Emphasis in original. 
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subdivision of his administration was not surprising, considering the escalation of tensions 
between these institutions and the president’s special fondness for international politics. 
According to Nazarbayev’s vision, the foreign ministry eventually had become the 
principal policymaking body. As was demonstrated in instances of presidential diplomacy 
towards China and Russia, it was the foreign ministry that provided main policy input, whereas 
the International Department coordinated the exchange of information and carried out other 
technical functions. The foreign ministry’s records of diplomatic negotiations with Beijing and 
Moscow reveal in detail the ministry’s contribution, as well as tell about Nazarbayev’s personal 
involvement in foreign affairs, and, in general, expose many aspects of the presidential advisory 
team operational and policy planning. 
This chapter will first explore the deployment of the concept of multivectorism in the 
official discourse and alternative definitions of the republic’s foreign affairs. Then the chapter 
will review strategic dilemmas and goals Almaty’s policymakers were confronted with as they 
deliberated on the republic’s future in the international arena. Policy papers examined later in the 
chapter verify the argument that there was a deliberate and intricate strategy of balancing 
between great powers. This is followed by an investigation of the Kazakhstani inter-institutional 
politics in their conflicting facet, as the correspondence between the MFA, ID AP, and the 
president suggests. The last empirical section reconstructs Nazarbayev’s politics in the Chinese 
and Russian directions in order to illustrate the president’s personal contribution and depict a full 
cycle of foreign policymaking, from the development of a strategy to its implementation. The 
chapter concludes with a discussion of the general trends in the evolution of Kazakhstani foreign 
policymaking at the initial stage of the republic’s existence.  
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Euphemistic foreign policy concept 
There has been much written in Kazakhstani and Western literature about a multivector foreign 
policy that Kazakhstan has been following for the past two decades.386 From a conventional 
point of view multivectorism indicates a tous azimut, non-ideological course towards all possible 
external actors. Stated differently, “this concept should be understood as the renunciation of an 
unequivocal and exclusive orientation toward any external force – a great power, a political bloc, 
a civilization, or any other regional association.”387 Such a definition appears more 
comprehensible if contrasted against other alternative foreign strategies. For example, juxtaposed 
to a policy of a state that follows a single-handed foreign orientation toward one particular 
international partner or block, at the expense of relations with others (e.g. a Cold War “satellite 
state”); or, on the other polarity, a state that deliberately chooses an isolationist policy, 
encapsulating itself from external influences (North Korea being an extreme example). The term 
itself was derived from the official foreign policy rhetoric of the president and other high-
ranking authorities in the 1990s.388 In Nazarbayev’s words, multivectorism is a “development of 
friendly and predictable relations with all states, which play significant [roles] in global affairs 
and present a practical interest to the nation.”389 
Even though the definition of multivectorism is conventionally applied to the broad 
spectrum of Kazakhstan’s external activities and chronologically covers the entire period of the 
republic’s foreign affairs since the inception of independence, the expression itself did not 
appear as early. The term “multivector foreign policy” was first introduced into the official 
discourse by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1995. In that year, the ministry published a 
                                                 
386 As was discussed in chapter II. 
387 Murat Laumulin, The Geopolitics of XXI Century in Central Asia (Almaty: KISI, 2007), 213.  
388 For the discussion of the conception of multivectorism within the context of official policy rhetoric see 
Laumulin, “Triumf,” and Murat Laumulin, “Mnogovektornost’ kak Ona Est’,” Kontinent 3, no. 115 (2004): 20-23; 
Nikolai Kuz’min, “V Eksportnom Ispolnenii,” Expert Kazakhstan 47 (December 2008), 
http://expertonline.kz/a4607/; and Abdunabi Sattorzoda, “Nekotorie teoreticheskie aspekty mnogovektornosti vo 
vneshnei politike gosudarstv Tsentral’noi Azii,” Vremya Vostoka (June 2009), 
http://www.easttime.ru/reganalitic/1/206.html. 
389 President Nazarbayev’s speech at the Collegium of the MFA, 2000. Cited in Marat Shaikhutdinov, “Prezident 
Nazarbayev i formirovanie vneshnepoliticheskoi strategii Respubliki Kazakhstan,” Institute of World Economics 
and Politics (July 2008), http://iwep.kz/stariysite/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1456&Itemid=44. 
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brochure containing the collection of speeches and articles presented at the Council on the 
Foreign Policy of Kazakhstan in Almaty on 15 February 1995. This Council was the first large 
meeting of policymakers from different state institutions devoted to the discussion of the 
progress of the Kazakhstani diplomacy and to the planning of a future foreign policy strategy. In 
the preface to this brochure, prepared by the ministerial editorial board headed by a newly 
appointed minister Tokaev, the nation’s external strategy was characterized in the following 
way: “Due to the peculiarities of its geographic location, Kazakhstan adheres to the principles of 
multivectorism, realizing a course of development of balanced relations with both European and 
Asian nations.”390 This was one of the earliest documents where Kazakhstani officials conveyed 
the notion of multivectorism. The term was not featured in the preceding documentation, both 
internal and public.391 
Interestingly enough, the president in his speech at this milestone policy meeting did not 
advert to the term, limiting the description of the foreign policy as “balanced and 
multilateral.”392 Only a year later, in the 1996 annual address, Nazarbayev called for the foreign 
policy “to have a multivector character; not to dogmatically close on just a few priorities; and be 
flexible, prudent, and balanced.”393 The notion of multivectorism has thereafter sporadica
emerged and disappeared from the official discourse. A few examples will suffice here. In the 
1997 strategic document, Kazakhstan 2030, the term multivectorism was not used to define a 
foreign policy posture. Nazarbayev deployed the metaphor of the “Snow Leopard” who is 
peaceful but will never give away what belongs to him.
lly 
                                                
394 Neither it is likely that this idiom was 
 
390 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Vneshniaia Politika Kazakhstana. Sbornik Statei 
(Almaty-Moskva: MID RK, 1995), 3. Emphasis added. 
391 The year 1995 as the approximate chronological period of introduction of the term multivectorism was confirmed 
by Murat Laumulin, interview with the author, 20 June 2013, Almaty. 
392 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vneshniaia Politika, 9. 
393 “The Annual Address to the People of Kazakhstan, 7 October 1996,” Nursultan Nazarbayev, Nursultan 
Nazarbayev’s personal website, accessed 10 August 2013, 
http://personal.akorda.kz/upload/hronika/hronika_swf/1996-1997/index.html. 
394 The text of the strategy reads: “It will never be the first to attack anyone, ever prone to avoiding direct clashes. 
However, any time when his freedom, habitation or descendants come to be threatened, the animal would defend 
them with all its might.” See “The Annual Address to the People of Kazakhstan, 16 October 1997,” Nursultan 
Nazarbayev, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan, accessed 12 August 2012, 
http://mfa.gov.kz/en/#!/information_about_kazakhstan/kazakhstan-2030/. 
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introduced to the first Foreign Policy Concept (Kontseptsiia Vneshnei Politiki), enacted in 19
where it was substituted by the notion of balanced relations.
95, 
blic’s 
 
 philosophy. 
                                                
395 Still, Tokaev used the idea of 
multivectorism extensively in his works that were first published just a few years after the 
adoption of the Foreign Policy Concept and in which he explains the principles of the repu
external strategy.396 Tokaev describes the notion of multivectorism as the one that “presupposes 
increased attention of establishment and development of friendly and mutually advantageous 
relations with influential nations of Asia and Europe.”397 This principle of openness to any part 
of the world is strikingly similar to another foreign policy concept attributed to the Kazakhstani
diplomacy of the 1990s – the Eurasian Bridge
The first direct reference to the republic’s role as a strategic transcontinental link was 
made in the earliest programmatic document of Kazakhstan, “A Strategy of the Establishment 
and Development of Kazakhstan as a Sovereign State on 16 May 1992”: “Today Kazakhstan can 
play a strategically important role of the communication link between Europe, post-Soviet Asia, 
rapidly progressing Asia-Pacific, and South of Asia.”398 Passolt argues that this strategy was 
dually directed inside and outside the republic because of the need to appease the large Russian 
population while advertising the country’s openness to the nations on the both sides of the 
Eurasian continent.399 This strategic Eurasian Bridge rhetoric has further evolved into the 
Eurasianism doctrine of integration of the post-Soviet space, first stipulated by Nazarbayev in 
Moscow in 1994.400 The latter doctrine of Eurasianism, however, was quite different from the 
original Eurasian Bridge concept. Laumulin defines the Eurasian Bridge policy: “in the early 
1990s, the government projected the concept of the Eurasian Bridge, showing that Kazakhstan 
 
395 This argument is based on the analysis of the texts of draft policy papers, which possibly were subsequently 
included in the content of the Concept. For the draft policy papers see “Main directions of the foreign policy of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan (analysis and assessment),” MFA, 1994-1995. APRK f. 175NL, op. 1, d. 156. 
396 Tokaev, Pod Stiagom; and Vneshniaia Politika.  
397 Kassym-Zhomart Tokaev, Ocherki Diplomata. Pod Stiagom Nezavisimosti (Almaty: Zhibek Zholy, 2007b), 14. 
398 Nursultan Nazarbayev, “A Strategy for the Establishment and Development of Kazakhstan as a 
Sovereign State,” Kazakhstanskaia Pravda, 16 May 1992. 
399 Passolt, “Kazakhstan's Foreign Policy,” 102-105.  
400 For the text of the president’s public lecture in the Moscow State University on 29 March 1994, where 
Nazarbayev outlined basic ideas of the Eurasian Union see G. Nurymbetova and R. Kudaibergenov, 
Vneshnepoliticheskie Initsiativy Prezidenta Respubliki Kazakhstan N.A.Nazarbaeva (Almaty: Kazak 
Entsiklopediiasy, 2010), 46-52. 
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belongs both to Europe and Asia with respect to geography, culture, history, and civilization.”401 
This more constructivist interpretation is different from the economic integrationist appeals made 
by Nazarbayev in 1994.402 While it is hard to judge why the connotation of the Eurasian Bridge 
concept underwent such evolution in the president’s rhetoric, an assumption can be made that 
Nazarbayev felt a discursive appeal of this concept and for him it appeared as a more versatile 
notion, applicable to a wide range of continental affairs. 
Laumulin argues that the Eurasian Bridge concept preceded the multivector policy: 
“Later on, in the late 1990s, the concept [of the Eurasian Bridge] transformed into the so-called 
principle of multivector diplomacy.”403 Similarly, in Gleason’s interpretation, the initial concept 
of “Eurasian-ness” – “the idea of the close linkages among the peoples of the Central Eurasian 
landmass” has evolved into the concept of multivector policy that was aimed at “maintaining a 
balanced distance from Russia, remaining neither too close nor too distant.”404 In this vein, the 
Eurasian Bridge concept may be considered as the transitional formulation of the 
omnidirectional foreign policy of Kazakhstan. As Laumulin comments, “the president’s constant 
statements that Kazakhstan lays in the heart of Asia and serves as the way that links Europe and 
Asia could be interpreted as the attempt to conceptually formulate the international status of the 
republic.”405 Overall, the delineation between the Eurasian bridging strategy and multivectorism 
is convoluted. Consider Tokaev’s words at the ministerial Collegium on February 1994: “The 
peculiarity of the geopolitical position of Kazakhstan that serves as a natural linking role 
between East and West, Asia and Europe, presupposes an increased flexibility, special 
sensitivity, and an adequate reaction towards events in the external domain.”406 This Eurasian 
link notion, much like multivectorism later on, was likely to be an umbrella concept covering the 
entire spectrum of broadly oriented geographical and functional aspects of Almaty’s external 
                                                 
401 Laumulin, Geopolitics of XXI century, 242. 
402 See Cummings, “Eurasian bridge,” for an analysis of Eurasianism as an external and internal policy instrument. 
403 Laumulin, Geopolitics of XXI century, 242. 
404 Gleason, “Russia and Central Asia’s Multivector Foreign Policies,” 251. 
405 Laumulin, Kazakhstan v Sovremennikh, 140.  
406 APRK f. 75N, op. 1, d. 824, l. 28. 
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affairs. Nazarbayev, in one of his earliest foreign policy statements, even before the 
independence, stipulated this openness: “Geographic positioning and social potential of the 
republic facilitate Kazakhstan’s orientation towards both Asia-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic 
regions.”407 After all, this rather vague foreign policy provision can be equally attributed to the 
Eurasian Bridge principle or, as Passolt and Gleason do, to multivectorism.408 
However it is the principle of multivectorism, and not the Eurasian Bridge doctrine, that 
is considered by Kazakhstani experts and policymakers alike to be fundamental to the republic’s 
foreign policy. For example, Ermukhamed Ertysbaev notes that this policy has become “the 
conscious doctrine of Kazakhstan in the sphere of international affairs.”409 Meanwhile, the 
ubiquity of the notion of multivectorism in the academic literature on one hand and its irregular 
utilization and substitution by other terms in the official discourse on the other, confounds the 
understanding of the phenomenon. From the operationalization point of view, what is the 
multivector policy? Is it a strategic doctrine followed by the republic’s leadership, is it a 
delineating definition of the specific foreign strategy the country follows, or is it an academic 
notion, occasionally borrowed by officials to be included to their public statements? Finding an 
answer to these questions seems to be precursory to the assessment of the foreign policy 
behaviour of Kazakhstan.  
Laumulin argues that in reality the concept of multivectorism was basically a euphemism 
for the actual policy of balancing between great powers.410 As Laumulin noted elsewhere: 
                                                 
407 “The Inaugural Address to the Supreme Soviet, 10 December 1991,” Nursultan Nazarbayev, Nursultan 
Nazarbayev’s personal website, accessed 29 July 2013, http://personal.akorda.kz/upload/hronika/hronika_swf/1990-
1991/index.html. 
408 Passolt, “Kazakhstan's Foreign Policy,” 112; Gleason, “Russia and Central Asia’s Multivector Foreign Policies,” 
251. 
409 Ertysbaev, Kazakhstan i Nazarbaev: Logika Peremen (Astana: Elorda, 2001), 509.  
410 Laumulin, “Mnogovektornost’,” 20.  
Across the literature on the topic written in Russian the term balansirovanie implies not a state’s strategy to seek 
defensive collations externally, or to build up military power internally, as prescribed by the neorealist theorizing, 
but rather a strategy for ensuring a balance in foreign relations with different external entities. Compare the 
understanding of Kazakhstan’s balancing with Schweller’s neorealist definition: “Balancing means the creation or 
aggregation of military power through internal mobilization or the forging of alliances to prevent or deter the 
territorial occupation or political and military domination of the state by a foreign power or coalition.” See 
Schweller, “Unanswered Threats,” 166. 
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However paradoxically, during the first half of that decade the declared multi-vectored foreign 
policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan did not appear in reality. It was more dualistic, a policy 
of balance between Russia and America, between the West and the CIS.411  
 
Indeed, across the official foreign policy discourse the term “balanced foreign policy” 
often comes as a substitute to the multivector foreign policy. This may not necessarily come as 
wordplay, since the two notions bear two slightly different connotations. If the former signifies 
Almaty’s purposeful play on the overlaps of the great power’s interests, than the latter is a 
broader and more vague definition. They are, however, not mutually exclusive. Depending on 
the audience, either of the notions could have been used by Kazakhstani leadership and 
diplomats. For instance, when speaking with the American or Chinese colleagues, 
multivectorism comes as a more politically correct definition. On the other hand, the term 
balancing seems to be a more precise expression to use for a discussion of the long-term foreign 
policy priorities in the security sphere with fellow diplomats. This parallels Gleason’s argument 
about the purpose of the “multivectorism” label, which he makes in reference to Central Asian 
states’ external relations that bypass Moscow:  
Russia is too big and too close to ignore, too aggressive to contest. At the same time, Russia is 
not easy to interact with simply as an equal partner. Central Asian policy officials use the 
concept of ‘multivector foreign policy’ to explain and justify their diplomatic and security 
relationships with other countries within the Central Asian region and with other countries 
outside the region and with international organizations.412 
 
Moreover, often both definitions are pooled together. For example, in a 2004 interview 
Tokaev plainly used both terms: “Balanced, multivector foreign policy – it is not a whim, but an 
objective necessity. Our historic mission, if you want. In other words, Kazakhstan can not, [and] 
does not have a right to conduct a different policy.”413 In Ertysbaev’s interpretation, 
multivectorism and balancing serve as the two foundations of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy and 
safeguards of national interests.414 It seems that for the Kazakhstani leadership the terms became 
interchangeable at some point in the mid-1990s. 
                                                 
411 Laumulin, Geopolitics of XXI century, 214.  
412 Gleason, “Russia and Central Asia’s Multivector Foreign Policies,” 244. Emphasis added.  
413 Kassym-Zhomart Tokaev, quoted in Laumulin, “Mnogovektornost’,” 16.  
414 Ertysbaev, Kazakhstan i Nazarbaev, 509. 
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This finding is the key to understanding what Almaty politicians and diplomats meant 
when they enunciated the multivector foreign policy idiom. For the president and his key 
advisers, both notions of a balanced policy and multivectorism (and, earlier, the Eurasian Bridge) 
stand for the same strategic foreign policy principle of prevention a single pro-state X orientation 
and capitalization of the intersecting interests of great powers – namely Russia, China, and the 
USA. Such an understanding casts the republic’s foreign policy in a different light. The 
multivector policy, therefore, comes as an official title for a purposeful, intricate strategy that has 
guided Almaty’s foreign policy decisions. Marat Shaikhutdinov acknowledges that the 
“multivectorism is not only a mean and method of survival, but also of the strengthening of the 
geopolitical and international subjectivity in the face of more powerful states.”415 It might not 
necessarily have been labelled multivector policy all the time, but the principle of balancing 
between great powers, embedded in multivectorism, has been maintained in Kazakhstan’s 
outlook. Meanwhile, as will be shown below, this balancing strategy was believed to be the 
optimal response to the systemic constraints as they were seen from the vantage point of 
Almaty’s policymakers.  
 
External challenges of independence 
Nazarbayev’s close associate, Makhmud Kasymbekov, quotes president’s retrospective vision of 
the situation of Kazakhstan at the eve of independence: 
With the disintegration of the Soviet Union many rapacious looks were turned on Kazakh 
lands. I shall not give their names or colours: nation’s historians know them well.416 
 
This perception of strategic vulnerability and the need for alertness is illustrative of the 
sentiments that dominated foreign policy discourse in the initial period of independence and 
which eventually predetermined a preference for the strategic balancing behaviour model. For 
example, one internal policy paper prepared in 1992 states that the first strategic goal of 
                                                 
415 Shaikhutdinov, Geopolitika, Globalistika iTeoriia Natsional’noiBezopasnosti, 268. 
416 Kasymbekov, Perviy. Ocherki o Prezidente Respubliki Kazakhstan (Astana: Foliant, 2011), 158.  
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Kazakhstan’s foreign policy is to safeguard state sovereignty and territorial integrity of the 
republic.417 Tokaev openly writes in a similar perceptual paradigm:  
After the collapse of the Soviet Union Kazakhstan faced a difficult dilemma: which foreign 
policy it needs to pursue in order to better protect its interests? This task was complicated by 
the peculiar geopolitical location of the young state and uneasy demographics inherited from 
the times of the colonial past.418  
 
Also note that here Tokaev is implying a need to safeguard the national interests, rather than 
seeking ways to realize them.  
Indeed, there was much to be concerned about at this dramatic period at the inception of 
independence. To name a few: a long, unprotected and disputed border with China; a large 
Slavic population who were not readily self-identifying themselves as citizens of the newly 
independent republic; and a neo-imperialist revival in Russia.419 Laumulin portrays the dramatic 
nature of the situation in December 1991:  
To say that Kazakhstan after the fall of the Soviet Union found itself in a complicated situation 
is to tell almost nothing. The situation was extremely complicated. Traps and dilemmas were 
set by Kazakhstan’s geography and geopolitics, demographics and history, economy and 
politics.420 
 
Furthermore, in reference to a possible direct military threat, one internal policy 
document stipulates that Kazakhstan’s military potential neither represents a threat to 
neighbouring states nor does it have sufficient resources for independent defence capabilities in 
the existing geopolitical environment.421 Moreover, in the first of the nation’s programmatic 
documents Nazarbayev publicly acknowledged the existence of perceived potential military 
threats: 1) aspiration of certain nations or coalitions to dominate on the global or regional level 
and attempts to resolute disputes through military means; 2) presence of powerful armed forces 
                                                 
417 “Foreign Policy and National Security Concept of the Republic of Kazakhstan,” CSS, first half of 1992. APRK f. 
166N, op. 1, d. 13, l. 7. 
418 Kassym-Zhomart Tokaev, Ocherki Diplomata. Preodolenie (Almaty: Zhibek Zholy, 2007a), 131. Emphasis 
added. 
419 The 1993 political report of Kazakhstani embassy in Russia reads: “It is necessary to note that there are powerful 
political forces in Russia which aim to complicate relations between two nations and cause interethnic tensions in 
Kazakhstan. This is especially notable in the electoral period. In particular, there were attempts on part of these 
forces to resuscitate territorial issue and to acuminate the question of Russian population.” APRK f. 5N, op. 1, d. 
2156, l. 31. For more on these concerns see Abazov, “Practice of Foreign Policymaking”; Laumulin, Kazakhstan v 
Sovremennikh; Olcott, Kazakhstan: Unfulfilled promise; Starr, “Kazakhstan’s Security Strategy”; and Gleason, 
“Russia and Central Asia’s Multivector Foreign Policies.” 
420 Laumulin, Tsentral’naia Aziia.Vol.3, 251. 
421 “Main directions of the foreign policy.” APRK f. 175NL, op. 1, d. 156, l. 8. 
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groupings in certain states or coalitions, and the continued presence of their basing systems 
including territories near Kazakhstan’s borders; 3) internal political instability and armed 
interstate conflicts; 4) build-up of military potential by certain states.422 These enormous 
challenges led Nazarbayev and his group of security and foreign policy advisers to be 
preoccupied with the concern that outside actors may threaten the statehood of the newly born 
nation. This belief predetermined the inclination of the Kazakhstani leadership towards the 
survivalist logic in handling the republic’s foreign relations.  
This defensive rationale and the compelling drive for political and security resilience 
dictated the logic of foreign policy of the time, as attitudes of Nazarbayev’s advisory team 
defined the republic’s foreign policy goals and orientations. Such a weltanschauung of the 
Kazakhstani leadership’s narrowed the republic’s foreign strategic policy outlook to only a few 
nations (or vectors) that were seen as likely sources of threat. These were the two adjoined states, 
which happened to be nuclear powers with great military and population resources – Russia and 
China. Naturally, the Kazakhstani policymakers regarded relations with Moscow and Beijing as 
being of primary importance. At the same time, another important player – the USA was also 
crucial to account for in the balancing game. As Shirin Akiner explains the balancing dynamics, 
Almaty, through maintenance of relations with these three great powers, ensured “that potential 
predatory advances from any one of them will be blocked by the others. This in turn safeguards 
Kazakhstan’s territorial integrity, as well as its political and economic independence.”423 
Nevertheless, notwithstanding the importance of the USA in the securitization of the republic’s 
sovereignty, the American direction of Kazakhstan’s foreign relations was less influenced by the 
perception of threat. In a larger part due to the fact that during the initial period of bilateral 
relations, the diplomatic agenda of Almaty and Washington was imbued by issues of nuclear 
disarmament.424 Therefore, the initial strategic outlook was explicitly bi-vector in nature. 
                                                 
422 Nazarbayev, “Strategy.” 
423 Akiner, “Evolution of Kazakhstan's Foreign Policy: 1991-2011,” Journal of Turkish Weekly, 6 (February 2013), 
http://www.turkishweekly.net/article/406/evolution-of-kazakhstan-39-s-foreign-policy-1991-2011.html. 
424 Kazakhstan’s nuclear politics are discussed in Chapter V, below. 
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Nazarbayev had to define a strategy to manoeuvre between “the immeasurably more powerful 
neighbours of Russia and China.”425 On practical terms, the president needed to adopt a policy 
that would preserve the de facto borders of the ex-Kazakh SSR and make sure that the republic 
was secured against possible hostile actions by its neighbours.426 As a result of this situational 
context, all principal foreign policy actions, initiatives, and moves were dictated by this 
survivalist rationale. 
 
Planning the defensive balancing 
Naturally, this defensive strategic outlook at some point had to be translated into the content of 
strategic policy documents that would guide Almaty’s external affairs, particularly in relations to 
Moscow and Beijing. Paradoxically, the first official Foreign Policy Concept (Kontseptsiia 
Vneshnei Politiki) was adopted only in 1995. A foreign policy concept is the usual form that 
strategic documents on external relations take on the post-Soviet territory and diplomats and 
politicians use them as official guidelines and reference frameworks. For example, such concepts 
were officially endorsed in Kyrgyzstan, Moldova and Russia.427 The Russian document presents 
“a systemic description of basic principles, priorities, goals and objectives of the foreign policy 
of the Russian Federation.”428 In Kazakhstan, foreign policy concepts are a state secret and 
therefore no official definition can be obtained. In general, in Kazakhstani legal terms, a concept 
is the generic form of the official document used in strategic planning, which “reflects general 
vision of the development of a particular sphere, justification of the change of the respective 
                                                 
425 Dannreuther, Creating New States, 73. 
426 In Nazarbayev’s words: “However independent a state is, until the nation’s border is regulated, and until your 
integrity and indivisibility is recognized by all neighbours, there is no much use of this independence. …The state is 
blood, flesh, cradle and tombs of fathers. The border is a ‘body’ of statehood. Until the border problem is solved, the 
problem of stability can not be solved” (Cited in Kasymbekov, Perviy, 159-160). This reflection is quite 
representative of the sentiments of the republic’s elite at the time. 
427 See, respectively, “Kontseptsiia Vneshnei Politiki Kyrgyzskoi Respubliki,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
Kyrgyz Republic, accessed 8 April 2012, http://www.mfa.kg/acts/koncepciya-vneshnei-politiki-kr_ru.html; 
“Kontseptsiia Vneshnei Politiki Respubliki Moldova (Proekt),” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of 
Moldova, accessed 8 April 2012, http://www.iisr.ru/kvprm.html; “Kontseptsiia Vneshnei Politiki Rossiiskoi 
Federatsii,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, accessed 8 April 2012, 
http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/6D84DDEDEDBF7DA644257B160051BF7F; 
428 “Kontseptsiia Vneshnei Politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 
accessed 8 April 2012 http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/6D84DDEDEDBF7DA644257B160051BF7F; 
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state policy, proposals and solutions of the problematic issues of this sphere.”429 Each foreign 
policy concept is reviewed and approved by the Security Council. Nikolai Kuz’min observes that 
Kazakhstan’s Foreign Policy Concept is “a view of the world, of the international system, of 
problems we are facing and the ways to solve them,” and adds that the content of a foreign 
policy concept was not hidden from the public as some of its provisions would be included in the 
president’s annual address.430 Nazarbayev, speaking before the foreign ministry’s Collegium in 
November 2008, described the future content of a new Foreign Policy Concept in the following 
way: “The document should contain an advanced analysis of the contemporary situation in the 
world, clearly define positions of the nation on the most important international issues, and 
Kazakhstan’s foreign policy interests and role in global and regional affairs.”431  
On the other hand, considering the intensity of diplomatic activity since independence in 
December 1991, the question arises about the guidelines and principles that steered the 
republic’s foreign policy before the first Concept was enacted in 1995. Three years, especially 
during such a decisive period, is a rather long deadline. There existed, however, several 
transitional documents that were used as foreign and security policy guidelines by the MFA and 
the president. Some of them took the form of public programmatic documents, some were the 
policy papers addressed to Nazarbayev and some were the internal foreign ministry’s drafts and 
work plans. 
The first public document that had discussed, among other issues, the immediate and 
long-term foreign policy goals of the republic was “A Strategy for the Establishment and 
Development of Kazakhstan as a Sovereign State” proclaimed in May 1992 (the May 1992 
Strategy).432 At the same time, this Strategy was a generic programmatic developmental 
document, akin to the “Kazakhstan 2030” strategy adopted in 1997 and was not a specific policy 
                                                 
429 “Sistema Gosudarstvennogo Planirovaniia v Respublike Kazakhstan,” Kazakhstanskaia Pravda (Arkhiv), 
accessed 9 April 2012, http://mail.kazpravda.kz/c/1245710960.  
430 Kuzmin, “V Eksportnom Ispolnenii.”  
431 “Official website of the Administration of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan,”  
http://www.akorda.kz/ru/page/page_nursultan-nazarbaev-kazakstan-respublikasy-syrtky-ister-ministrliginin-
keneitilg_1348723221 
432 Nazarbayev, “Strategy.” 
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document focused entirely on foreign affairs.433 Tokaev writes that the first draft of the foreign 
policy concept (that is of a doctrinal document that specifically outlines a foreign policy 
strategy) was prepared by the foreign ministry in March 1992, while the Apparatus of the 
President and the Centre for Strategic Studies were preparing their own versions.434 The MFA 
had been also developing annual work plans, which also served as policy guides for the 
upcoming year. In total, eight policy documents were prepared during the studied period: 
Table 1.1: Official public and internal foreign policy planning documents (and drafts), produced 
between 1992 and 1995435 
 
 Date Document type Title Developer and 
author(s) 
1 April 1992 Policy paper Main provisions of the Foreign Policy Concept  MFA. Suleymenov, 
Tokaev 
2 May 1992 Strategic plan Strategy of the Establishment and 
Development of the Republic of Kazakhstan as 
an Independent State 
AP. 
Nazarbayev, 
Zhukeyev 
3 first half of 1992 Policy paper Foreign Policy and National Security Concept  CSS. Kasenov, 
Abuseitov, 
Laumulin  
4 February 1993 Policy paper On foreign policy priorities in 1993 MFA. Suleymenov, 
Tokaev 
5 April 1993 Internal ministerial 
document   
MFA annual report and work plan MFA 
6 April 1993 Policy paper On foreign policy of Kazakhstan (analysis, 
prospects) 
ID AP. 
Kasymov, 
Akhmetov. 
7 February 1994 Internal ministerial 
document   
MFA annual report and work plan MFA 
8 summer 1994 –  
first half of 1995 
Strategic doctrine 
and preceding 
drafts thereof 
Foreign Policy Concept of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan 
MFA, AP. 
Nazarbayev, 
Zhukeyev, 
Suleymenov, 
Tokaev, 
Isinaliev, 
Sarybai, Kasymov. 
 
                                                 
433 Former Vice-president Yerik Asanbayev tells in the interview that the May 1992 Strategy was a three-year 
strategic plan and that it was the first programmatic plan in line of strategic plans of national development adopted 
in the first decade after independence. See Karlygash Ezhenova, Svideteli (Almaty: East Point, 2001), 217.  
434 Tokaev, Ocherki. Preodolenie, 145. It is likely that Tokaev refers to the MFA document submitted to the 
president in April 1992. See “Main provisions of Foreign Policy Concept of the Republic of Kazakhstan.” MFA. 9 
April 1992. APRK f. 75N, op. 1, d. 21, ll. 147-156. 
435 See, respectively, APRK f. 75N, op. 1, d. 21, ll. 147-156; Nazarbayev, “Strategy”; APRK f. 166N, op. 1, d. 13; 
APRK f. 5N, op. 1, d. 2155, ll.1-12; APRK, f. 75N, op. 1, d. 2; APRK f. 5N, op. 1, d. 2155, ll. 13-29. APRK f. 75N, 
op. 1, d. 345; APRK f. 175NL, op. 1, d. 156. 
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As seen in Table 1.1, quite a few high-ranking authorities representing different state 
institutions were involved in the elaboration of policy papers. These public and internal policy 
documents reflected policymakers’ views on the state of international affairs and the foreign 
policy guidelines and principles. One of the members of the working group on the final draft of 
the Foreign Policy Concept, Kairat Sarybai, recollects the fundamental questions the developers 
were posing for themselves in summer 1994: “Who are we and where are we?”436 Tokaev’s 
address to the Collegium in February 1994, the time at which a newly independent Kazakhstan 
was finalizing its foreign policy course, is very illustrative of how key decision-makers 
interpreted the world around them, what strategic dilemmas they were facing, and what were the 
perceived tactics and strategies to ensure nation’s survival and development:  
Like never before we need a deep analysis of the state of international affairs on the regional 
and global levels, a precise calculation of tactical aims and strategic interests of Kazakhstan 
within its external context. It is important to correctly weigh Kazakhstan’s potential with its 
international actions, to know how to critically approach foreign policy priorities, to practice 
skills of political manoeuvring without forsaking (and constantly keeping in mind) 
fundamental aspirations of the Kazakhstani people – preservation and strengthening of the 
independence of our state.437  
 
Along the formative period, the principal objective for Nazarbayev’s advisory team was 
to find an optimal mode of interaction with the external world, while dealing with the totality of 
political and security challenges emanating from the outside. Certainly, economic objectives, 
like the need to attract foreign investments, develop transit routes, or seek assistance to create a 
market economy were integral parts of the general foreign policy outlook, but the importance of 
political and security issues was overwhelming. Starr highlights the importance of the security 
factor for Kazakhstan: “It is no accident…that President Nazarbayev…identified ‘the security of 
the nation and the preservation of its state’ as a precondition for advances in these other areas 
[economy and politics].”438 In some ways confirming Starr’s presumption are Tokaev’s 
recollections that the basic provisions for the Foreign Policy Concept were based on the May 
                                                 
436 Erlan Idrissov, Prioritety kazakhstanskoi diplomatii na rubezhe vekov (Moscow: Russkiy Raritet, 2000), 212.  
437 APRK f. 75N, op. 1, d. 824, l. 20.  
438 Starr, “Kazakhstan’s Security Strategy,” 12. Emphasis in original. Starr further adds that relatively high level of 
external and internal security enjoyed by Kazakhstan in the later times, “have led several otherwise competent 
observers simply to ignore security when they assess the state of Kazakhstan’s development.” Olcott’s Kazakhstan: 
Unfulfilled Promise is provided as an example; for Starr, these scholars “confuse effect with cause.” Ibid, 12, n.1. 
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1992 Strategy and the priority was given to issues of national security.439 References to this May 
1992 Strategy also appear in the 1993 policy paper “On foreign policy priorities in 1993”; in the 
1993 MFA’s annual plan; and in the 1993 ID AP document.440 The frequent reference to the 
May 1992 Strategy demonstrates that different institutions at different time points were using
uniform formulation of what the national interest and strategic challenges were. The key 
strategic imperatives of the May 1992 Strategy pertaining to foreign policy and national security 
were: 
 the 
                                                
The consideration for the geopolitical self-determination. Maintenance of multilateral and 
multivariate military-political balances in order to ensure security and sovereignty of 
Kazakhstan.  
 
The peculiarity of Kazakhstan’s geopolitical position and ethno-demographic composition, 
level of economic development and military development, make dominant not the military, but 
political instruments based on, primarily, own resources and reasonable, balanced diplomacy in 
order to ensure the security [of the state]. 
 
In construction of national security we proceed from our geostrategic positioning on the 
juncture of two powers – Russia and China.441  
 
Considering the importance Almaty had been paying to the issues of territorial integrity 
and sovereignty of the newly born state, it is not accidental that the principal attention was 
expectedly rendered to relations with Russia and China, which became the two priority vectors 
for the Foreign Policy Concept developers. Starr credits Tokaev with the development of this bi-
directional balancing strategy:  
Tokaev proposed that Kazakhstan seek two roughly equal partnerships and to manage the 
relationship between them [Russia and China] in such a way as to affirm its own sovereignty 
and independence…to balance them in way that are mutually beneficial, that minimize or 
curtail the worst tendencies of each partner, and that in the end strengthen the sovereignty and 
independence of Kazakhstan itself. …All this requires delicacy and art.442  
 
As demonstrated below, members of Nazarbayev’s advisory team had been determined to 
find a way to utilize the interplay of rivalry dynamics between great powers in order to maximize 
the republic’s national interests. All in all, these two themes – a defensive paradigm and a 
balancing strategy vis-à-vis great powers are explicitly reflected in the content of the reviewed 
 
439 Tokaev, Ocherki. Preodolenie, 144-145. 
440 See, respectively, APRK f. 5N, op. 1, d. 2155, ll. 1-12; APRK f. 75N, op. 1, d. 345, ll.54-55; APRK f. 5N, op. 1, 
d. 2155, ll. 13-29. 
441 Nazarbayev, “Strategy.” 
442 Starr, “Kazakhstan’s Security Strategy,” 14. 
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documents that were written in the settings of strategic uncertainty. As it was said during one of 
the earliest internal discussions of conceptual approaches to Kazakhstan’s foreign policy: 
Likely we should not fool ourselves and let priorities to set the main directions for work. 
History shows, that states that are positioned at the juncture of the continents need to show 
resourcefulness (izvorotlivost’); with a view to create an absolutely secure conditions for our 
state. There is a danger that these priorities will call for them. Kazakhstan can only be 
independent if we keep our eyes on adjacent states and blocks.443 
 
Certainly, the perception of threat from Russia and China was grounded on specific 
political and security factors emanating from the proximity to these great powers. Reviewed 
documents reflect a number of specific concerns Almaty policymakers shared among themselves 
in  this, at times perilous, external environment. Perhaps the most complicated and cautious was 
the discovery of China as a great neighbour. At the outset of bilateral relations, Kazakhstan’s 
leadership was under the influence of preconceptions, part of which originated from the Kazakh 
historical memory and part from the uneasy history of a regional neighbourhood during the 
Soviet Union. 
From the preceding historical period, Kazakhstan and China inherited number of complex 
problems, greatest of which was the border dispute.444 Another problematic matter was China’s 
nuclear arsenal and continuing tests on the Lobnor polygon, located in Xinjiang region, close to 
the Kazakhstani border. However the biggest strategic dilemma Almaty had in relation to China, 
described in one document as a “nascent superpower,” were the possible hegemonic aspirations 
Beijing might have entertained.445 One internal discussion portrays an alarming picture of 
Beijing’s politics in relation to Kazakhstan: 
China, judging from its ambitions and potential, is seriously aiming to obtain a leading position 
in the world already by the beginning of the next century. PRC’s aim in  Kazakhstan is quite 
clear – to press out Russia’s and Turkey’s influence, to counter the USA, to expand a zone of 
political, ideological, and, if possible, a physical presence in the republic.446  
 
                                                 
443 APRK f. 75N, op.1, d. 345, l. 6. 
444 For the history of Kazakhstan’s border negotiations with China, Russia, and Central Asian regional nations see 
Kassym-Zhomart Tokaev, et al., Pravda o Gosudarstvennoi Granitse Respubliki Kazakhstan (Almaty: Zhibek 
Zholy, 2007). 
445 China is defined as a superpower in the draft policy paper “Main directions of the foreign policy.” APRK f. 
175NL, op. 1, d. 156, l. 21. 
446 “Minutes of the Collegium, February 8, 1994.” APRK f. 75N, op. 1, d. 824, l. 22. 
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Again, within this context the problem of unregulated borders and disputed territories was 
certainly a number one agenda topic. Ertysbaev puts himself in the president’s shoes:  
Suppose we would leave it as it is. This problem would surface again. Who can assume what 
would the situation look like then? How China will act if the problem will re-emerge? Who can 
foresee their territorial claims then? Who would rule this great empire and what policy would 
these rulers pursue? It is all unknown.447 
  
The principal importance of regulation of the Sino-Kazakh border dispute is a recurring 
theme in the reviewed documents. A less openly discussed security issue was the illegal 
immigration of the Chinese to Kazakhstan. The usual practice of the time for the Chinese 
citizens was to come to Kazakhstan with a group of tourists and stay illegally.448 Head of the 
International Department of the President’s Apparatus Gani Kasymov wrote in the policy 
document prepared for the president: “We need to immediately work on this problem using all 
legal means in order to prevent a creation of a Chinese ‘fifth column’ in Kazakhstan and 
appearance of a ‘Chinese factor’ in internal politics of our republic in the future.”449 A large 
Kazakh population living in Xinjiang region further complicated the ethnic component in 
bilateral relations. The president’s adviser observes: “It is well known the Beijing was 
conducting an assimilation policy towards Turk minorities, including Kazakhs, which was aimed 
at eliminating their cultural identity and assimilating them with Han population.”450  
The ethnic factor loomed much more in relations with the other great power – the Russian 
Federation. As one draft document explains, the nexus between demography and foreign policy 
in the following way:  
The interethnic accord gains a critical importance due to the multiethnic composition [of the 
nation], peculiarities of the territorial and sectoral distribution of significantly large enclaves of 
non-indigenous population. This problem has an explicit external aspect, neutralization of 
which [the aspect] will be one of the main directions of the republic’s foreign policy. Dynamics 
of ethnic and cultural issues…may complicate the background of the Kazakhstani diplomacy in 
the Russian and Chinese directions.451  
 
                                                 
447 Ertysbaev, Kazakhstan i Nazarbaev, 483. 
448 As it was reported at the foreign ministry’s Collegium, in August 1992 from the group of 113 Chinese tourists 
only 12 have returned. “Minutes of the Collegium, 19 February 1993.” APRK f. 75N, op. 1, d. 345, l. 6. 
449 “On Kazakhstan’s foreign policy (analysis, prospects).” ID AP. 6 April 1993. APRK f. 5N, op. 1. d. 2155, l. 28. 
450 Ertysbaev, Kazakhstan i Nazarbaev, 484. 
451 “Main directions of the foreign policy.” APRK f. 175NL, op. 1, d. 156, l. 14. 
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In general, such features as the distinctiveness of the ethnic composition of the republic, 
frequently pronounced in the public discourse, was often an epithet to indicate the fact that a new 
Kazakhstani nation was comprised of a 40% Slavic population. The largest portion of the Slavic 
population resided in Northern Kazakhstan, which far-right Russian politicians like Vladimir 
Zhirinovsky had claimed to be part of Russia. The related problem of Cossacks was another 
point of Almaty’s discontent. Against this background, Russia’s pressure for a double-citizenship 
of the Kazakhstani residents of Slavic descent had certainly caused even more anxiety. For these 
reasons, the republic’s leadership was constantly monitoring the internal political situation in 
Russia: “We need to clearly set orienting points. This is unarguably Russia – everything that is 
related to the influence of internal processes in Russia over Kazakhstan. This requires a special 
approach to Russia.”452 The fear of the risk of falling into the zone of influence of China, which 
Almaty policymakers constantly thought of, was not less prominent in their deliberations about 
Russian politics. In November 1994, at the ministerial Collegium Tokaev said: “Efforts of our 
state on the international arena will be aimed against possible attempts of the neo-imperial 
tendencies in Russia’s foreign policy to politically press Kazakhstan on the issues of citizenship 
and situation of the population of the Russian origin.”453 
 The Kazakhstani leadership planned to deal with problematic issues in bilateral relations 
with Beijing and Moscow in a complex, systemic way. In other words, Almaty’s policymakers 
attempted to construct a holistic picture of interrelated security challenges caused by the 
republic’s vulnerable external and internal state of affairs. An example of such a complex vision 
of foreign policy challenges is found in the protocol of the MFA Collegium that took place in 
February 1994:  
[Kazakhstan] needs to neutralize any preconditions to the development of a such situation that 
could lead to aggravation of our relations with neighbouring states on the basis of territorial or 
economic reclamations, sentiments of particular ethnic groups among a population, existence 
of defence structures on our territory, or increase of internal instability in bordering nations.454  
 
                                                 
452 “Minutes of the Collegium, 19 February 1993.” APRK f. 75N, op. 1, d. 345, l. 4. 
453 “Minutes of the Collegium, 19 November 1994.” APRK f. 75N, op. 1, d. 826, l. 11.  
454 “Minutes of the Collegium, 8 February 1994.” APRK f. 75N, op. 1, d. 824, l. 8.  
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At the same time, this approach naturally implied avoiding a uni-vector foreign 
orientation. Characteristically, at the same venue in February 1994, diplomats were warned that 
“it would be politically short-sighted to fetish the Russian direction of Kazakhstan’s foreign 
policy.”455 
Kazakhstan’s policy response to the security dilemmas posed by relations with Russia 
and China was the development of the balancing model of foreign policy. Excerpts from the 
reviewed policy documents reveal that often the contraposition of great powers’ interests was the 
main instrument sought to level out the strategic vulnerability of Kazakhstan: 
The Russian military might is reckoned by Beijing which is why the Russian vector in the 
Kazakhstani security policy remains prioritized in the nearest and future perspective.456 
 
The Chinese factor bears a long-term importance in relations of Kazakhstan with key foreign 
partners, particularly in containment Beijing’s regional hegemonism. We need to fully utilize 
an overlap of interests of the USA, Russia, Japan, and other Asia-Pacific nations in  that 
matter.457  
 
Practicing flexibility and ability for a political manoeuvring we need to undertake actions to 
neutralize China’s aspirations to expand and strengthen its own sphere of influence in 
Kazakhstan through supplanting of potential rivals like Russia, USA, Turkey and others. To 
this end we need to fully exploit congruence of our interests on one hand and geopolitical plans 
of corresponding powers on the other.458  
 
Kazakhstan, like other CIS states was proclaimed to be a zone of strategic interests of 
Russia….Taking into account the fact that there is a certain space for a political manoeuvring it 
is possible to presume that negative repercussions of cooling of Kazakhstani-Russian relations 
can be neutralized. The situation will not be as fatal if we could deploy other possibilities, 
namely: the potential of relations with the USA and other Western nations.459 
 
There is an occurrence of certain disagreements between Russia, USA, and China in reference 
to Kazakhstan. Under these conditions it is important to maintain a balance of interests in our 
relations with great powers and to achieve an equal partnership with them, while skilfully and 
flexibly use the contradictions among them to our own advantage.460  
 
What can be additionally demonstrated from these very characteristic passages is that 
Almaty decision-makers did not employ the Eurasian Bridge or multivectorism rhetoric in their 
internal discussions. Certainly, the multidirectional undertone is present, but it mainly relates to 
strategies towards the three great powers. Even though that the above excerpts are derived from 
the content of the documents prepared by the foreign ministry, the content of policy papers 
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456 “Main directions of the foreign policy.” APRK f. 175NL, op. 1, d. 156, l. 21. 
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sourced from other policymaking institutions briefly introduced above, suggests that in general, 
the actual policy planning discourse was very “technical” in a sense of its practicality and 
rationality. Policymakers in their documents clearly enunciated the republic’s goals and spelled 
out the means of realization of the strategy of balancing. 
In developing the republic’s foreign policy strategy political leadership was motivated 
primarily by the desire to minimize possible harm to the republic’s statehood that seemed very 
likely because of the unfavourable internal and external circumstances in 1992-1994. Reviewed 
documents clearly indicate that the republic’s leadership was carefully triangulating the great 
powers’ political and security dynamics. Almaty opted for a behavioural model of playing on 
great powers’ conflicting interests. These strategic imperatives laid the foundation of the 
balancing foreign policy doctrine that was essentially an amalgam of a foresight, pragmatism, 
and rationale as much as of hesitancy, and apprehensions of those involved in foreign 
policymaking.461  
 
Institutionalization of the foreign policymaking apparatus 
As Almaty decision-makers were approaching closer to a finalized vision of the conception of 
the republic’s foreign strategy, another, if not equally important, foreign policy development had 
been progressing. Throughout 1993 a turf war was unfolding in the corridors of Almaty’s 
policymaking establishments. Organizational theory describes turf wars as situations in which 
bureaucratic organizations engage in power competition among each other to improve their 
relative influence vis-à-vis each other. Accordingly, an organization is found to “jealously guard 
and seek to increase its turf and strength, as well as to preserve undiluted what it feels to be its 
‘essence’ or ‘mission’.”462 This competition for power does not come as a surprise, considering 
                                                 
461 The balancing strategy has subsequently continued to manifest in a multilateral format with the active 
engagement of Kazakhstan not only in the CST arrangements, originated in 1992 but also in the NATO PfP from 
1995, and the Shanghai Five-SCO, from 1996.  
462 Valerie M. Hudson, “Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground of International 
Relations,” Foreign Policy Analysis 1, no. 1 (2005): 8. 
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that the institutionalization of the republic’s foreign policymaking apparatus was at the 
embryonic phase.  
Given the complexity and scale of the international issues, Nazarbayev had to establish a 
foreign policymaking machinery from the earliest stage of Kazakhstan’ independence. 
Nazarbayev recalled that in 1992 there was some sense of euphoria about international prospects 
– many people around him and in the general public believed that it was enough just to proclaim 
the independence and the whole world would open its doors for the republic.463 In reality it was 
neither simple nor easy to find a fairway in the world undergoing major geopolitical changes. 
The president understood that the nation needed its own foreign policy quickly, before the 
national interests could be undermined by real or potential threats. Nazarbayev expediently 
started to form a policymaking apparatus that would assist him in handling the upcoming 
challenges with his own person in the centre of the scheme. Ertysbaev explains why the decision-
making scheme was configured this way: 
The concentration of foreign policy authority in the hands of the president becomes 
understandable if we look at the end of 1991-beginning of 1992…in the shortest time 
[Nazarbayev] not only had to assert himself as a head of the newly independent state and 
occupy a place in the international community, but also to deal with the burden of colossal 
problems inherited from the Soviet Union.…Strategic, tactical, and even instantaneous tasks 
had to be solved promptly, that is why the president’s prerogative in the foreign policy was 
predetermined.464  
 
The three main institutions below the president in which the foreign policy was 
conceived, conceptualized, initiated, and implemented were: the Apparatus of the President with 
the International Department in charge of handling foreign affairs; the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs; and the Centre for Strategic Studies. The Apparatus, later transformed to the 
Administration of the President was the penultimate bureaucratic structure before the president. 
The Head of the Apparatus, Nurtai Abykaev in many instances served as a gatekeeper to 
president Nazarbayev. State Counsellor Tolegen Zhukeyev’s role in planning and realizing 
external affairs of the republic was quite influential up until 1994 when he was appointed to the 
position of the Security Council Secretary for a few months to be later appointed a vice-premier 
                                                 
463 Nazarbayev, Na poroge. 2nd. ed., 191. 
464 Ertysbaev, Kazakhstan i Nazarbaev, 463-464.  
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for social affairs. Reflecting on his ambitions during this period, one expert writes that Zhukeyev 
wanted to become “Kazakhstan’s foreign policy guru” and one interviewee described him as an 
eminence grey of foreign politics.465 For example, Zhukeyev was the person who signed the 
1992 Lisbon Protocol on accession to the NPT treaty on behalf of the republic. While Counsellor 
Zhukeyev was officially affiliated with the President’s Apparatus, the Apparatus had its own 
foreign policy detachment, the International Department (Mezhdunarodnyi Otdel), which role in 
foreign policy, according to Kasenov, was more organizational than analytical.466 In the foreign 
ministry, the central policymaking body was the Collegium. This consultative body 
(soveshatel’nyi organ) was in fact the most important inter-departmental unit where strategic 
foreign policy issues were elaborated and discussed. This authoritative unit, headed by the 
Minister and run by 16 other leading diplomats had the power to review the central apparatus’s 
and embassies’ work; to control the execution of the president’s decisions; to approve or 
disapprove diplomatic personnel appointments; to hear the top management of the Ministry’s 
and ambassador’s reports.467 The foreign minister was able to bypass the International 
Department to communicate its policy advice directly to the president.468 The CSS was involved 
in “preparing, drafting, and evaluating the most important documents, programs, and moves in 
the areas of foreign policy and national security.”469 The Centre’s head, Kasenov, at least at the 
earliest stage, also enjoyed occasional access to the president bypassing the President’s 
Apparatus and submitted analysis and advice directly.470  
Recollections during the interviews with former foreign minister Tuleitai Suleymenov and 
the head of the president’s chancellery Makhmud Kasymbekov about Nazarbayev’s preferences 
for group decision-making and inter-agency policymaking coordination and cooperation suggest 
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that the model in the beginning of 1990s was essentially a mix of formality and collegiality (to 
adapt the memories of the diplomats to scholarly terms).471 In instances of strategic foreign 
matters, the president preferred to be informed and personally involved in the policymaking 
process at any point of time. He could either convene ad hoc groups comprised of representative 
of different institutions to discuss available policy options, or, equally possible, he could 
communicate with his advisers or high-ranking experts individually, either by inviting them or 
even by telephone.472 Unsolicited policy advice could reach the president either through formal 
lines of communication whereas a memorandum is written, for example, by the head of one of the 
president’s apparatus departments and then passed other through the head of the apparatus. 
Alternatively, the analytical memorandum could be handed in to the president personally, 
depending on the political authority of the correspondent. A memorandum was usually a 
conceptual material prepared collectively at one of the institutions that outlined a foreign policy 
problem or a foreign policy initiative to the president and contained a policy recommendation. 
The president is known to either write an instruction, in case he wanted this memorandum to 
progress into an actual foreign policy act, or to initial the document, signalling that the he had 
read it, but did not feel that the advice was worth further realization.473 The lines of inter-
institutional communication were blurred and the decisional hierarchy below the president was 
not yet formalized. Overall, until at least 1995, Kasenov’s assertion about an irregular and non-
systematic character of foreign policy decision-making in Kazakhstan appear to be relevant.474 It 
is possible to presume that such an ambiguous situation where different institutions were 
supposed to produce alternative strategies on the same issue and inconsistent group decision-
making norms were not only the consequences of the early developmental drawbacks aggravated 
by lack of finances and staff. It could be in fact that this was Nazarbayev’s deliberate intention as 
it encouraged a more productive internal policy discussion. 
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It is in this oblique policymaking environment that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
endured a profound bureaucratic attack from the head of the International Department of the 
president’s apparatus Gani Kasymov. Kasymov was a career Soviet diplomat educated in 
Moscow, reaching the peak of his Soviet carrier in the position of the General Secretary of the 
Kazakh SSR foreign ministry. In 1990 he was appointed, first, a foreign policy adviser to the 
president and later he became a head of the International Department in the president’s 
apparatus. Although Kasenov scales down the Department’s role to handling routine 
organizational functions, nonetheless it appears to be an important institution in the 
policymaking hierarchy.475 Its political weight stemmed from two factors. First, all formally 
prepared policy papers from the foreign ministry addressed to president pro forma had to be 
either funnelled through or approved by the Department. Second, the head of the department, 
Kasymov, occasionally had direct access to president’s “ears and eyes,” either during the foreign 
trips, where he would normally accompany the president, or during day-to-day work at his 
apparatus that was located in the same governmental building on the Republic’s Square where 
the president worked. 
In 1993 Kasymov writes several letters addressed to Nazarbayev, in which he criticizes 
operational, functional, and organizational aspects of the MFA’s work. The thrust of his criticism 
was related to the state of affairs in the republic’s foreign policymaking. In two memoranda 
Kasymov points out to the president the existing problems of the republic’s foreign policy 
mechanism at large.476 Kasymov expresses concern that the further development of the 
Kazakhstani diplomacy could be stalled due to the problems of policy elaboration and 
implementation. Kasymov highlights three basic areas of nation’s foreign policymaking that in 
his opinion are either missing or deficient: the absence of a foreign policy concept; an 
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ineffectiveness of policy decision-making and implementation mechanism; and a shortage of 
trained diplomatic personnel.477  
The fact that there was no officially adopted foreign policy concept at the time gave 
Kasymov the reason to argue that the Kazakhstani diplomacy was “impulsive and lacked 
focus.”478  To develop such a conceptual document he proposed to task the president’s apparatus, 
the foreign ministry, the Centre for Strategic Studies, and other think tanks to elaborate several 
alternative versions of an external strategy. These projects would be then discussed at the 
Security Council and the synthesized document would then need to be endorsed in the 
parliament. The second problem raised by Kasymov is related to the way a foreign policy 
decision was initiated, formulated, and implemented. In the letter he draws a picture of a 
fractured decision-making mechanism, plagued by the irregular work of the Security Council, 
the weak central apparatus of the foreign ministry, the ineffective embassies, and the lack of 
control from the republic’s leadership and the parliament.479 To improve the inter-institutional 
coordination, Kasymov proposes a novel scheme of the strategic decision-making: “Embassy-
MFA-President’s Apparatus-(Security Council)-MFA-Embassy.”480 According to the proposed 
coordination sequence, initially the information and analysis is gathered and produced “in the 
field,” i.e. diplomatic missions abroad, and sent to the central apparatus of the foreign ministry, 
then the ministry aggregates the information and sends the synthesized analytical memorandum 
to the International Department of the President’s Apparatus, the Department decides whether to 
pass the information on to the president, then, if the president receives it and thinks that a certain 
                                                 
477 APRK f. 5N, op. 1, d. 2661, ll. 1-6.  
These points were recognized by the MFA itself to a certain degree. Former first deputy Minister Salim 
Kurmanguzhin writes that the necessity for a separate foreign policy analysis department within the ministry was 
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479 There were three meetings of the Security Council in 1993; none of them was devoted to foreign policy issues. 
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policy act has to be taken then he informs the International Department which tasks the ministry 
and the ministry tasks its overseas missions. The Security Council stands between the ID and the 
president in cases where security and defence matters are concerned. This scheme presumes the 
President’s Apparatus and the Security Council to be positioned at the pinnacle of the decisional 
process. The third problem, the low human resources potential, can be at least partially solved, 
Kasymov writes, through cooperation with Russian think tanks and universities. This problem, 
according to Kasymov, is exacerbated by questionable appointment and promotion practices of 
diplomats in the foreign ministry, which bypass the KNB and the President’s Apparatus 
consent.481 
In another letter Kasymov elaborates on the perceived shortcomings of the existing 
mechanism of foreign policymaking.482 In particular, Kasymov was not happy with the fact that 
the foreign ministry occasionally had a direct access to the president. He straightforwardly 
argues that this bypassing of his department indicates that the ministry wants to exclude the 
International Department from foreign policymaking and become the only foreign policy 
executive body. Kasymov doubts the ministry’s ability to carry out the policymaking and 
implementation on its own. He writes that policy papers prepared by the MFA reveal the 
ministry’s superficial attitude to international issues; an absence of a clearly oriented concept; 
and certain “passiveness and shiftlessness” – these factors combined supposedly decreased “the 
efficiency of the Kazakhstani diplomacy.”483  
On these grounds Kasymov proposed to establish a set of rules for the endorsement of the 
policy documents addressed to the president and drafts of the international agreements to be 
signed by the president.484 The political documents would be primarily prepared in the MFA and 
then compulsorily endorsed by the ID before they reach the president. The MFA and the 
Ministry of Defence would jointly prepare the military-political and national security documents. 
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Then the Defence and Political Analysis departments of the President’s Apparatus would 
endorse them and the International Department would prepare a written assessment of these 
documents as an attachment. 
Recalling the events inflicted by this bureaucratic attack, Tokaev writes: “The 
understanding of the importance of the MFA did not come instantly. There were attempts to 
degrade its role, to make diplomats carry out ‘servant’ functions in protocol and document 
elaboration spheres.”485 In response to Kasymov’s criticism, the ministry prepared a large letter 
addressed to the president.486 Reflecting on Kasymov’s invective on the lack of the conceptual 
foundation for republic’s foreign affairs, the ministry writes that there actually was a conceptual 
foreign policy paper – the May 1992 Strategy, basing on which the foreign apparatus had been 
setting its strategic goals.487 The authors of the letter expectedly disagree with Kasymov’s 
proposed scheme of foreign policymaking mechanism “Embassy-MFA-AP-MFA-Embassy,” 
introduction of which would make the ministry “a subsidiary division of the ID AP.” As a 
counter-measure, the authors of the letter make a proposition for the ID AP operational functions 
to be downgraded and limited to the presidential protocol services. The underlining point is 
made: “The MFA needs a goodwill advice, but not ambitious claims to curate the foreign 
ministry. Our principal position is that there is a need for close coordination of work in order to 
effectively realize the president’s foreign policy provisions.”488  
It is thus understandable why several years later Tokaev wrote in his memoirs that the 
foreign ministry was “decisively and consistently defending the position that the president has an 
exclusive right to determine the strategic directions of the foreign affairs of the nation and to take 
cardinal decisions.”489 In the diplomats’ view, in a highly centralized foreign policymaking 
environment with the president at its pinnacle, the foreign ministry would be the primary 
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organization to provide the president with advice and expertise. Whereas the foreign ministry 
advocated “a need for a unified team that would formulate and implement Kazakhstan’s foreign 
policy course,” the ministry saw itself as a leader for this team. 490  
Nazarbayev watched closely the evolution of the turf war between the two alternative 
centres for foreign policy planning and making. He eventually decided to extend his authoritative 
help to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which he saw as the next policymaking echelon after 
himself. Nazarbayev explicitly stated his position to all personalities involved, defending the 
MFA and telling Kasymov to “desist from chicanery over the MFA (prekratite sutiagu vorkug 
MIDa).”491 It remains unclear why Nazarbayev had favoured the ministry instead of the 
International Department. One possible explanation may be that the ministry possessed more 
human resources since the majority of the Soviet-trained diplomats, intelligence officers, and 
foreign policy experts were actually working in the foreign ministry’s apparatus. In March 1992 
Suleymenov wrote to Nazarbayev with his view on diplomatic personnel recruitment: “In our 
opinion, the executive diplomatic corps has to be formed with the [ex] cadre of the [ex-Soviet] 
MFA, KGB, MVES, as well as with diplomats currently working in the Russian structures, since 
this category has already developed certain diplomatic work skills.”492 Another possibility is that 
in such highly personalized policymaking process the minister was simply a more politically 
powerful person than the head of the International Department. Either way, in the conclusive 
report to the Head of the President’s Apparatus Abykaev, Kasymov uses less belligerent tone and 
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tries to justify the critique of the ministry’s work by saying that his department felt obliged to 
take part in the work on elaboration of the foreign policy concept:  
The Department continues to believe that the work on the development of our strategy has to 
be carried out permanently, since it is not a congeal substance. Moreover, the situation 
demands not only a fast comprehension, but also an elaboration of adequate preventive 
measures to confront future challenges. To calculate and forecast changes in the 
multidimensional life and find a place in it while securitizing the state, is a duty and obligation 
of all concerned specialists.493  
 
The way the bureaucratic confrontation ensued and ended had direct and far-reaching 
implications for the nature of foreign policy decision-making structure and process. In the 
aftermath the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had legitimized its privileged position in the 
policymaking structure. Tokaev reflects on the outcome of the conflict:  
Such a support from the president has undoubtedly increased the MFA’s authority among 
governmental institutions. Moreover, and this is more important, the ministry’s capacity was 
reinforced. Diplomats had understood that they are entrusted with big political issues.494  
  
The president’s support warranted the foreign ministry’s principal position in the Almaty 
policymaking hierarchy. Any subsequent attempts to redistribute the balance of authority were 
highly unlikely without the president’s sanction. Thus, the foreign ministry became a prime 
policymaking institution with an exceptional level of authority in matters of external affairs and 
with the principal role of communicating aggregated policy advice to the president. 
This chronicle of bureaucratic conflict between the foreign ministry and the International 
Department (or more precisely, the latter’s head Kasymov), reveals several important features of 
the nature of Almaty’s foreign policymaking. The most striking finding is the absence of any 
policy debate on strategic foreign policy issues. Kasymov had never questioned the foundational 
principles of Kazakhstani foreign policy. The general strategy of balancing between great powers 
or the main foreign policy orientations and priorities had not become the subjects of Kasymov’s 
criticism. 
It may also be possible that the president and his key policy advisers viewed the 
international environment through one perceptual lens. In either case, this episode demonstrates 
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that the bureaucratic “pulling and hauling” did not concern strategic matters, and that the turf 
war had developed in its limited form, where the two institutions fought not for their 
contradictory policy positions, but for mere political authority. Nazarbayev recognized that such 
solidarity on the fundamental strategy of the republic was a crucial element for a successful 
diplomacy with Kazakhstan’s great neighbours. As discussed below, the president relied on 
many of his advisers in charting a course of engagement with Beijing and Moscow. As far as the 
document records show, there were no internal debates on how to handle controversial questions 
on the bilateral agenda with either neighbour. 
 
Nazarbayev’s personal diplomacy and diplomatic manoeuvring  
Eastern approaches 
Discovering China as a great Eastern neighbour was a particularly complicated and cautious 
process. During the earliest period of contacts in 1990s, Kazakhstan leadership was under the 
influence of preconceptions that originated from Kazakh historical memory and a Sino-Soviet 
confrontation of the Union’s past.  
The contemporary history of Almaty’s affairs with Beijing started in July 1991 when 
Nazarbayev visited China for the first time in the capacity of the president of the Kazakh SSR. 
At this point in time Nazarbayev, a leader of Kazakhstan, although already a sovereign, but not 
yet an independent state, had already envisioned border problems with China. The border issue 
was issue number one on Nazarbayev’s agenda during this July visit. He told Jiang Zemin: 
We want to establish a new type of relations between our nations. First of all this relates to the 
border situation. We have common border along several thousand kilometres, and here it is 
important that old disagreements are being resolved, because setting of a good neighbourhood 
relations corresponds to the interests of peoples of our nations.495 
 
Nazarbayev did not limit his actions to diplomatic talks with China’s Chairman. He 
wanted to make sure that he would be personally involved in the resolution process of the Sino-
Soviet border issue. Upon his return to the Union, in the report to Gorbachev about the results of 
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his trip, Nazarbayev added by hand the following line: “The participation of the republic in the 
decision process over the problems of the Eastern part of Sino-Soviet border which relate to 
Kazakhstan would be desirable.”496 This evidently indicates how considerate and pro-active 
Nazarbayev was about the republic’s territorial integrity at the outset of Sino-Kazakhstani 
affairs. 
In any case, the Sino-Soviet talks on border problems terminated with the fall of the 
Soviet Union, leaving Nazarbayev to seek ways to solve it without Moscow’s backing.497 The 
border problem was not the only issue causing serious concerns in Almaty. Other controversies, 
even though less strategic, but not less acute, were the large Kazakh Diaspora in Xinjiang, the 
continuation of Lobnor nuclear tests in the immediate proximity of Kazakhstan, and the trans-
border rivers problem. The presence of these issues on the Kazakh-China agenda ensured that 
Nazarbayev continued to pay principal importance to building friendly and working relations 
with Beijing.  
With these paramount questions in mind, president Nazarbayev foresaw his state visit in 
October 1993 to Beijing as a milestone in the history of Kazakhstani-Chinese relations.498 The 
visit was of vital importance for Kazakhstan since the negotiations agenda was supposed to 
cover the main issues and problems in the bilateral relations. This became particularly acute after 
Chinese prime-minister Li Peng aborted his visit to Almaty in April 1993.499 In anticipation of 
Nazarbayev’s visit, both sides agreed to produce a joint “Declaration on the Principles of 
Peaceful Relations” that the two presidents were to sign in Beijing. Kazakhstan leadership 
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considered this Declaration to be the principal document that would set the course of future 
relations with China. 
Much of the decision-making concerning Kazakhstan’s policy towards its Eastern 
neighbour occurred during the preparations for the president’s visit to Beijing in October and for 
the discussion of the text of the joint declaration with the Chinese counterparts.500 The 
importance of the upcoming visit for Nazarbayev was reflected in the level of personalities he 
tasked with the preparatory groundwork. Tokaev, deputy minister and a professional sinologist 
was appointed as a chief negotiator. Naturally, Tokaev mobilized both the central apparatus of 
the foreign ministry and Kazakhstani embassy in Beijing, headed by the former Speaker of the 
Supreme Soviet Murat Auezov. Tokaev came to China beforehand, leading an “advance group” 
of experts and diplomats to finalize the details of the visit. He worked in close cooperation with 
Counsellor Zhukeyev who was involved in agenda setting from the side of the Apparatus of the 
President and cabled his instructions from Almaty.501    
One internal analytical memorandum written in preparation of the visit provides an 
insightful view of Kazakhstani leadership’s perceptions on issues with China.502 The addressee 
of this document highlighted several sections and wrote marginal notes.503 These notes 
emphasise the issues on the Kazakhstan-China agenda deemed most important for Almaty 
policymakers and reflect their attitude towards these issues. The following are the highlighted 
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excerpts; corresponding marginal notes are given in italics; the underlined passages are 
reproduced as in the original: 
During the discussion of international problems, the Chinese can raise an issue of the East-
West relations and Kazakhstan’s position in this system. A more precise position of the PRC 
toward Kazakhstan’s CICA initiative can be formulated. The position [to be included] to the 
themes to discuss with the Chairman of the PRC.  
 
The problem of nuclear tests on the Lobnor polygon. The Chinese think that the anti-Chinese 
sentiments in Kazakhstan relating to nuclear arms tests are encouraged by the Kazakhstani 
leadership and Nazarbayev personally. Inside the Chinese Foreign ministry there is an opinion 
that Kazakhstani leader does this in order to gain diplomatic bargaining leverage in 
negotiations in Beijing through developing a so-called ‘guilt complex’ for the damage incurred 
by Kazakhstan from tests in Xinjiang. We need to energetically [the end is unintelligible, but 
most likely the meaning is “rebut”].  
 
Diplomatic circles in China consider incomplete legal arrangement of border and presence of 
disputed sectors to be another problem important for the prospects of Kazakhstan-China 
relations. Therefore, it is likely that Beijing will express readiness in expediting final 
congruence of disputed border sectors. Taking into account other memoranda, we need to press 
[the Chinese side]. 
 
The Chinese will touch upon the issue of the activities of anti-Han Uighur organizations 
allegedly present on Kazakhstan’s territory.  
 
Representatives of the indigenous population of Xinjiang and some foreign diplomats express 
opinions that the president’s visit after an aborted visit of the Premier of the State Council of 
China Li Peng, and given the fact that almost all first ranking Kazakhstani leaders had visited 
China already, can create an impression of a certain weakness and acceptance of Almaty of its 
secondary status vis-à-vis its ‘Great Neighbour.’ We need to eradicate this position by our 
actions.      
 
A number of observations can be made here. Generally it is possible to talk about the 
careful planning that Nazarbayev undertook in order to convince the Chinese to find a mutually 
acceptable solution to the most pressing issues, particularly the border delimitation. For this task 
both the MFA and AP were mobilized. For Almaty’s leadership, the primary goal of 
Kazakhstan’s foreign policy in a Chinese direction was to get an official recognition from 
Beijing and, through that recognition, assurances about inviolability of borders, territorial 
integrity, and guarantees of political sovereignty.504 Achieving these ends was certainly an 
interactive exercise, where president Nazarbayev accomplished a personal diplomatic tour de 
force at the meetings with Chairman Zemin.505 Overall, Nazarbayev acted as an equal and his 
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visit in October 1993 yielded concrete political results.506 The aggregated policy advice reflected 
in the internal exchange of letters, memoranda, instructions between Kazakhstani embassy in 
Beijing, central ministry’s apparatus, International Department, and State Counsellor Zhukeyev, 
in one form or another, reached the president who attended to most of the points raised at the 
preparatory stage and utilized them in negotiations with his Chinese counterpart. 
 
Northern vector 
Relations with the former Union “big brother”– the Russian Federation – were considered by 
Almaty as the number one priority throughout the 1990s. As it was shown above, a number of 
ethnic, territorial and political factors caused a great deal of concern and development of the 
perception of threat emanating from the North. Already in March 1992, Nazarbayev tasked the 
MFA to prepare a foundational treaty with Russia and instructed the president’s apparatus to 
supervise the work on it.507 The “Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance,” 
signed in Moscow in May 1992, laid the basis of the Kazakhstani-Russian relations in the new 
status of independent states and not Soviet republics. It was considered by Almaty as the 
principal document ensuring that both Nazarbayev and Boris Yeltsin had reached an 
understanding on a number of major points on the bilateral agenda.  
The treaty covered the majority of the crucial political and security issues, and was 
referred to in one internal letter as the document that “defined the principles and main directions 
of cooperation.”508 Among others, the most essential provisions read:  
The High Contracting Parties build their relations as friendly nations, consequently guided by 
principles of mutual respect of the state sovereignty and territorial integrity, peaceful resolution 
of disputes and non- use of force or the threat of use of force, including economic and other 
forms of pressure, equal rights and freedoms, fulfilment of obligations in a good faith, and 
other commonly accepted rules of the international law. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
friends, sort out the border issue, clear the situation and make a final decision’.” Nazarbayev’s reply to this was: 
“Mister Chairman, you are a large country and we are a small one. I propose – let the 53% of disputed territories be 
ours, and 47% - yours.” See Kasymbekov, Perviy, 170-171. 
506 The MFA report on the results of Nazarbayev’s visit sums up main results of negotiations by stating: 
“Considering geopolitical position of our nation, the joint declaration’s importance in terms of provision of long 
term security interests of Kazakhstan can not be overestimated.” APRK f. 75N, op. 1, d. 467, ll. 9-11. 
507 Tokaev, Ocherki. Pod Stiagom Nezavisimosti, 147. 
508 APRK f. 75N, op. 1, d. 2, ll. 22-26. 
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In case of the act of aggression against any of the Parties or both, Parties will provide each 
other the necessary assistance, including the military one. 
 
The High Contracting Parties recognize and respect the territorial integrity and inviolability of 
the existing borders of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Kazakhstan.  
 
Parties will forbid and suppress, in accordance with their legislature, the establishment and 
activities on their territories of the organizations and groups, as well as activities of individuals, 
directed against independence, territorial integrity of both states, or directed on aggravation of 
interethnic relations. 509 
 
Overall, given the overwhelming relative power capabilities of Russia, the document 
gives the impression that Kazakhstan was more interested in signing the treaty than its 
counterpart. After all, Russia’s territorial integrity was unlikely to be challenged by Kazakhstan, 
neither could Russia’s military forces significantly benefit from the Kazakhstani arms support in 
case of an external aggression. In the period following the signing of the treaty, Almaty was also 
able to reach a compromise with Moscow on additional bilateral issues such as the agreement not 
to set a maritime border in the Caspian Sea and demilitarization along the Chinese border.510 
However, there remained a number of other problematic questions that Kazakhstan 
highlighted in its communication with Moscow. In 1992-1994 the status of the Baikonur 
military-space complex, dual citizenship and the Cossack political mobilization had concerned 
Almaty policymakers most. These points of discontent were correspondingly reflected in 
documents developed at the time in the republic’s policymaking establishments and in the 
agendas of bilateral talks between Kazakhstani and Russian politicians and diplomats.  
Up until 1994, Almaty policymakers experienced hardships in repelling the Russian 
pressure to make more concessions on the Baikonur complex and to extend a double-citizenship 
to willing ethnic Slavs living in the republic. One internal document exposes the intensity of the 
Almaty-Moscow debate: 
In practice it [the Russian assertiveness] leads to rough and aggressive position of the Russians 
on Baikonur, strategic forces, and on dual citizenship. Prospects of a compromise that would 
consider Kazakhstani positions are unlikely, and, if we speak realistically, overall 
impossible.511 
                                                 
509 For the full text of the treaty see “O ratifikatsii Dogovora o Druzhbe, Sotrudnichestve i Vzaimnoi Pomoshi 
mezhdu Respublikoi Kazakhstan and Rossiiskoi Federatsiei,” Adilet legal database, accessed 21 June 2012, 
http://adilet.zan.kz/rus/docs/B920005500. 
510 APRK f. 75N, op. 1, d. 2, ll. 22-26. 
511 “Minutes of the Collegium, 8 February 1994.” APRK f. 75N, op. 1, d. 824, l. 20. 
 141 
 
 
Throughout the mid-1990s Russia had been persistently bringing up these issues in 
negotiations with Kazakhstan. For instance, when in April 1993 the Russian ambassador Boris 
Krasnikov had an appointment with Nazarbayev, he raised the following issues: the status of the 
Russian language; the possibility of double-citizenship; and allegedly increasing emigration of 
the Russian population from the republic.512 At this meeting Nazarbayev explained to the 
Russian envoy the official Kazakhstani position, stating that all citizens regardless of ethnicity 
had equal rights; the Russian language remained a means of inter-ethnic communication; that 
Cossacks are not recognized as a ethnic group and that their paramilitary organizations would 
not be tolerated; and that dual citizenship is not possible.513   
The problem of Cossacks was perhaps the most uncomfortable to discuss at this April 
meeting because just a month before president Yeltsin signed the famous “Decree on the State 
Support of Cossacks,” which Kazakhstani Cossacks, similarly to their counterparts elsewhere, 
considered a direct signal and encouragement from Moscow to continue their political 
mobilization in the territory of Kazakhstan.514 To add to Almaty’s nervousness with the neo-
imperialist tendencies in the higher echelons of the Russian political establishment, there was 
now a rise of pro-Moscow organizations inside the republic. Cossacks started to form 
organizations with ranks, uniforms and other paraphernalia common to paramilitary 
organizations. Their activities in the Central and Northern regions of Kazakhstan, where there 
native Kazakh population was disproportionately low in comparison to significantly larger 
Slavic, was particularly alarming. 
In summer 1993, Russia wanted to stage high-level negotiations headed by vice-premier 
Sergei Shakhray from the Russian side to discuss with Kazakhstan the issue of Cossacks in the 
                                                 
512 APRK f. 5N, op. 1, d. 2164, l. 83. 
513 APRK f. 5N, op. 1, d. 2164, l. 83. 
514 One of the provisions of the decree directly tasked the Russian foreign ministry to regulate relations with other 
CIS countries concerning Cossacks residing on their territories. For the full text of the decree see “Ukaz Prezidenta 
Rossiiskoi Federatsii o reformirovanii voennykh struktur, pogranichnykh i Vnutrennikh voisk na territorii Severo- 
Kavkazskogo regiona Rossiiskoi Federatsii i gosudarstvennoi podderzhke kazachestva,” Official site of the 
President of Russia, accessed 24 May 2012, http://graph.document.kremlin.ru/page.aspx?1177598. 
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republic and, quite possibly, try to convince Almaty to extend additional privileges to them. 
Yeltsin sent Nazarbayev a telegram with the request to consider such possibility.515 For 
Nazarbayev it clearly was not a welcoming development so he sought diplomatic and legal 
advice from the MFA, KNB, and the Prosecutor General’s apparatus on the available alternatives 
to reject the request while abiding the norms of the diplomatic etiquette. In the collective letter 
signed by heads of these organizations the president was advised to refrain from hosting a 
Russian delegation since: 
Such a discussion would establish an unneeded precedent and would mark a withdrawal from 
our previous positions that state that there is no such problem in Kazakhstan as the problems of 
Cossacks. The visit and negotiations could be considered as the de facto recognition by 
Kazakhstan of the existence of such problem in Russian-Kazakhstani relations. Moreover it 
could instigate an unneeded frenzy among Russian-speaking population and have negative 
impact on internal political situation in the republic. It would also give a reason for some 
national-patriotic forces to accuse the nation’s leadership in inability to counter the Russian 
interference in internal affairs of Kazakhstan, which could cause damage to the credibility of 
the leadership and the prestige of the nation in the eyes of world’s public opinion.516  
 
Nazarbayev agreed to this collective advice and endorsed the official message of the 
Kazakhstani MFA to the Russian MFA in which Almaty boldly made it clear that it does not 
want to engage in discussions on the issue of Cossacks: 
In the opinion of the MFA the problem of Cossacks does not exist in Kazakhstani-Russian 
relations. Cossacks are not recognized as an ethnicity in Kazakhstan. Creation of any 
paramilitary formations is forbidden by the country’s law. Persons who have proclaimed 
themselves Cossacks, like any other citizens of Kazakhstan, have equal rights regardless of 
race, ethnicity etc. At the moment, the MFA does not see a necessity in holding bilateral talks 
on the interstate level on the situation with Cossacks.517 
 
A hard-line stance on the problem of the Cossacks demonstrated by Kazakhstan 
exemplified both the sensitivity and resilience of Nazarbayev’s policymaking team towards 
issues of sovereignty and interethnic relations. It is highly possible that Nazarbayev had also 
discussed this issue with Yeltsin personally, behind closed doors. In any case, the eventual 
Russian MFA’s response revealed acquiescence with Nazarbayev’s demands to leave the 
Cossack issue out of the political agenda, both domestically and internationally: “The Russian 
Federation MFA is honoured to inform that it shares the concern related to the activities of some 
                                                 
515 APRK f. 75N, op. 1, d. 298, ll. 169-170. 
516 APRK f. 75N, op. 1, d. 298, ll. 169-170. 
517 APRK f. 75N, op. 1, d. 298, ll. 167-168. 
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Cossack diasporas that constitute infringement of Kazakhstan’s legal framework.”518 The talks 
with vice-premier Shakhray did not take place. The assertive behaviour of the Kazakhstani 
leadership in this case made it possible for the Cossacks’ problem to never been raised between 
both countries thenceforth. 
The history of negotiations with Russia in the initial period of independence enhanced the 
confidence of Almaty policymakers in their diplomatic abilities. Certainly, there were unsettled 
disagreements left on the bilateral agenda. For example, although the text of the “Treaty of 
Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance” did contain the point on the use of the 
Baikonur complex, it specified that the matter would have to be solved through separate 
agreements. Nevertheless, the overall tendency was positive for Almaty. The fact that 
Kazakhstan was able to secure a principal agreement with Russia on the most pressing matters 
concerning the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and security guarantees was certainly an 
encouraging sign for Almaty policymakers. Moreover, Russia’s agreement not to support the 
Cossacks could also be considered as another indication for Kazakhstan that it is achievable to 
follow the chartered course and defend national interests even in negotiations with great powers. 
It is possible to assume that not only the self-confidence of diplomats grew, but also their belief 
in Nazarbayev’s international authority as well as in Russia’s goodwill on strategic issues. 
 
Conclusion 
Rosenau, discussing the construction of a national interest, writes about the inherent ambiguity 
of the concept:  
What is best for a nation in foreign affairs is never self-evident. More important, it is not even 
potentially knowable as a singular objective truth. Men are bound to differ on what constitute 
the most appropriate goals for a nation. For, to repeat, goals and interests are value-laden. They 
involve subjective preferences, and thus the accumulation of national interests into a single 
complex of values is bound to be as variable as the number of observers who use different 
value frameworks.519  
 
                                                 
518 APRK f. 75N, op. 1, d. 298, ll. 171. 
519 James N. Rosenau, The Study of World Politics. Vol. 1 (London: Routledge, 2006), 249.  
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In the case of Kazakhstan, the national interest was defined by the leadership in a precise form – 
to preserve borders of the former Kazakh SSR and to maintain political sovereignty. This vision 
had set the parameters for the republic’s foreign policy. The acknowledgement of the criticality 
of the republic’s play on great powers’ interests for the statehood’s survival does not necessary 
mean that policymakers in Almaty were acting out of an inferiority complex. More likely, they 
can be credited for the careful and pragmatic calculations of Kazakhstan’s relative capabilities.  
The fact that there were no substantial disagreements among Almaty leadership on either 
strategic foreign policy orientation or courses of actions strengthens the assumption about the 
centralization of policymaking in Nazarbayev’s hands. The policymakers might have disagreed 
on certain operational matters of foreign conduct, but their visions had to correspond with the 
president’s opinion. The turf war that unfolded during this challenging period proved to be a 
“infantile disorder” indicative of the formative phase of policymaking apparatus development 
without the implication of serious repercussions to the republic’s strategic outlook. Through this 
bureaucratic confrontation the Kazakhstani policymaking apparatus was moulded to 
accommodate the foreign ministry as its pillar with other institutions retaining their involvement 
in the foreign decision-making process. Eventually, these different actors with varying degrees 
of political authority and closeness to the president had concurred in identification of security 
threats posed by the international environment and opted for the general strategy of balancing. 
This policymaking model proved its effectiveness in assisting Nazarbayev’s diplomatic 
endeavours both with China, which eventually ended with the peaceful and just resolution of a 
century-old dispute, and with Russia, which ensured Moscow’s guarantees regarding territorial 
integrity and military protection without having to make manifest concessions in regard to the 
republic’s sovereignty. In general, Nazarbayev’s personal involvement and policy advice from 
his associates from the various institutions were critical in the development of the Kazakhstani 
foreign strategy. Through difficult and complex process of policy planning and coordination, the 
MFA, the CSS, the ID AP and Counsellor Zhukeyev profoundly contributed to the way 
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Nazarbayev’s had come to envision the republic’s international future. Recalling these 
achievements, Nazarbayev said: “In such an uneasy situation, when the nation’s destiny was on 
the scales of history, we were prudent and self-restrained. We unfolded substantial negotiations 
with all near and distant neighbours and started to affirm territorial integrity and strengthen 
nation’s borders.”520 
 
The principle of balancing between interests of foreign actors also manifested in the resolution of 
the nuclear dilemma that Nazarbayev and his key advisers faced in 1991-1992. The issue of the 
inherited Soviet nuclear arsenal had immediately turned into a significant problem for 
Nazarbayev, as the Western nations, led in their effort by the USA, subjected the Kazakhstani 
president to intense diplomatic pressure both publicly and behind closed doors in order to force 
him to relinquish nuclear weapons on terms dictated by the West. The salience and urgency of 
the matter ensured that Almaty policymakers treated it separately from any other international 
issue. The next chapter follows this episode and expounds the presidential decision-making 
behind the development of Almaty’s nuclear strategy. 
                                                 
520 Nazarbayev’s speech at the Third Kazakh Kurultai, 2005. Cited in Kasymbekov, Perviy,158. 
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Chapter V: Nuclear decision-making 
The first impression that one gets of a ruler and of his brains 
is from seeing the men that he has about him. When they are 
competent and faithful one can always consider him wise, as 
he has been able to recognize their ability and keep them 
faithful. But when they are the reverse, one can always form 
an unfavourable opinion of him, because the first mistake 
that he makes is in making this choice.  
Niccollo Machiavelli, The Prince. 
 
A nuclear dilemma had been the principal foreign policy problem for Nazarbayev and his 
advisers. The immediate salience of the factor of nuclear weapons deployed on Kazakhstani 
territory has not thus far been surpassed in the republic’s foreign policy history. This issue was 
unique in several aspects. The first, and foremost, reason for this was the fact that the nuclear 
factor directly related to the national security and sovereignty of the newly emerged state. 
Second, the nuclear theme dominated the initial relations of Kazakhstan vis-à-vis two major 
powers of the time – Russia and the USA. Third, the nuclear issue chronologically and 
circumstantially coincided with the formative period of Kazakhstani foreign policy decision-
making tradition. 
Between the period from 16 December 1991, when Kazakhstan gained its independence, 
and 23 May 1992, when the Lisbon Protocol to the START I (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) 
was signed, Almaty deliberately pursued an ambivalent nuclear strategy neither confirming nor 
renouncing its nuclear status.521 Only on May 23, 1992 did Kazakhstan finally give up its 
nuclear ambitions and agree to become non-nuclear weapon state.522 This day marked the end of
one of the most complicated rounds of foreign policymaking involving the highest-ranking 
authorities of the
 
 republic. 
                                                
The existing scholarship on the case of Kazakhstan’s denuclearization unanimously 
argues that political and security developments in the international environment were the key 
 
521 A bilateral “Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms” signed by the USA and the 
USSR on 31 July 1991. 
522 On other countries’ denuclearization processes, see, for example, William J. Long, and Suzette R. Grillot, “Ideas, 
Beliefs, and Nuclear Policies: The Cases of South Africa and Ukraine,” The Nonproliferation Review 7, no. 1 
(2000): 24-40. 
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factors leading to the Kazakhstani leadership’s final decision to renounce its nuclear status.523 
Nazarbayev’s memoirs and public statements support this argumentation.524 The political and 
security considerations also come into play when researchers correlate an overall ambivalence of 
the republic’s nuclear strategy with Nazarbayev’s desire to gain a maximum out of the nuclear 
cards he held. 
In an attempt to transcend limitations imposed by these systemic international factors, 
Kazakhstan’s leadership elaborated and pursued a sophisticated strategy that balanced between 
an immediate relinquishment of weapons and an entrance to the nuclear club. Evidently, 
Nazarbayev was the key actor in the development and realization of this foreign policy scenario. 
At the same time, the president received information, advice, and analysis that assisted him both 
in identification of international constraints and in planning and implementing his nuclear game. 
Nevertheless, the existing literature only implicitly suggests that Nazarbayev relied on his 
advisory group in developing his nuclear agenda. Hitherto, a nuclear decision-making process 
under way in Almaty was described rather abstractly, averting its detailed exposition.  
Since Kazakhstan’s denuclearization was certainly not a single man’s endeavour, the 
input of the president’s advisers has to be credited. To a certain degree, the views and opinions 
of those around Nazarbayev steered the nuclear strategy pursued by Almaty during the six-month 
period under consideration. Knowing the roles and policy positions of key decision makers 
would enhance the understanding of Kazakhstan’s nuclear behaviour. Archival materials 
reviewed in this chapter shed some additional light on how the presidential advisory group was 
involved in charting Nazarbayev’s nuclear strategy.  
                                                 
523 Laumulin, Kazakhstan v Sovremennikh, 143-160; William C. Potter, The Politics of Nuclear Renunciation: The 
Cases of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine (Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, 1995), 16-19, 35-42; and 
Mitchell Reiss, Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain their Nuclear Capabilities (Washington, DC: Woodrow 
Wilson Center Press, 1995), 138-182.  
524 Nazarbayev, Na poroge. 2nd. ed., 61-73; Epitsentr Mira. 2nd. ed. (Almaty: Atamura, 2003b), 27-38; and 
Nursultan Nazarbayev and Peter Conradi, Nursultan Nazarbayev: My Life, My times and the Future… 
(Northampton: Pilkington Press, 1998), 139-50. President Nazarbayev, quoted in Don Oberdorfer, “Kazakhstan 
agrees to give up the A-Arms; START treaty roadblock is cleared,” Washington Post, 20 May 1992. The statement 
by President Nazarbayev to the Supreme Soviet Hearings, Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Kazakhstan, The 
Evening Session of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Kazakhstan, May 26, 1992. Minutes (Almaty: The 
Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 1992).  
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Issue overview 
Deliberately ambivalent nuclear policy 
The emergence of Kazakhstan on the world political map on 16 December 1991 was a direct 
result of the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In turn, the collapse of the nuclear state created “a 
paradoxical situation where in the place of one nuclear superpower, there had emerged at least 
four.”525 Kazakhstan was among these four nuclear powers, now host to the world’s fourth 
largest nuclear arsenal.526 Immediately after independence, this invoked noticeable domestic and 
international developments pro et contra the nuclear Kazakhstan.  
The republic’s leadership faced a major foreign policy issue that concerned some of the 
most fundamental aspects of Kazakhstan’s existence and future development. From December 
1991 to May 1992, for the first six months of the existence of the republic in a nuclear capacity, 
the Kazakhstani leadership’s position on the renunciation of its nuclear status and relinquishment 
of nuclear weapons constantly oscillated between renouncement and retainment.527 Such 
behaviour was induced by a specific strategy that included elements of: an intentional ambiguity 
in  Almaty’s nuclear stance; frequent introduction of new issues to the denuclearization agenda; 
and a simultaneous political and security diplomatic manoeuvring vis-à-vis Russia and the USA. 
The ambivalence of the Kazakhstani nuclear stance manifested itself from the start. One 
of the earliest statements by Nazarbayev on the nuclear issue was made at a meeting with the US 
Secretary of State James A. Baker on 17 December 1991, where Nazarbayev told the State 
Secretary: “As long as Russia has nuclear weapons, Kazakhstan will too.”528 This statement was 
soon reiterated in the first official letter to Bush, in which Nazarbayev informed his American 
                                                 
525 Omurserik Kasenov, Dastan Eleukenov, and Murat Laumulin, Kazakhstan and the Non-Proliferation Treaty 
(Almaty: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1994), 4. 
526 “Contribution to International Security,” Embassy of the Republic of Kazakhstan in USA, accessed 10 March 
2011, http://www.kazakhembus.com/page/contribution-to-international-security. 
527 Laumulin, Kazakhstan v Sovremennikh, 143-144; also Reiss, Bridled Ambition, 138-141.  
528 President Nazarbayev, cited by the US Secretary of State, James A. Baker, as reported by the ABC News 
Channel, World News Tonight with Peter Jennings, 17 December 1991.  
 149 
 
counterpart “Kazakhstan will join the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a 
nuclear weapon state.”529 
Intriguingly, according to Mitchell Reiss, as early as December 1991 Nazarbayev 
allegedly twice pledged in private talks with American officials to join the NPT as a non-nuclear 
state, thus renouncing Kazakhstani claims on the nuclear weapons deployed on its territory.530 In 
public statements made during the following months, however, Nazarbayev withdrew his non-
nuclear commitment and confirmed the nuclear status of the republic.531 Reiss writes that 
Nazarbayev was “deliberately more ambiguous on the nuclear issue in public than he was in 
private with the Americans.”532 To give another illustration, consider the impressions of the two 
Western foreign ministers who discussed the issue with Nazarbayev in January and February 
1992. For the French minister Roland Dumas, Nazarbayev “virtually behaved like the leader of a 
nuclear power.”533 The British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd told reporters after meeting with 
Nazarbayev: “I am clear that President Nazarbayev has no ambitions for Kazakhstan to be a 
nuclear power but he is very conscious of the cost and time taken to dismantle and transfer the 
nuclear weapons.”534 This seemed to be a specific diplomatic tactic employed by Nazarbayev to 
keep the nuclear issue oblique for the moment.  
In general, Nazarbayev is believed to be a skilled diplomat. Reiss makes an inquisitive 
inference about Nazarbayev’s ability to manipulate a situation in negotiations. Explaining the 
episode of Nazarbayev’s stopover in Moscow on 17 May 1992, en route to Washington, to 
discuss with Yeltsin his upcoming negotiations with the Americans, Reiss presumes:  
From his press statement after this meeting, it was clear that Nazarbayev had fooled Yeltsin 
into allowing Almaty to keep half of its SS-18s beyond the seven-year START 
                                                 
529 “Nazarbayev-Bush letter, 7 January 1992.” APRK, f. 5N, op. 1, d. 289, l.2. 
530 Reiss, Bridled Ambition, 141. 
531 Ibid. 
532 Ibid. 
533 Dumas cited in Mikhail Shchipanov, “Easier to Deal With Bush,” Kuranty, 8 February 1992. Also, consider the 
following excerpt from the Nazarbayev-Dumas dialogue: Dumas: “Will you have more [nuclear] tests?” 
Nazarbayev: “No, I put a ban on them. …For now.” (Emphasis added). “Minutes of the talks between President 
Nazarbayev and French state minister – Minister of Foreign Affairs Roland Dumas in Almaty, 25 January 1992.” 
APRK f. 5N, op. 1, d. 218, l. 13. 
534 Steve Doughty, “West Must Pay Us to Destroy Our Nuclear Weapons,” Daily Mail, 20 January 1992. 
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framework….Nazarbayev’s cleverness alerted Washington to the possibility that he might 
attempt a similar ploy in Lisbon.535 
 
While keeping a vague stance on the fate of the nuclear weapons deployed on the 
republic’s territory, Nazarbayev was a keen supporter of another nuclear alternative – to preserve 
the unified control over nuclear weapons and to establish a joint strategic forces command in 
cooperation with Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine. At the CIS inaugural summit in Almaty on 21 
December 1991, the agreement on “Joint Measures on Nuclear Arms” was signed, and “The 
Agreement on Strategic Forces,” signed at the Minsk Summit on 30 December 1991, reiterated 
the four nation’s intention to keep the joint command over nuclear weapons. These acts allowed 
Nazarbayev to reach two objectives: to remain within a single strategic space with Russia, thus 
deterring possible military threats from outside the CIS territory, and to obtain additional 
international legitimacy over the nuclear weapons deployed on the republic’s territory. One of 
the main provisions of these agreements was setting a veto system for nuclear launches. In 
theory, the launch of nuclear missiles would have to be authorized by all four presidents who 
were interconnected by a special communication line. In realty, the functions of command and 
control over Soviet nuclear missiles were never handed over by the first and the last Soviet 
president Mikhail Gorbachev to anyone except Russia’s president Yeltsin.536 
As Kazakhstan continued to defend its right for a nuclear status, it presented a new 
argumentation of its claim. Based on the provisions of the NPT, according to which any state 
that produced and tested nuclear weapons prior to January 1967 was considered a nuclear 
weapon state, Almaty justified its claim for a nuclear state status to Washington: “if 
circumstances made the independent republic to become a nuclear state, then it [the republic] 
should be accepted as such, in accordance with the international definitions.”537 In a twist to this 
argumentation, Kazakhstan also proposed the introduction of a new classification of a nuclear 
                                                 
535 Reiss, Bridled Ambition, 146. 
536 On 25 December 1991 Gorbachev resigned and passed nuclear launch codes to the president of Russia Boris 
Yeltsin.  
For the illustration of Nazarbayev’s belief in the unfeasibility of the veto system see “Minutes of the talks between 
Nazarbayev and Dumas, 25 January 1992.” APRK f. 5N, op. 1, d. 218, ll. 1-19. 
537 “Nazarbayev-Bush letter, 7 April 1992.” APRK, f. 5N, op. 1, d. 1361, l. 27. 
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state, whereby, since the republic was nuclear at the time, but intended to denuclearize in the 
future, it should be considered as a temporary nuclear state.538 These two policy positions are 
explicated in the Kazakhstani foreign ministry’s policy paper submitted to the president in April 
1992: 
Kazakhstan cannot be called a non-nuclear state because it would contradict the objective 
reality. Nuclear weapons were deployed on the republic’s territory long before 1 January 1967. 
Thus, in accordance with the Treaty [NPT], Kazakhstan, as one of the successors to the USSR, 
should be categorized as a state-possessor of nuclear weapons. At the same time, the ultimate 
goal of Kazakhstan is to become a territory free from nuclear weapons, that is a ‘nuclear free’ 
zone….The logic itself dictates the following conclusion: Kazakhstan possesses nuclear 
weapons temporarily. But as of now it possesses them in reality. Therefore Kazakhstan is in its 
right to have a status of a state-possessor of nuclear weapons. This position would allow 
Kazakhstan to fully secure its interests as a sovereign state, an independent subject of 
international law. Besides, the republic in the foreseeable future would be able to keep 
powerful leverages over global processes, alongside leading powers.539 
 
On another occasion, showing some flexibility, Nazarbayev linked the prospects of 
Kazakhstan’s nuclear renouncement to geostrategic security concerns and global nuclear 
disarmament: “We have a perception of a threat from the USA, China, Russia, among others; if 
they [dismantle] their strategic weapons, we will follow suit.”540 The nuclear claim was 
articulated up until early May 1992, when during the visit of Japanese foreign minister Michio 
Watanabe the president clearly restated the point that Kazakhstan was a nuclear state.541 
Nonetheless, a few weeks later, on 19 May 1992, Nazarbayev officially proclaimed Almaty’s 
intention to accede to the START treaty and to join the NPT treaty.542 
                                                 
538 President Nazarbayev: “I sent a letter to President Bush in which I informed him of our desire to become a non-
nuclear state. However, pending the destruction of the nuclear warheads, I asked him to temporarily view 
Kazakhstan as a nuclear state,” as reported in the Official Kremlin International News Broadcast, 28 April 1992. It 
is unknown, though, whether the president meant the 7 April 1992 letter, as in the letter itself there are no passages 
containing the term a “temporary nuclear state.” APRK, f. 5N, op. 1, d. 1361, ll. 25-28. 
539 “Main provisions of the Foreign Policy Concept.” APRK f. 75N, op. 1, d. 21, ll. 154-155. Underlined passages in 
original. 
540 “Nazarbayev Seeks ‘Parity’ in Atom Cuts: When Others Disarm, So Will Kazakhstan,” Washington Post, 23 
February 1992. 
541 On 1 May 1992, in the interview to the Japanese TV channel, Nazarbayev stated that “Kazakhstan will retain its 
nuclear weapons for at least 15 years,” quoted by NHK TV, aired 1 May 1992, transcript, as reported in BBC 
Summary of World Broadcasts, 4 May 1992. On 2 May 1992, during talks with Watanabe in Almaty, Nazarbayev 
told the Japanese diplomat that the republic “had no alternative but to keep nuclear weapons unless Russia, US and 
China will guarantee the security of Kazakhstan,” quoted in “Kazakh Leader Shows Understanding of Territorial 
Dispute,” Japan Economic Newswire,  2 May 1992. 
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Four days later, on 23 May 1992, Kazakhstan State Counsellor Zhukeyev signed the 
Lisbon Protocol to the START I treaty proclaiming that Kazakhstan would join the NPT as non-
nuclear weapon state and would accede to the START I treaty as a signatory state.  
The shift in Kazakhstan’s position was determined by several factors. The key security factors 
were: the conclusion of the Collective Security Treaty (CST) in Tashkent on 15 May 1992; the 
statement of the Chinese Foreign Ministry assuring Kazakhstan that Beijing had no territorial 
claims; the message from US Secretary of State Baker to Nazarbayev reaffirming the US 
security commitment to non-nuclear states if they were threatened with nuclear power; and the 
intention to sign the bilateral “Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance” 
between Kazakhstan and Russia.543 According to Nazarbayev, an equally important factor for 
Almaty’s nuclear policy shift was the change of the US position whereby Washington finally 
agreed to recognize Kazakhstan as an independent party to the START treaty. This was reflected 
in Nazarbayev-Bush letter written on the eve of Nazarbayev’s visit to Washington, in which the 
Kazakhstani president’s explains the change in Kazakhstan’s position: 
The signing of the CST led to the qualitatively new situation in the national security sphere of 
Kazakhstan. Furthermore, considering the fact that the USA agreed with our request to 
consider Kazakhstan as a Party to the START and that in the future Kazakhstan will participate 
in the START process as an independent and full-fledged partner, and also considering the US 
assurances about holding its obligations for taking immediate assistance measures in case 
Kazakhstan becomes the object of aggression or threat....Kazakhstan accedes to the NPT as a 
non-nuclear state.544 
 
These security and political points circumscribed the contours of nuclear deliberations as 
they touched upon underlying issues that informed how decision-makers in Almaty perceived a 
nuclear dilemma and correspondingly adapted their nuclear position and strategy. 
 
Nuclear geopolitics  
For the Kazakhstani leadership the nuclear dilemma was essentially a security dilemma. In this 
context, the nuclear arsenal was viewed both as a deterrence mechanism against a possible threat 
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and as a bargaining tool to receive security guarantees in exchange for the arsenal’s 
relinquishment. At the same time, one of the general concerns of the time was the actual utility 
of the nuclear weapons for the nation’s security needs, as it was noted by Kasenov and 
Abuseitov, “[were] the nuclear arsenals really able to provide the needed guarantee of security 
for the Republic of Kazakhstan in the essentially new type of international situation?”545  
For many in Almaty at this time a probability of a direct military threat from China and 
Russia was realistic. One internal analytical document written for Kazakhstan’s leadership 
stated: 
Kazakhstan, elaborating its national security concept, has to come from its geostrategic 
location ‘at the junction’ of two powers, RFSR and PRC, each of these two could possibly 
make territorial claims in the future and each of these two posses powerful military potential, 
including nuclear weapons.546 
 
In view of the alleged Chinese territorial claims and the likelihood of a far-right neo-
imperialist rise in Russia, nuclear weapons were considered as an effective deterrent instrument. 
In one interview for the American press, Nazarbayev said to reporters:  
I must tell you that our neighbour China has nuclear weapons, our neighbour Russia has 
nuclear weapons.…Some Russian politicians have territorial claims to Kazakhstan. There are 
Chinese textbooks that claim that parts of Siberia and Kazakhstan belong to China. Under these 
conditions how do you expect Kazakhstan to react?547  
 
The geostrategic location of Kazakhstan in the Central Asian region was another point of 
concern. Laumulin notes that the disappearance of the Soviet strategic arsenal from its territory 
left the young republic “practically defenceless in the face of impetuous developments in Central 
Asia.”548 Many security threats and challenges have escalated in the region including political 
destabilization, economic collapse, border disputes, separatist movements, ethnic and religious 
conflicts.549 The geographical proximity of Kazakhstan to the Middle East, with several nuclear 
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“threshold states” – Pakistan, India, Iraq, and Iran – added further stress to the strategic security 
outlook.550 
These specific security concerns were regularly reiterated in Nazarbayev’s public 
statements and diplomatic cables. The demand for security guarantees from major world powers 
was an inalienable element for any talks on Kazakhstan’s denuclearization. In another example, 
in the April 1992 interview with Russian journalists Nazarbayev told them: “Kazakhstan will 
show flexibility if the USA guarantees the inviolability of its territorial integrity, ensures that the 
republic does not come under nuclear attack from either the USA or Russia, or China.”551 The 
letter from Nazarbayev to Bush written the same month reads:  
It is an invariant goal of Kazakhstan to become a nuclear-free state. If this process could 
possibly become unilateral then we will need relevant guarantees from the USA, Russia, China, 
and Great Britain. I base my judgment on the assumption that the Republic of Kazakhstan 
could rely on international guarantees to ensure its national security.552 
 
The nuclear issue thus appeared to be an existential one for Kazakhstan’s leadership. 
Kazakhstan had no choice but to realistically weigh up the real value of the nuclear weapons 
factor for ensuring its military security. The internal policy memorandum written to Vice-
President Yerik Asanbayev reads: “Apparently, the main goal of the Kazakhstani diplomacy 
should be the utilization, for the provision of the republic’s security, of the fact that nuclear 
weapons are deployed on its territory.”553 
For Kazakhstan’s leadership, Russia and the USA were the principal security guarantors. 
At the same time, they were also perceived as potential sources of strategic threat. This point, 
interconnected with the American and Russian natural interest in the fate of the republic’s 
nuclear weapons, predisposed the Kazakhstani nuclear policy dynamics to be informed by 
interactions with the USA and Russia.  
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Trilateral nuclear diplomacy 
The interrelatedness of Kazakhstan’s security concerns and outside powers’ interests made the 
nuclear dilemma substantially multilateral, whereby Almaty had to consider its policies towards 
each participating country within a broader political and security context. To illustrate this point, 
consider the following presumption put forward by Potter: while the Russian nuclear umbrella 
could assure deterrence from China, nuclear deterrence from Russia could be seen in a form of 
the “independent nuclear weapons program”; the latter action would certainly alienate Moscow – 
the option Almaty could not afford.554 Furthermore, the retaining of nuclear arsenals would 
increase chances of Western isolation of Kazakhstan, thus making it more susceptible to Russian 
or Chinese pressures.555 The need to calculate the repercussions of Kazakhstan’s dealings vis-à-
vis each nation and each security issue had certainly complicated the solution of the nuclear 
dilemma for the Kazakhstani leadership. 
As Almaty was probing the realization of its own nuclear strategy, both Moscow and 
Washington were extensively practicing public and behind-the-scenes politics of pressure to 
convince Almaty’s decision makers to renounce nuclear weapons. Putting himself in the place of 
policymakers in Almaty, Potter assumes: “Given the country’s geostrategic location, it is natural 
that Kazakhstan’s leadership was most attentive to its nuclear-armed neighbours. Any nuclear 
weapons ambitions it may have entertained, however, were also constrained by anticipation of 
the West’s response.”556  
Indeed, Almaty well realized the inevitability of a negative reaction from Russia and the 
USA to any Kazakhstani step off the denuclearization path. For Russia it was important to 
remain the sole nuclear state for several reasons, including its claim for the Soviet seat at the 
Permanent Security Council, matters of international prestige, and geopolitical factors affecting 
its complicated relations with another newly emerged nuclear state, Ukraine. Russia had a direct 
leverage on Kazakhstan’s nuclear stance since Moscow was in fact the only power to exercise 
                                                 
554 Potter, Politics of Nuclear Renunciation, 37-38.  
555 Ibid, 39. 
556 Ibid. 
 156 
 
command and control over the strategic forces deployed on the territory of four post-Soviet 
states. Russia’s importance for Kazakhstan’s strategic security had been reflected in many policy 
papers of the time, for example, in one of the earlier papers on the republic’s foreign policy 
concept, the relations with the Russian Federation were described as being of a “vital 
importance.”557 Almaty certainly had to carefully consider Moscow’s opinion. Illustrative of this 
trend was a stopover of Nazarbayev in Moscow en route to Washington. During this stopover, 
Nazarbayev discussed with his Russian colleague Kazakhstan’s nuclear position and wanted to 
hear Yeltsin’s judgment of Almaty’s tactics on the upcoming talks with the Americans.558 
Moscow’s major leverage came from the fact that Russia’s president was actually the only head 
of state in full control of the Soviet strategic forces. The Kazakhstani leadership clearly realized 
the formal character of the “launch veto” arrangements provided by agreements signed at Almaty 
and Minsk summits. On 25 December 1991, the same day Gorbachev passed nuclear codes to 
Yeltsin, the latter issued a decree on the “Improvement of the Steadfastness of the Combat 
Control of the CIS Unified Armed Forces’ Strategic Nuclear Forces in Emergency Situation” 
which allowed Russia’s president to use the nuclear forces deployed on the territory of the four 
republics without other presidents’ prior consent.559 This decree undermined the principles of the 
Almaty and Minsk accords.  
Nazarbayev shared the distress over the impracticality of unified nuclear control and the 
probability of the unilateral use of nuclear weapons by Russia even with Western diplomats. On 
25 January 1992 French Foreign Minister Dumas had a meeting with president Nazarbayev. 
Following are the excerpts from the minutes of this meeting, which in detail reveal Nazarbayev’s 
attitude to the question of the unified control of the strategic nuclear arsenal.  
General Chesnot (member of the French delegation): Please pardon me, but I will ask you a 
military question. You said that for 10 more years you will have in your possession the nuclear 
strategic weapon….How do you think you can make a decision to use this weapon? Do you 
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want to have an independent launch button or do you agree that this button will be held by 
Russia’s president? 
Nazarbayev: We have signed the agreement in that respect. The launch button is with the 
Commander-in-Chief of the CIS Unified Forces, with the Head of the General Staff [of the CIS 
Unified Forces], and with the President of Russia….The decision about a possible use is made 
by four heads of states that posses nuclear weapon. This is because the one who has the nuclear 
arms have to consider that he can be retaliated. 
Dumas: Yes, the retaliation. 
Nazarbayev: This is why I am not indifferent; this is why we have a special instantaneous 
connection line to make a decision. 
 
General Chesnot: Do you possess any other physical material device, apart from the telephone 
communication, to prevent the decision of the president of Russia, with which, possibly, you 
would not agree? 
Nazarbayev: I like this question! Today nobody, neither Kravchuk, nor Shushkevich, nor me 
can block it [the decision of the president of Russia on the use of nuclear weapons]….After we 
have signed the agreement that a decision to use of the nuclear weapon can only be made in 
concourse with all of us, Yeltsin issues the decree [the 25 December 1991 Decree] by which, in 
case of the shortage of time, Yeltsin, the Commander-in-Chief, and the Head of the General 
Staff can make this decision. What does he [Yeltsin] mean by shortage of time? The decision 
can be made in different mood. I wrote him that this decree breaches our agreements….I wrote 
him a letter that this is no good. 560 
 
As one Kazakhstani expert suggested, this 25 December 1991 Yeltsin decree had eventually 
become the decisive factor in Nazarbayev giving up whatever nuclear ambitions he might have 
entertained to date.561 
The USA, another principal partner in Almaty’s nuclear diplomacy, had a genuine 
interest in the relinquishment of all Soviet nuclear arsenals to Russia so they would have to deal 
with nuclear disarmament matters with one party rather than with all four. In fact, the nuclear 
factor was a key reason for the USA (among other Western countries) to be interested in 
Kazakhstan. The president’s press-secretary Seitkazy Matayev explicitly articulated this point in 
spring 1992: “If we didn’t have nuclear weapons, they would never have bothered,” said the 
press-secretary, commenting on recent visits by US State Secretary Baker, British foreign 
secretary Hurd and French foreign minister Dumas, “a state with nuclear bombs has a decisive 
role in world affairs…Nuclear weapons are our trump card.”562 This interest, however, reflected 
not only the significance of Almaty’s politics for the USA, but also for the reciprocal 
implications whereby Kazakhstan was subjected to intense American pressure.  
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Consider this section of the “Nuclear and Security Issues Agenda” attached to a letter 
sent by Bush to Nazarbayev on 28 December 1991.563 A fairly bold style of language used in the 
Agenda discursively suggests an element of power politics from the USA from the earliest 
phase:  
As a matter of high priority, Russia should confirm specifically that it considers itself bound to 
fulfil all the obligations of the former Soviet Union under the NPT. All other Republics should 
promptly become parties to the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states and take all steps necessary 
to fulfil their obligations under the Treaty.564 
 
Using similar stylistics, Secretary Baker wrote Nazarbayev about his meeting with the Russian 
foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev: “On the question of START ratification, I reiterated our view 
that ratification process in the US required a single partner and that that partner should be the 
Russian Federation.”565 
The USA also utilized the NATO authority to exert pressure on the Kazakhstani 
leadership. In April 1992 the US chargé d'affaires in Almaty William Courtney conveyed the 
“NATO statement on NPT Accession” to minister Suleymenov. The part of the text addressed to 
Nazarbayev read:  
Neither the mere physical presence of nuclear weapons in these states [Belarus, Kazakhstan, 
Ukraine], nor the locus of past Soviet testing activities constitutes grounds for regarding these 
states as nuclear weapon states under the treaty [NPT]….Allies fully expect that Ukraine, 
Belarus, and Kazakhstan will accede to the NPT not as non-nuclear weapon states….This will 
facilitate their further integration into the international community and will promote the 
security interests of all concerned states.566 
 
The annual review of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs reflects the scale of political 
pressure used by Washington to compel Almaty to give up its nuclear ambitions: 
The character of Kazakhstani-American relations was mainly defined by the presence of 
strategic offensive arms on the territory of Kazakhstan and Washington’s interest in the 
adoption of the status of a nuclear-free state by Kazakhstan. The MFA’s efforts were aimed at 
finding an active variant of the solution of this problem, while asserting Kazakhstan’s right as 
an independent sovereign state. After long, sometimes exhausting negotiations we were able to 
persuade Russia and USA to convert the START treaty to a multilateral format. Our statement 
on the intention to relinquish strategic weapons in accordance with the START treaty timetable 
and join the NPT has eliminated the elements of American power politics (politika silovogo 
davleniia) that manifested themselves prior to signing the Lisbon Protocol on May 23, 1992.567 
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Such pressure also took form of mass-media reports and intelligence “leaks” on alleged 
sales of Kazakhstan nuclear components to the Middle East states that were sounded in January 
1992. Several European and American information agencies reported that Tehran could have 
purchased nuclear technologies and weapons from Almaty.568 Almaty policymakers had 
correctly recognized the motivation behind these “leaks.” Illustrative of this understanding of the 
situation is the letter from the plenipotentiary mission of Kazakhstan in Moscow.569 On 10 
January 1992 the mission’s head, Kanat Saudabayev informed Nazarbayev about the visit by 
Counsellor R. Clark from the US Embassy in Moscow. Counsellor Clark expressed the US State 
Department’s concern about the “unconfirmed information” that Kazakhstan could export 
nuclear components to Iran. In the letter Saudabayev indicates the “political forces, not interested 
in development of full-fledged Kazakhstani-American relations” as sources of such false 
accusations.570 Saudabayev was worried about the possible negative American reaction in case 
Washington receives additional falsified information about nuclear export. He warns 
Nazarbayev: “the American side is throwing a ‘trial balloon’ on a very serious 
issue…Kazakhstan will find itself in a vulnerable position in regard to possible charges of 
breaching its international obligations.”571 Laumulin assumes that these allegations about covert 
arm deals with Iran were initiated in order to test the readiness of Kazakhstan to follow the 
international agreements and, at the same time, to gauge the strength of the Islamic sentiments in 
the republic and the proclivity of the Kazakhstani leadership to cooperate with Islamic 
fundamentalist regimes.572 When Nazarbayev discussed this issue in his meeting with French 
foreign minister Dumas, the president told the European diplomat: 
Concerning insinuations about our relations with Arab nations, including Iran and others, I 
responsively state that this is not less than a provocation. We yet do not have any, neither 
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political nor economic relations with Iran or Pakistan, or with other Arabic nations. They can 
occur, but they can only concern our mutually beneficial economic relations. Kazakhs treat 
Islamic fundamentalism the same way French do.573 
 
Eventually, Kazakhstan’s foreign ministry had to officially deny allegations of selling 
nuclear weapons and its components, stating that they were “aimed at damaging Kazakhstan’s 
international prestige on the eve of it joining the UN.”574  
However, not only “stick,” but also “carrot” politics were used in the American and 
Russian attempts to influence Kazakhstan’s decision. The Americans promised large-scale 
economic and technical assistance to Kazakhstan. The fact that the Lisbon Protocol was signed at 
the international aid conference devoted to assisting post-Soviet nations in transition is 
illustrative of the point. Counsellor Zhukeyev would later recall: “Kazakhstan received its own 
Marshall Plan in exchange for nuclear renouncement.”575 Potter, with reference to the US 
ambassador, sums up the incentives and disincentives presented to the Kazakhstani leadership by 
the USA:  
Lengthy discussions between senior US and Kazakhstani officials…especially in the period 
prior to May 1992, had the effect of highlighting to Kazakhstan the security liabilities of 
retaining nuclear weapons and the strategic, as well as economic, benefit that would accrue 
from their removal.576  
 
Motivation from the Russian side would primarily come from the politico-military 
domain. Nazarbayev had solid reasons to expect Russia to guarantee the republic’s sovereignty 
and territorial integrity, as well as to extend a nuclear protection. One of the main goals of the 
Almaty CIS summit in December 1991 was to recognize Russia as the legal successor to the 
USSR, including its membership in the nuclear club, thereby legitimizing its claim for a 
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permanent seat at the UN Security Council. At the Almaty summit CIS presidents agreed to 
support Russia in taking over the USSR seat in the Security Council.577 In turn, Russia was 
expected to serve as a security guarantor for Kazakhstan, Belarus and Ukraine. Eventually 
Russia did become the primary security guarantor for Kazakhstan after the nuclear 
renouncement. The republic remained in the common strategic military space and thus under the 
Russian nuclear umbrella. These political-military arrangements were legalized first in Tashkent, 
where the Collective Security Treaty was signed on 15 May 1992, and then in Moscow, where 
the bilateral “Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance” between Kazakhstan 
and Russia was signed on 25 May 1992. 
The Russian and American factors were the most significant external factors for the 
republic’s nuclear strategy. The politics of Moscow and Washington delineated a corridor within 
which Almaty could manoeuvre. Nazarbayev’s nuclear game had to constantly take into account 
considerations of the outside partners. Each action or change in position from Russia or the USA 
automatically entailed a policy response from Kazakhstan. Therefore, Almaty’s nuclear politics 
appears to be a highly interactive endeavour.  
 
Nuclear deliberations 
Issue novelty 
When the nuclear dilemma surfaced, neither Nazarbayev nor his policy advisers had at their 
hands a finalized comprehensive and coordinated policy position. This situation occurred 
because of the infancy of Kazakhstan foreign policy per se and because of the novelty of the 
issue for Nazarbayev himself. Chronologically, the founding period of Kazakhstan’s foreign 
policy coincided with the nuclear period of the republic’s history. The absence of any prior 
experience of independent foreign policy planning and implementation at the early stage of 
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independence was the general setting in which the nuclear debate unfolded.578 As described in 
detail in the previous chapter, both the foreign ministry and other institutions, involved in foreign 
policymaking were at their nascent formation stages. Standard operating and policy planning 
procedures were only beginning to emerge to deal with routine and non-routine policy issues. 
Although virtually every foreign policy issue had to be dealt with from scratch, the nuclear 
question naturally required serious expertise and attention.  
Although some basic information about the nuclear infrastructure was known in Almaty 
prior to independence, Nazarbayev admits that only in December 1991 he found out detailed 
information about nuclear weapons deployed on Kazakhstan territory.579 In one letter to Bush 
Nazarbayev confidently tells his American colleague: 
To be frank, due to understandable reasons, previously [before the independence] main 
information about the presence, qualitative composition, and potential power capacity of this 
type of weapons [nuclear missiles] was not available for Kazakhstan. Naturally, some time was 
needed for me personally to comprehend the situation.580 
 
Potter draws a more sceptical picture of Nazarbayev’s comprehension of nuclear matters 
at the initial period. The author quotes an anonymous Kazakh official who, serving as the 
presidential adviser at the CIS summit in Almaty on 21 December 1991, was asked by 
Nazarbayev: “What should we do with the nuclear weapons?”; in a reply to this question the 
adviser suggested to “not be in a hurry.”581 Potter uses this evidence to illustrate his point about 
Kazakhstan’s leadership initial inexperience in foreign matters.582 
                                                 
578 All interviewed individuals who worked in the foreign ministry in the beginning of the 1990s highlight this point 
as a particular feature of the initial period of independence. 
579 Jonathan Aitken, Nazarbayev and the Making of Kazakhstan (London: Continuum, 2009), 137.  
Before the proclamation of independence, on 29 August 1991 Nazarbayev closed the Semipalatinsk testing polygon 
– an action that certainly required some basic understanding of a nuclear problem. 
580 APRK f. 5N, op. 1, d. 1361, l. 25.   
581 Potter, Politics of Nuclear Renunciation, 16. 
582 While making a chronologically correct observation that Kazakhstan’s leadership had only recently started to 
engage in foreign policy and thus had a “very limited experience in international affairs,” Potter overlooks the fact 
that even prior to independence the president had at least some preliminary information about the nuclear subject. 
The anonymous witness’s account cited by Potter does not correlate with the confident style Nazarbayev held during 
his talks with James Baker just 5 days before. Had Nazarbayev been a complete novice in nuclear problem it would 
be unlikely that his discussions on nuclear issues with Baker were held tête-à-tête, if held at all. The cited dialogue 
between Nazarbayev and his adviser was most likely framed more generally and aimed at motivating his advisers to 
produce more policy options than the Kazakh leader had to the date.  
 163 
 
Therefore, it is natural that Nazarbayev initially had no set nuclear position.583 To 
develop one there was a need, to one degree or another, for the policy advice and expertise of 
advisers he had around him. While the circle of experienced diplomats, foreign policy experts, 
and nuclear specialists in the republic was limited, the president mobilized every professional to 
deal with this issue. 
 
Alternative nuclear discourses 
During this six-month period, from December 1991 till May 1992, Nazarbayev was continuously 
receiving different, often contradictory policy recommendations that ranged from dovish 
proposals of unilateral and unconditional nuclear disarmament to hawkish calls to run an 
independent nuclear weapons programme. Nazarbayev recalls: “We had no choice but to embark 
on the difficult path of measuring conclusions and counterarguments, doubts and fears, in a 
grand debate as we deliberated whether or not Kazakhstan would become a nuclear power.”584  
Nuclear proponents argued that nuclear weapons would effectively allow Kazakhstan to 
increase its own political status as a full-fledged member of the nuclear club and to deter 
possible security threats from China, Russia and the Middle East. To overcome technical and 
financial difficulties in managing the entire nuclear arsenals, a proposition was made to keep the 
small number of strategic nuclear missiles in order to maintain a so-called “defensive 
sufficiency” whereby not the quantity but the mere presence of nuclear weapons would count. 585  
Representatives of another pole in a nuclear debate, nuclear pacifists, who urged for an 
unconditional denuclearization, mainly represented ecological movements and based their clause 
on the catastrophic effects of Semipalatinsk nuclear test range closed in August 1991 by the 
president’s decree. Apparently, such unilateral unconditional renouncement did not seem to 
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guarantee any security or economic gains in return. The main argumentation base was 
constructed from the environmental and civilizational elements. 
The circle of critics of nuclear retention included a mid-level official in the president’s 
apparatus and a former foreign minister of the Kazakh SSR Isinaliev.586 Nevertheless, neither 
“hawks” nor “doves” were represented at the highest foreign policymaking echelons. It made the 
former less susceptible to the extreme political pressure from Washington and Moscow 
Nazarbayev was subject to. Correspondingly, the latter could not fully perceive prospects of 
appropriate political, security, and economic compensation for nuclear weapons. Furthermore, 
both wings did not have sufficient technical information about the state of affairs with the 
stationed nuclear weapons. It is unlikely that the nuclear pacifists and nuclear protagonists knew 
that the full control over strategic arms remained in Moscow’s hands and that a safe 
deconstruction of silo-launched nuclear missiles required enormous technical and financial 
resources that Almaty did not have.587 
Meanwhile, Nazarbayev’s political post clearly gave him a better opportunity to perceive 
all elements of the puzzle since he was a person in the centre of a nuclear debate. At some early 
stage in this period, Nazarbayev discarded both ultra-dovish and ultra-hawking opinions and in 
this grand debate chose a “steady course between capitulation and confrontation.”588 According 
to Nazarbayev’s own recollections and Tokaev’s memoirs, the president affirmatively adhered to 
the non-nuclear option but deliberately protracted the finalization of a nuclear question in order 
to gain maximum political, security, and economic compensation.589 Hence, out of the three 
major nuclear outlooks prevailing at the time: 1) position of “hawks” in favour of keeping an 
entire nuclear arsenal to serve as a deterrent and as a political leverage; 2) position of 
                                                 
586 Burkytbai Aiaganov headed the Public Opinion Research and Sociological Forecasting Sector of the Apparatus 
of the President. 
One newspaper article criticizing nuclear agreements reached by Nazarbayev in Washington in May 1992 was 
written by a former minister of foreign affairs Isinaliev and sent to Kazakhstanskaia Pravda, but it remained 
unpublished. See Isinaliev, “Net Garantii Bezopasnosti,” 21 May 1992. APRK f. 5N, op. 1, d. 1381, ll. 18-23. 
587 For Nazarbayev’s view on a nuclear debate in Kazakhstani society, see Nazarbayev, Epitsentr Mira. 2nd. ed., 27-
38. 
588 Reiss, Bridled ambition, 143. 
589 Nazarbayev and Conradi, Nursultan Nazarbayev; Nazarbayev, Na poroge; Epitsentr Mira; Tokaev, Pod Stiagom. 
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“bargainers” who argued for retaining nuclear arms until they can be exchanged for security 
guarantees; and, 3) position of “doves” who wanted immediate and total denuclearization, 
Nazarbayev vowed for the second one – the “bargainers’ line.”590 
But Nazarbayev was certainly not alone in charting the nuclear course. Almaty’s nuclear 
strategy was an amalgam of the president’s own contemplation and policy recommendations he 
received from his key advisers. Once the “bargainers' line” became the official course of action, 
Nazarbayev’s foreign policy team began to elaborate a blueprint of Almaty’s nuclear strategy. 
This middle path between retention and renouncement is where foreign policymaking manifested 
itself.591 Nazarbayev set the general preferences – to eventually become a nuclear-free state but 
to protract nuclear renouncement for as long as it was necessary to gain political and economic 
dividends. His advisory group generated a number of alternative nuclear positions in line with 
the president’s general strategy. 
 
Obscure foreign policymaking 
Just as the Kazakhstani nuclear strategy seemed ambiguous for Russian and American diplomats, 
a nuclear decision-making process in Almaty continues to seem obscure to researchers. The 
existing literature on Kazakhstan’s denuclearization contains limited information on the principal 
details of the foreign policymaking process and structure in the studied period. A usual practice 
in both primary and secondary sources is to abstract foreign policymaking, either by centring the 
focus of attention on the president’s role, or by anthropomorphizing and substituting decision-
making personalities with such constructs as “Kazakhstan,” “the Republic,” “Almaty” etc. 
Therefore, many questions are left unanswered. Who were the president’s key advisers on 
nuclear politics? Was there an established ad hoc group to deal with this issue? What were the 
policy positions of the foreign minister? How was policy advice communicated to the president? 
                                                 
590 Aitken, Nazarbayev and the Making of Kazakhstan, 137-138. 
591 Reiss, Bridled Ambition, 142. 
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These and other queries, principal for a foreign policy decision-making analysis, have not been 
hitherto explicated. 
Narratives of Kazakhstan’s denuclearization mostly revolve around Nazarbayev, and he 
is often identified in them as the sole decision-making actor. The president’s biographers depict 
foreign policymaking through the prism of Nazarbayev’s vision and action. Ertysbaev: 
“Nazarbayev could not miss a chance to take advantage of the situation when Kazakhstan, even 
if for a short time, became a nuclear state. He determinedly decided to expand issues of nuclear 
security and convert them to the dimension of security guarantees for Kazakhstan.”592 
Kasymbekov: “Nevertheless, President of Kazakhstan Nazarbayev chose a path that even his 
former opponents today agree to have been the most rational.”593 Aitken: “So Nazarbayev had to 
restrain his instincts to indulge in the gesture politics of an immediate renunciation of nuclear 
weapons after becoming president. Instead, he embarked on a delicate diplomatic minuet with 
the world’s major nuclear powers, designed to extract maximum advantage for Kazakhstan.”594 
As Reiss flatteringly summarizes: 
But he [Nazarbayev] adroitly negotiated the pace, terms, and price of their [nuclear weapons] 
return to extract maximum advantage. He was able to parlay a weak hand – a poor economy, 
fewer nuclear weapons than in Ukraine, borders with two nuclear-armed states, enormous 
human suffering and environmental harm from past nuclear tests, and suspicion over ties to 
other Moslem states – into a winning hand, gaining kudos for his statesmanship and 
international status for his country. 595 
 
Nazarbayev’s own autobiography and memoirs expectedly focus on the president’s 
deliberations and involvement in the denuclearization process, very loosely hinting at the 
advisory group around him.596 Similar difficulties in obtaining detailed information were 
encountered at the interviews with former and active government officials. During the 
interviews, Nazarbayev’s character featured prominently, reflecting his active role in nuclear 
                                                 
592 Ertysbaev, Kazakhstan i Nazarbayev, 469. 
593 Kasymbekov, Institut Prezidentstva, 220. 
594 Aitken, Nazarbayev and the Making of Kazakhstan, 129. 
595 Reiss, Bridled Ambition, 150. 
596 Only in one instance does Nazarbayev directly credit the presence of the adviser, who was the Russian general 
from the strategic forces branch providing expert advice to the president at the negotiation rounds in Washington. 
Nazarbayev recalls: “All the time the Russian officer was sitting next to me, giving me advice and correcting any 
mistakes which I made.” Nazarbayev and Conradi, Nursultan Nazarbayev, 148.  
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policymaking. His custom to consult with his associates was also confirmed by senior foreign 
ministry and the president’s office officials.597 At the same time, names or ranks of these 
advisers were not disclosed. Nevertheless, the president’s practice to discuss nuclear issues both 
formally and informally suggests that there was an established circle of his advisers who assisted 
him in elaborating Kazakhstan’s nuclear strategy. 
Intentionally or not, the Kazakhstani decision makers directly involved in nuclear 
deliberations tend not to be specific in their accounts either. In his memoirs, Nazarbayev himself 
often uses the pronouns “we,” “us” etc. to describe his foreign policymaking circle. Illustrative 
of this tendency, Nazarbayev describes nuclear negotiations with Baker in his autobiography in 
the following manner:  
However, I insisted that it would be wrong to see this as an attempt by us to stake a claim to the 
nuclear weapons on our territory. We were realists; we knew how expensive it would be to 
maintain these weapons.…Nevertheless, we were not prepared simply to renounce these 
weapons without getting something in return – in particular, security guarantees.598  
 
In Nazarbayev’s memoirs, even the name and rank of the official who signed the Lisbon 
Protocol on behalf of Kazakhstan was withheld. This person, State Counsellor Zhukeyev, was 
depicted as “a representative of Kazakhstan.”599 
Tokaev, who was in the office of the deputy foreign minister from March 1992 onwards 
and personally participated in the elaboration of the nuclear strategy, is also unspecific in his 
recollections. Tokaev abstracts the decision-making in Almaty either by anthropomorphizing the 
republic or signifying the president’s role. Describing the complexity of the nuclear dilemma, 
Tokaev recollects: “Kazakhstan faced an uneasy task of grasping the specifics of global nuclear 
politics, to determine positions on different issues of nuclear disarmament. President Nazarbayev 
charted a denuclearization course.”600 
Reiss, having interviewed many people who were involved in nuclear decision-making 
both in Almaty and Washington, made the following observation: 
                                                 
597 Kasymbekov, interview; Kurmanguzhin, interview, 10 February 2012, Suleymenov, interview. 
598 Nazarbayev and Conradi, Nursultan Nazarbayev, 146. 
599 Ibid, 149. 
600 Tokaev, Pod Stiagom, 696. 
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What may not have been known to US officials at this time [December 1991-May 1992] was 
the nature of a behind-the-scenes nuclear debate then under way in Almaty. Government 
officials and military officers argued over the perceived political advantages and disadvantages 
that nuclear weapons conferred.…Although only the contours of this debate are known, it had 
clearly influenced Kazakhstan’s nuclear stance at the two December 1991 summits and 
afterward.601 
 
Potter is more straightforward in describing the essence of the nuclear decision-
making. The author also bases his findings on the interviews he conducted with 
Kazakhstani and US officials. Potter argues that nuclear decision-making was contracted at 
the highest level with only two persons in charge of making decisions: “Although the 
ministers of foreign affairs and defence were involved formally in the formulation of 
nuclear policy, in fact all key internal and international nuclear deliberations appear to have 
involved only President Nazarbayev and State Counsellor Zhukeyev.”602 
If the president’s role in denuclearization is illustrated rather sufficiently, the existence of 
some sort of decision-making structure is only implicitly suggested. The opaqueness of non-
Nazarbayev foreign policymaking has been a common problem for researchers of that period. 
The lack of primary information impeded scholars from making a detailed description of the 
personalities and organizations involved in the nuclear deliberations. While the presence of some 
sort of advisory group is presumed, the literature does not trace or describe any nuclear decision 
making not involving the president. And although it is possible to generally follow Nazarbayev’s 
line of thought, it is hard to portray the organizational and institutional settings in which the 
president was making his choices, because of the “obliviousness” of the main protagonists of the 
nuclear episode. As a result, the picture of a nuclear decision-making is blurred. 
 
The ad hoc decision-making group 
The archival documents reviewed in this section shed additional light on the events and policy 
debates arising around the nuclear dilemma. Due to technical reasons and matters of 
confidentiality noted in Chapter I, it is not possible to obtain access to a comprehensive set of 
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602 Potter, Politics of Nuclear Renunciation, 41. 
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documents relating to the nuclear policy development. The reviewed set of archival documents 
includes letters, analytical memoranda, drafts of public statements and addresses, and policy 
papers produced in the Apparatus of the President and the Foreign Ministry in the period from 
December 1991 to May 1992. The majority of these documents reflect an uneasy diplomatic 
game around the two distinct nuclear issues that featured prominently in Almaty’s general 
strategy of protracted denuclearization. The first, and the principal one, was Kazakhstan’s 
nuclear status per se. The USA and Russia insisted that Kazakhstan should proclaim itself non-
nuclear weapon state and join the NPT under this category. Almaty attempted to avoid a 
renouncement of its nuclear status, first by referring to the original NPT provisions on the 
categorization of nuclear states, and later by introducing a new, “temporarily nuclear weapon 
state” classification. The second policy position concerned Almaty’s desire to become a full-
fledged member of the START treaty, thus transforming it from the bilateral to multilateral 
format. Here as well, the American and Russian leadership had a divergent opinion as both states 
wanted to keep the START treaty bilateral. In this case, Almaty took a firm stand and skilfully 
steered a negotiation process. 
To proceed with the review and analysis of the content of these letters it is essential to 
consider the particular class of documents called the Rezolutsiia (instruction). Rezolutsiia is the 
written reaction of the addressee to a document he receives, in most cases it is formulated as a 
direct instruction. It usually contains formal commands and guidelines for the immediate 
subordinate of the addressee in  a document or an issue concerned. The first set of documents 
under review contains appended instructions from high-ranking decision makers, including 
Nazarbayev himself, that relate to the nuclear issue. These written messages reflect not only an 
addressee’s reaction to a letter, but also reveal important details about the composition and 
dynamics of the decision-making circle. They show the hierarchy of officials, levels of their 
responsibility, scope of their work, chains of command, and lines of communications. Not only 
do the instructions reveal some important information about the president’s preferences for the 
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dynamics of his advisory group, they are also helpful for planning out a general structure of 
nuclear decision making.  
The main document type under review is the Pismo (Letter). The internal exchange of 
letters between the president and the foreign ministry was one form of nuclear decision-making. 
The reviewed letters follow the internal discussion of the membership status in the START 
treaty. Nazarbayev named the US agreement to consider Kazakhstan (along with Belarus and 
Ukraine) as a full-fledged party to the START I treaty as one of the main reasons for the shift in 
the republic’s position and Almaty’s final decision to renounce a nuclear status. The 
coordination of negotiations on the START treaty membership status was one of the primary 
tasks of the foreign ministry. This issue was the subject of extensive negotiations with the USA 
and Russia on the level of the respective foreign ministers. The main points of these negotiations 
are reflected in the documents considered below. The analysis of the set of documents in the 
START treaty portrays an interactive picture of discussions between the president and the 
foreign ministry’s staff.  
 
Instructions on the nuclear policy development 
The reviewed instructions were appended to the documents relating to nuclear decision-making. 
 
Instruction 1.1 
Foreign minister Suleymenov forwarded Nazarbayev the letter by US State Secretary Baker with 
the cover letter addressed to the Head of the President’s Apparatus Abykaev. This letter was 
considered by Nazarbayev, who instructed Counsellor Zhukeyev to prepare a reply.  
[Handwritten]  
 
To: Comrade Zhukeyev T.T. 
 
In coordination with the MFA prepare a reply. Simultaneously … [unintelligible] an opportunity 
to explain our position on the further reductions of the strategic arms. (We can communicate in 
the form acceptable to the USA, because Kazakhstan adheres to democratic, civilized 
principles). 
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N. Nazarbayev, 28 March 1992 603 
 
 
Image 1.1 Nazarbayev’s instruction to Zhukeyev, 28 March 1992. 
(photograph by the author with the permission from the APRK) 
 
Instruction 1.2 
In turn, Zhukeyev ordered the foreign minister to prepare a reply on behalf of the president. 
The State Counsellor of the Republic of Kazakhstan 
 
To: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan 
Comrade Suleymenov T.S. 
 
Instruction: 
 
Please, urgently prepare a reply. Please, endorse a prepared draft with me. 
 
T. Zhukeyev, 30 March 1992 
 
In turn, minister Suleymenov tasked deputy minister Tokaev with this order. 
[Handwritten] 
 
To: Comrade Tokaev K.K. 
 
Instruction: For the execution.604 
 
                                                 
603 APRK f. 5N, op. 1, d. 20, l. 39. 
604 APRK f. 5N, op. 1, d. 20, l. 36. 
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 Image 1.2: Zhukeyev’s instruction to Suleymenov, 30 March 1992. 
(photograph by the author with the permission of the APRK) 
 
Instruction 2.1 
Minister Suleymenov sent the president a letter regarding the presidential campaign in the USA 
(4 April 1992) as part of preparatory work for the president’s visit to the USA in May 1992.605 
Nazarbayev read the letter and sent it to Abykaev. In the instruction, Nazarbayev charged 
Abykaev with the task of assembling the advisory group that would assist the president before 
and during his trip: 
[Handwritten] 
 
To: Abykaev N.A. 
 
Instruction:  
 
1. There is a need to set up a group to elaborate the overall ideology of the visit to USA. 
Submit for approval. 
2. Possibly, as a supplement, prepare one political document for signing.  
 
                                                 
605 APRK f. 5N, op. 1, d. 1343, ll. 64-67. 
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N. Nazarbayev, 14 April 1992 606 
 
Image 1.3: Nazarbayev’s instruction to Abykaev, 14 April 1992. 
(photograph by the author with the permission of the APRK) 
 
Instruction 2.2 
Abykaev in turn ordered the head of the International Department in the Apparatus of the 
President Kasymov, to suggest suitable candidates to be included in this group. 
The Head of the Apparatus of the President and the Prime Minister of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan 
To: Comrade Kasymov G.E. 
Instruction:  
Please, urgently submit your proposal. 
N. Abykaev, 15 April 1992607 
                                                 
606 APRK f. 5N, op. 1, d. 1343, l. 65. 
607 APRK f. 5N, op. 1, d. 1343, l. 64. 
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 Image 1.4: Abykaev’s instruction to Kasymov, 15 April 1992. 
(photograph by the author with the permission of the APRK)  
 
Instruction 3.1 
Nazarbayev forwarded the draft of the “Protocol on ratification and implementation of the 
START” proposed by the Americans to minister Suleymenov and ordered him to develop 
Kazakhstan’s position on the issue. 
The President of the Republic of Kazakhstan 
To: Comrade Suleymenov T.S. 
Instruction: 
Please define our position/draft in regard to the document sent from USA. 
Time for execution: 3 days. 
N. Nazarbayev, 20 April 1992 
Minister Suleymenov tasked deputy minister Tokaev and the head of the International Law 
Directorate Askar Shakirov to execute the president’s order. 
 175 
 
[Handwritten] 
To: Comrades Tokaev K.K. 
     Shakirov A.O. 
Instruction: For the execution. 
T. Suleymenov, April 1992608 
 
Image 1.5: Nazarbayev’s instruction to Suleymenov, 20 April 1992. 
(photo by the author with the permission of the APRK) 
 
Instruction 4.1 
Minister Suleymenov sent a letter, addressed to the president, presenting the ministry’s view on 
the “Position of Kazakhstan on joining the NPT.” Nazarbayev read this letter and forwarded it to 
Zhukeyev who in turn returned the copy to the MFA in order to execute the president’s task.  
To: Zhukeyev T.T. 
Instruction: 
We need to find (work out) a unified approach to this problem.  
Prepare jointly with the MFA. 
                                                 
608 APRK f. 75N, op. 1, d. 21, l. 50. 
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N. Nazarbayev,6 April 1992  
When the copy was returned from Zhukeyev, minister Suleymenov tasked his deputy Tokaev, 
who eventually wrote on the instruction: 
Kazakhstan’s approach to the NPT issue was reflected in President Nursultan Nazarbayev’s 
letters to G. Bush and J. Baker.  
K. Tokaev, 1 May 1992.609 
 
Image 1.6 Nazarbayev’s instruction to Zhukeyev, 6 April 1992. 
(photo by the author with permission of the APRK) 
 
Inferences from instructions 
A number of inferences about the structure and nature of nuclear decision-making can be drawn 
from the reviewed instructions. The documents confirm the other sources’ argument that 
Nazarbayev performed as the ultimate foreign policymaking actor. Nazarbayev was deeply 
involved in nuclear decision-making in several ways. First, the president appears as the final 
bureaucratic level to which the policy advisory group reported. The handwritten instructions 
show that Nazarbayev immersed himself in nuclear policy elaboration and implementation, and 
continually kept track of the issue. The instructions also indicate that the president personally 
coordinated the work of his advisers.  
The work of key members of the nuclear policy group is reflected in the instructions. 
Among them are State Counsellor Zhukeyev, foreign minister Suleymenov, and deputy foreign 
                                                 
609 APRK f. 75N, op. 1, d 21, l. 163. 
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minister Tokaev. The documents show that Zhukeyev was working on a nuclear issue in close 
coordination with the MFA. The importance of developing a “unified approach” is stressed by 
the president, suggesting that Nazarbayev favoured policy coordination and cooperation among 
his advisers.  
Despite the fact that in the Instruction 1.2 the State Counsellor is in a position to task the 
foreign ministry, Instruction 1.1 demonstrates that communication between Nazarbayev and the 
foreign ministry at some points would bypass the State Counsellor. Instruction 2.1 clearly 
indicates that there was a group of experts involved in the preparation of all aspects of the 
upcoming trip to the USA, allowing the presumption that some mid-level officials and experts 
were involved in developing the nuclear strategy. Instruction 4.1 suggests that Nazarbayev 
evidently relied on the MFA’s advice and expertise on the nuclear problem. Again, this 
instruction clearly reveals that the foreign ministry was directly involved in a nuclear debate 
alongside the State Counsellor.  
 
Letters on the START membership 
The following section depicts the internal documents exchange that ensued as the issue of 
Kazakhstan’s participation in the START treaty evolved into what eventually became the Lisbon 
Protocol to the START treaty.  
 
Letter 1, Suleymenov to Nazarbayev, 30 March 1992. 
In the 30 March letter to Nazarbayev, Suleymenov informs him about an urgent cable from 
Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev regarding the START treaty implementation and ratification 
and writes his own vision in respect to the Russian letter.610 The statuses, roles, and obligations 
                                                 
610 APRK f. 75N, op. 1, d. 21, ll. 232-236. In the referred cable, the Russian foreign minister urges his Kazakhstani 
counterpart to try to find an agreement acceptable for all four nuclear countries at a proposed four-lateral meeting 
offered to be organized and hosted by the Russian side on 1-2 April 1992 in Moscow. Suleymenov informs 
Nazarbayev that following this message he consulted with his Belarusian and Ukrainian colleagues who assured him 
that they would hold on to their previous positions expressed in Kiev 10 days before (which most likely was 
contrary to the Russian position). APRK f. 75N, op. 1, d. 21, l. 234. 
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of the four post-Soviet nuclear states in the START treaty were outlined in the two proposed 
documents elaborated by Russia: 1) the “Agreement on implementation principles and 
procedures of the START treaty”; and 2) the “Protocol on the mechanism of implementation of 
the START treaty.” The leaders of the four nuclear states could not previously concur on these 
two documents during the Kiev summit on 20 March 1992.  
According to the Suleymenov’s follow up on the cable, the main disagreement of Almaty 
(and, possibly, of Kiev and Minsk) with Russia in  the START treaty concerned two points: the 
ratification procedures, and the status of Russia in the agreement. With  ratification procedures, 
the Russian side insisted that since the START treaty was bilateral (signed on 31 July 1991 by 
the USSR and the USA), then Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Belarus, having ratified the treaty in 
their parliaments, would submit relevant approval documents to the government of Russia. 
Therefore, Suleymenov concludes, the Russian Federation would be in the capacity of a party to 
the agreement. In respect of the status of Russia in the proposed agreement, Moscow wanted to 
include in the agreement a provision by which the Russian Federation would be defined as the 
“sole nuclear state” (edinstvennoe iadernoe gosudarstvo). Suleymenov reports that the USA “is 
affirmatively against the conversion of the START treaty from a bilateral to a multilateral one,” 
while not being against the exclusion of the provision that would consider the Russian 
Federation as the “sole nuclear state.”611 
According to the letter, at that moment Kazakhstan’s admission to the START treaty as 
an independent party seemed unfeasible for Almaty. So Suleymenov proposes to Nazarbayev the 
following policy option: to accredit the Russian Federation to act as the party to the agreement 
and to appoint Russia to represent and ensure the interests of other member states (Kazakhstan, 
Ukraine, and Belarus). The copies of the ratification instruments would then be submitted 
directly to the USA. Suleymenov justifies this alternative as the one that would “fully assert the 
interests of Kazakhstan as a sovereign state, independent subject of international law.” The 
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important result of this action, according to the letter, would be a denial (in agreement with the 
USA) of Russia’s claim to be the “sole nuclear state,” which was the “principal moment” for 
Almaty. Another, and “probably the most important” end, would be the creation of “favourable 
conditions in Kazakhstan-US bilateral relations” on the eve of Nazarbayev’s visit to 
Washington.612 
 
Letter 2, Suleymenov to Nazarbayev, 13 April 1992. 
As negotiations with the Americans and Russians ensued, Suleymenov wrote an update on 
Kazakhstan’s position on the START treaty. 613  Suleymenov reminds Nazarbayev that according 
to the agreement drafted earlier by Russia, the three republics – Kazakhstan, Belarus, and 
Ukraine – would have to submit their ratification instruments to the government of Russia. 
Moscow would then be expected to undertake the obligations to represent the other three nuclear 
states in dealings with the USA. The foreign minister explains that this provision would make 
Russia the only party to the agreement. However, the US position had changed, Suleymenov 
writes, and at that point the USA agreed to the direct exchange of ratification instruments with 
Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Ukraine. The recognition of Russia as the “sole nuclear” state 
remained to be supported by both the Russian and American sides. Noting this, Suleymenov 
argues that such recognition would mean that Kazakhstan could only be non-nuclear weapon 
state.  
Considering the previous letter, where Suleymenov proposed to submit ratification 
instruments to Russia and to allow it to represent Kazakhstan’s interests, the foreign ministry 
position has clearly changed:  
For Kazakhstan such approach by US and Russia is unacceptable, because it contradicts our 
position regarding the status of our Republic as one of the former USSR’s successors in 
relation to nuclear weapons. In principle the proposed variant of the START treaty ratification 
procedures does not suit us because Kazakhstan, as one of the USSR’s successor states cannot 
delegate Russia the right to act as a Party to the Agreement.614 
                                                 
612 APRK f. 75N, op. 1, d. 21, l. 236. 
613 APRK f. 75N, op. 1, d. 21, 163-169. 
614 APRK f. 75N, op. 1, d. 21, ll. 167-168. Underlined passages in original. 
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Suleymenov writes that the republic is ready to submit ratification instruments to the 
USA and considers it to be a “significant concession” on the part of Kazakhstan as far as the 
ratification procedures are concerned. The foreign minister notes that this concession “has to be 
mutual” and in exchange it would be desirable for the US and Russia to “show some 
understanding on our position regarding the [nuclear] status of Kazakhstan.”615 
 
Letter 3, Suleymenov to Nazarbayev, 25 April 1992. 
On 16 April 1992, Washington proposed its own version of the document that would guide the 
four post-Soviet states’ actions towards the START treaty.616 It now took the form of the 
“Protocol ratification and implementation of the START treaty.” The question of the nuclear or 
non-nuclear status of Kazakhstan (along with Belarus and Ukraine) was put in a different 
context. Instead of recognizing the Russian Federation as the “sole nuclear” state, the USA 
introduced provisions concerning the NPT treaty and the obligations of Kazakhstan, Belarus, and 
Ukraine to join the treaty as non-nuclear weapon states. 
Suleymenov sends Nazarbayev an analysis of the American variant of the proposed 
Protocol on the ratification and implementation of the START treaty. Firstly, Suleymenov 
highlights important changes in the American position towards recognition of Kazakhstan’s 
political status in the START treaty. He summarizes the main points: 1) the American party 
agreed for the START treaty to be ratified, not endorsed by Kazakhstan’s Supreme Soviet; 2) the 
right of Kazakhstan to carry equal responsibilities with other signatory states is asserted; 3) the 
American party has changed its position in  recognition of the treaty parties and now recognizes 
all four nuclear states as equal signatory parties; 4) Kazakhstan will exchange ratification 
instruments with the USA on its own. 617  
In the meantime, Suleymenov points at the points of disagreement with the USA. He 
expresses concern about the provision of Article 5 of the Protocol, according to which it would 
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become possible for Russia to station its strategic offensive weapons on the territories of 
Kazakhstan, Belarus and Ukraine “for the shortest possible time.” 618 On this issue, Suleymenov 
argues that the presence of one state’s nuclear weapons on the territory of another state will incur 
negative reaction from the population, particularly if the latter state is aiming to become nuclear-
free. 
Another point of disagreement is the demand by Washington for Kazakhstan, Belarus, 
and Ukraine to join the NPT as non-nuclear weapon state. Suleymenov writes: “Both USA and 
Russia argue that if these three countries join the NPT as nuclear states then the size of the 
‘nuclear club’ will increase from five members to eight, which can serve as a serious 
undermining factor for international security.”619 Suleymenov comments that this stipulation is 
the main point of discord between Kazakhstan and the USA.  
 
Letter 4, Nazarbayev to Baker, April 29 1992. 
The main arguments from Suleymenov’s letter were reflected in the Nazarbayev-Baker letter that 
continues a discussion of the proposed “Protocol on the Ratification and Implementation of the 
START Treaty” to be signed by the four post-Soviet nuclear states. 620 Nazarbayev writes to 
Baker that Article 5 of the Protocol, which allows Russian strategic forces to be deployed in 
Kazakhstan, “requires certain adjustment.”621 Justifying this point, Nazarbayev uses 
Suleymenov’s argument about the negative reaction of the local population of a sovereign state 
to the presence of nuclear weapons belonging to some other state deployed on the territory of a 
former state outlined in the 25 April 1992 letter.  
To avoid commitment to non-nuclear status, Nazarbayev proposes producing a separate 
ratification and implementation protocol related to the NPT realization and excluding Article 6 
of the Protocol, which refers to the NPT and binds Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Ukraine to join the 
                                                 
618 APRK f. 75N, op. 1, d. 21, l. 53. 
619 Here Suleymenov quotes Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev’s statement on the same subject made on 11 April 
1992. APRK f. 75N, op. 1, d. 21, l. 56. 
620 APRK f. 5N, op. 1, d. 289, ll. 42-44. 
621 APRK f. 5N, op. 1, d. 289, l. 43. 
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NPT as non-nuclear weapon states and within a defined timetable.622 Nazarbayev links the need 
to exclude reference to the NPT, and, consequently, to non-nuclear status of Kazakhstan, with 
the probability of a successful ratification in the Supreme Soviet: 
I want to sincerely and very confidentially inform you that the possibility of such an 
unfavourable for us turn of events, embedded in the Article 6 text, cannot be entirely excluded. 
There is a probability that provision of a specific timetable for Kazakhstan to join the NPT as 
non-nuclear weapon state can be used by particular forces in the parliament to delay ratification 
of the START treaty. 623 
 
It is noticeable that Nazarbayev avoids precise formulations of Kazakhstan’s nuclear status. In 
the concluding section he writes to Baker:  
I would like to underline that Kazakhstan, striving to become a non-nuclear state, adheres 
firmly to the continuation of the global disarmament process under strict and effective 
international control. In this process the Republic intends to be actively involved as an equal 
partner. Kazakhstan fully supports the NPT and is ready to accede to it. 624 
 
Here, Nazarbayev is evidently not telling Baker unequivocally whether Kazakhstan wants to 
enter the NPT as nuclear or non-nuclear weapon state.  
 
Reflection on the Lisbon Protocol 
The text of the “Protocol to the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms” (the 
Lisbon Protocol) is very similar to the text of the document proposed by Baker in April. It is 
important to highlight that the three issues discussed between Nazarbayev and Suleymenov in 
the above letter exchange are reflected in the Protocol. First, in accordance with Article 5 of the 
protocol, Kazakhstan (together with Belarus and Ukraine) would join the NPT treaty as non-
nuclear weapon state in the “shortest possible time.” Second, in accordance with Article 6, 
Kazakhstan (together with Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine) would exchange their ratification 
instruments with the US. Third, the provision of a temporary storage of Russian nuclear weapons 
on the territories of the three republics is omitted from the protocol. 
                                                 
622 Exact dates were not specified in the draft Protocol. There was a blank space left instead in Article 6. APRK f. 
5N, op. 1, d. 289, l. 44. 
623 APRK f. 5N, op. 1, d. 289, l. 44. 
624 APRK f. 5N, op. 1, d. 289, l. 44. 
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Inferences from letters 
The review of the letters exchanged between the president and the foreign minister reveals 
additional nuances about the Kazakhstani nuclear decision-making. It clearly indicates that on at 
least several occasions the Foreign Ministry had provided the president with policy advice and 
analysis. It also shows that Kazakhstan’s leadership attempted, although unsuccessfully, to 
delink the issue of START treaty membership from the issue of nuclear status in the NPT. On 
the other hand, as reflected in the letters, Kazakhstan firmly backed its position that the republic 
(along with Belarus and Ukraine) should become a full party to the START treaty even though 
this step, much to the displeasure of Russia and the USA, transformed the START treaty from a 
bilateral to a multilateral treaty. The discussion, reflected in Letter 3 from Suleymenov to 
Nazarbayev and in the following Letter 4 from Nazarbayev to Baker on the proposed provision 
that would allow Russian strategic weapons to be temporarily stationed on Kazakhstan territory, 
shows that the Foreign Ministry provided the president with direct policy advice. In this case, the 
Foreign Ministry developed a justification for the undesirability of such a provision and the 
president approved it so it was reproduced in his letter to the US state secretary.  
 
Nuclear policymaking circle 
The principal finding can be made that there was an ad hoc foreign policymaking group tasked 
with elaborating the nuclear strategy and providing policy advice to the president. The archival 
documents confirm that the presidential foreign policy advisory team played a significant role in 
developing key components of Almaty’s nuclear strategy. It assisted Nazarbayev in identifying, 
interpreting, and evaluating systemic factors; it developed substitutive courses of action for the 
president to follow; it provided Nazarbayev with the argumentation of Almaty’s position on 
different nuclear issues of the denuclearization period.  
Key foreign policy advisers held the highest-ranking positions; they were all government 
officials either from the Apparatus of the President, like State Counsellor Zhukeyev, or from the 
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foreign ministry, like minister Suleymenov or deputy minister Tokaev. A number of mid-level 
diplomats were also drafted into the nuclear decision-making. The available archival documents 
show that at least one more governmental institution played a noticeable role in nuclear 
deliberations – the Centre for Strategic Studies under the President, headed by Kasenov.  
State Counsellor Zhukeyev was one of the three state counsellors and was in charge of 
foreign and security policy. In one interview Zhukeyev recollected:  
I was in charge of nuclear issues, a foreign policy, and a national security. …There are 
documents that one day will be retrieved from archives. There are internal memos, scenarios, 
which I wrote in regard to how we should have acted. From my point of view, there was not a 
single chance for Kazakhstan to retain nuclear weapons.625  
 
The head of the Apparatus of the President Abykaev was not directly involved in foreign 
policymaking; however he was a “gatekeeper” through whom many of the policy papers related 
to the nuclear question were submitted to Nazarbayev. 
Foreign minister Suleymenov was another of the president’s advisers on foreign policy. 
As a head of the foreign ministry he signed cover letters to many analytical memoranda and 
drafts of the president’s letters. However, the authorship of these documents was often collegial. 
An active contributor to the development of nuclear position was the head of the International 
Security and Arms Controls Directorate Bolat Nurgaliev.626 The head of the International Law 
Directorate Askar Shakirov was also involved in nuclear discussions. Their immediate 
supervisor was the deputy minister Tokaev.  
The CSS’s role in nuclear decision-making is directly reported in its work statement for 
the year 1992: “[The CSS] prepared and submitted analytical memos on nuclear policy as part of 
the preparation process for the president’s visit to USA.”627 Apart from the Centre’s head, 
Kasenov, two senior CSS experts were involved in articulating nuclear policy – Kairat 
Abuseitov, the Chief of Foreign Policy and National Security Program, and Murat Laumulin, a 
Senior Research Fellow. 
                                                 
625 “Pora perestat’ toptat’sia u dverei vlasti,” Tolegen Zhukeyev, interview transcript, 24 October 2008, Spik.Kz, 
accessed 12 February 2010, http://www.spik.kz/?lan=ru&id=104&pub=1152. 
626 Interviews with Nurgaliev are referenced in Reiss, Bridled Ambition. 
627 APRK 166N, op. 1, d. 9, l. 2.  
 185 
 
Conclusion 
The geostrategic concerns, political and security incentives and disincentives from the 
Americans and Russians, and a need for sustainable economic and technical assistance in 
development, led Nazarbayev to a decision not to go nuclear. This was by no means an easy 
decision, which the president made at times of strategic uncertainty of the republic’s future and 
divided domestic opinion. However, Nazarbayev recognized that the resolution of the nuclear 
dilemma, while dichotomous in its essence, provided for a range of alternative courses of action 
not necessarily leading to an immediate renouncement of Kazakhstan’s nuclear status and 
relinquishment of strategic arms. Once Nazarbayev decided to step off the nuclear path, he 
mobilized his advisers and tasked them to develop an evasive nuclear policy that would protract 
the inevitable relinquishment of nuclear weapons and renouncement of nuclear status as long as 
it was needed to secure political, security, and economic gains from the Americans and Russians. 
The ambivalent multi-element nuclear strategy intentionally pursued by Nazarbayev was in fact 
a product of group decision-making by the president’s advisory team.  
As a result of prolonged and complicated nuclear deliberations, the president and his 
advisers acquired exceptional diplomatic and decisional experience. The nuclear dilemma was a 
starting point for Nazarbayev’s ability to form and manage the foreign policymaking structure 
and process. As Aitken comments: “How Nazarbayev handled the choreography of his nuclear 
negotiations is a story that reveals much about him as both a man and a statesman.”628 
Correspondingly, the Kazakhstani foreign policymaking tradition was profoundly influenced by 
the formal and informal schemes and procedures intuitively developed during the nuclear 
episode. 
  
While the geopolitical triangulation exercise and the resolution of the nuclear dilemma were 
mainly imposed on Almaty and were perceived by policymakers as constraining situations, the 
                                                 
628 Aitken, Nazarbayev and the Making of Kazakhstan,129. 
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Nagorno-Karabakh peace initiative started as the opportunity offered by the international system 
to increase the republic’s clout. This facilitating environment, however, did not last for long and 
Almaty’s tolerance for pressure imposed by foreign actors was tested again, when its peace effort 
terminated and almost turned into a foreign policy fiasco, largely due to the hostility of the 
CSCE Minsk Group. The following chapter follows this largely forgotten episode. 
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Chapter VI: The Nagorno-Karabakh Peace Initiative 
Our experience of the first half of the nineties fully complies 
with the old saying that there are years that accommodate 
decades of a usual history.  
Nursultan Nazarbayev, Na Poroge XXI Veka.  
 
This case discovers a little known chapter in the diplomatic history of Kazakhstan.629 In 1991-
1992 Almaty was one of the most notable contributors to the international conflict resolution 
process in Nagorno-Karabakh. This episode stands out of the line of foreign policies pursued by 
Kazakhstan in the beginning of 1990s. At a glance, there were no apparent reasons why 
Nazarbayev decided to devote his time and efforts to assist the two Transcaucasian nations in 
finding ways to end the bloody conflict at a time when Kazakhstan itself was facing colossal 
international challenges. For Almaty, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was a remote one both in 
terms of security and politics. On the contrary, there were many other foreign policy issues that 
Almaty had to solve in 1992 and which were of much higher importance, ranging from the 
nuclear question to the delimitation of the section of the former Sino-Soviet border. Neither did 
Kazakhstan have reasons to project its interests in the Caucasus. The salience of the issue was 
relatively low given the foreign policy agenda in 1992. Nevertheless, Almaty embarked on this 
diplomatic journey and was able to achieve considerable success in bringing the Armenian and 
Azerbaijani sides closer to peace. 
The detailed examination of the Nagorno-Karabakh peace initiative decision-making 
exposes a complex combination of humanitarian and political motives informing Almaty’s 
foreign policymaking process. The initiation of Kazakhstan’s peace mission brought political 
dividends not only to Nazarbayev, but also to his close associates who proposed the idea to the 
president. At the same time, the president was not only interested in gaining international clout 
for himself and for the republic, but also had sincere personal inspiration to stop the bloodshed 
he witnessed during his tour to the region in autumn 1991.  
                                                 
629 Suffice to say that no scholarly publications on Almaty’s peace initiative have been published in Kazakhstan. 
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The case is also interesting due to the changing dynamics of Almaty’s peace initiative. 
What started as a purely non-reactive foreign policy under permissive conditions of the 
international context had later became highly adaptable and conforming to the growing 
contextual pressures. The case illustrates Kazakhstan as a state sensitive to its international 
environment. Throughout the course of its peace mission, Almaty’s foreign policy had closely 
reflected the policies of the two largest bidders in the mediation process – the Minsk Group and 
Russia. The republic’s policymakers proved to be vulnerable to the exclusive attitude of 
international mediators and as a result did not advance their unilateral mediation process further. 
Eventually, disappointment with modest results in the field, lack of international support, and 
dissatisfaction with the overall peace process progress naturally led to the gradual withdrawal of 
Kazakhstan from the Nagorno-Karabakh problem. 
 
Historical background 
During the last years of the Soviet Union’s existence the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was 
considered to be on of the largest and bloodiest inter-ethnic conflict fought on the Soviet territory 
with approximately 20,000 casualties and one and a half million refugees.630 After the fall of the 
Union the Nagorno-Karabakh issue transformed from an internal conflict between Soviet 
administrative units to a full-scale inter-state war between now independent Armenia and 
Azerbaijan. There was a “gradual spread of isolated hotspots to a real war. Interests of Russia, 
Georgia, Turkey, and Iran were directly concerned.”631 At the same time, a chaotic withdrawal 
of the Soviet Army and MVD Interior Forces both saturated the region with uncontrolled arms 
and created a power vacuum that would otherwise be able to constrain military actions by 
combating sides. Amidst the growing intensification of combat actions, Armenia and Azerbaijan 
the 
                                                 
630 Svante E. Cornell, “The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict. Report no. 46,” Department of East European 
Studies, Uppsala University (1999), http://edoc.bibliothek.uni-
halle.de/servlets/MCRFileNodeServlet/HALCoRe_derivate_00003079/Nagorno-
Karabakh%20Conflict.pdf;jsessionid=A91D405C2A6F357ECA72B2E68ACB55B6. 
631Vladimir Kazimirov, “Karabakh: Kak Eto Bylo,” Mezhdunarodnaia Zhizn 5 (1996), 42. 
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proclaimed their independence in 1991 and by the beginning of 1992 became members of the 
UN, CSCE, and CIS.632 The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict thus became international. 
Following these developments, in the late 1991- mid 1992 period there has emerged an 
international mediation process. Thomas De Waal, the author of one of the most comprehensive 
studies of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, describes the variety of peace initiatives of the period:  
“In 1991–1992, a galaxy of negotiators offered to mediate. There was the joint mission by 
presidents Yeltsin and Nazarbayev; a trip by the former US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance on 
behalf of the United Nations secretary general; the short-lived mediation by Iran.”633 These were 
both multilateral efforts under the aegis of international organizations and unilateral initiatives 
started by few concerned nations. The largest missions were formed by the CSCE in the format 
of the so-called Minsk Group, and by Russia, that established its mission in April-May 1992. 
Iran and Kazakhstan had also tried to help to solve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. In May 1992 
Iran’s initiative to settle the peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan was aborted by 
the seizure of Azerbaijani controlled strategic town of Shusha by Karabakh Armenians who did 
not participate in the Tehran meeting. Later, Kazakhstan was able to bring together foreign 
ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan in Almaty in late August 1992 and persuade them to sign a 
ceasefire agreement. This ceasefire, however, did not last long and Kazakhstan’s effort, received 
optimistically at the start, ended in vain as well.   
1992 is considered to be the initial phase of international mediation.634 The first 
noticeable international moves came from the CSCE in February 1992 when it commissioned the 
“Interim Report of the Rapporteur Mission on the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh,” and from the 
CIS at the Kiev summit on March 1992 when the decision was made to send the CIS 
                                                 
632 Armenia and Azerbaijan became members of the CSCE on 30 January 1992. See “Second Meeting of the 
Council in Prague, (January 1992),” in The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe: Analysis and Basic 
Documents,1972-1993, ed. Arie Bloed (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993), 106-107. 
633 De Waal, Black garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan Through Peace and War (New York: New York University 
Press, 2003), 228. 
634 See Ibid., also, John J. Maresca, “Lost Opportunities in Negotiating the Conflict over Nagorno Karabakh,” 
International Negotiation 1, no. 3 (1996): 471-499.  
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peacekeeping force to the conflict zone.635 The failure of the ceasefire agreement at the CSCE 
Stockholm meeting on December 1992 marked the end of the first stage of international 
mediation. This period yielded very modest results both due to internal dynamics, whereby both 
Armenia and Azerbaijan were overconfident in their military superiority and were not convinced 
in the necessity of negotiations; and, externally, due to the lack of professionalism of the Minks 
Group.636 
 
Minsk Group 
The CSCE Minsk Group, the largest international mediation mission on Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict at the time, was a consultative and coordination body created de facto in June 1992 to 
assist international negotiators to deal with the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. Since the UN preferred 
the CSCE to work on the Nagorno-Karabakh problem, the Group was the most authoritative 
international body commissioned to deal with the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. As such, it mostly 
represented the ideas and views on how to solve the conflict elaborated in the USA and Western 
European foreign policy establishments.637 Initially, this special body was created as a result of 
the decision made in March 1992 at the Helsinki summit to convene a high-level conference on 
Nagorno-Karabakh with the participation of Armenia and Azerbaijan as soon as possible. The 
conference, envisioned as “an on-going forum for negotiations towards a peaceful settlement of 
the crisis on the basis of the principles, commitments and provisions of the CSCE,” was planned 
to be convened on 21 June 1992 and to be hosted in the informal capital of the CIS, Minsk 
(hence the name of the body). An important nuance was introduced – the self-proclaimed 
Nagorno-Karabakh republic’s leadership was also invited to the conference in the status of 
“elected and other representatives of Nagorno-Karabakh,” and this became the main obstacle for 
                                                 
635 “Interim Report of the Rapporteur Mission on the Situation in Nagorno-Karabakh (February 1992),” in Bloed, 
ed., Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, 1191-1208; “Agreement on the Groups of military 
observers and the Collective peacekeeping forces in the CIS,” CIS Secretariat, accessed 11 January 2013, 
http://cis.minsk.by/reestr/ru/index.html#reestr/view/text?doc=62. 
636 Maresca, “Lost Opportunities,” 478-483. 
637 Vladimir Kazimirov, Mir Karabakhu: Posrednichestvo Rossii v Uregulirovanii Nagorno-Karabakhskogo 
Konflikta (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 2009), 35-41. 
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Azerbaijan’s participation in Minsk, so Baku declined the invitation.638 After this refusal, the 
USA and Russia proposed to set up a preparatory meeting to ensure the Minsk conference takes 
place eventually. All sides welcomed this idea. The first preparatory meeting was held on 1 June 
1992 in Rome because the chairman of the future Minsk Conference was the Italian diplomat 
Mario Raffaelli. Original members of the Minsk Group included: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, 
Czechoslovakia (later replaced by Finland), Germany, Italy, Russia, Sweden, Turkey, and 
USA.639 Since the Minsk conference still has not been convened, the Minsk Group exists to this 
date and “spearheads the OSCE's efforts to find a political solution to the conflict in and around 
Nagorno-Karabakh involving Armenia and Azerbaijan” and is headed by co-chairing troika –
France, Russia and USA.640 Kazakhstan’s leadership was determined to join the Group, but, as 
revealed below, the institution did not welcome it. 
 
Russian mediation mission 
Despite the activities of the CSCE, in 1992 Russia was considered to be the primary negotiator 
for the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict: “The Russians had many advantages in Armenia and 
Azerbaijan. In 1992, the Caucasus and Russia were still part of the same economic space; 
everyone spoke Russian; even the old official telephone lines still went directly through to 
Moscow.”641 The Russian MFA set up its own mediation mission on Nagorno-Karabakh on 5 
May 1992. The mission’s task was to organize “the systemic work of the Russia’s MFA in the 
interests of the peace regulation in Karabakh”; it was established as an organ of unilateral 
mediation; however it was additionally tasked with dealing with the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict 
within the framework of the CSCE.642 Experienced career diplomat, Vladimir Kazimirov was 
appointed as the head of the mission. Russia’ mission intensified its efforts starting from autumn 
                                                 
638 Suren Zolian, “SBSE v Karabakhskom konflikte (1992),” in Nagornyi Karabakh: Problema i Konflikt, (Erevan: 
Lingva, 2001), under “Nachalo Minskogo protsessa,” http://armenianhouse.org/zolyan/nf-ru/karabakh/6.html. 
639 “Helsinki Additional Meeting of the CSCE Council (March 1922),” in Bloed, ed., Conference on Security and 
Co-operation in Europe, 841-844. 
640 “Minks Group,” OSCE Minsk Group Official Website, accessed 12 April 2012, http://www.osce.org/mg.  
641 De Waal, Black Garden, 231. 
642 Kazimirov, Mir Karabakhu, 28, 32. 
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1992 against the backdrop of the growing disappointment with the Minsk Group’s progress. The 
Russian mission promoted itself as favouring multilateral efforts and actively backing mediation 
efforts within the CIS and CSCE formats.643 This impression was shared elsewhere – at the 
earlier stage of the conflict internationalization, the Armenian president Levon Ter-Petrosyan 
assessed Moscow’s role in the following way:  
Whereas now Russia tries to delegate part of the responsibility to international organizations. I 
think that we should applaud Russia's efforts in this respect. It is to a large extent thanks to 
Russia that we were able to draw the attention of the international community to the Karabakh 
problem. In other words, Russia did not refuse to participate in solving the Karabakh problem, 
but it did refuse to do it alone.644  
 
At the same time, Russia was advancing its own vision on how to end the conflict. The principle 
difference in the Russian approach at the initial stage of the conflict was the recognition of 
Nagorno-Karabakh as the third party to the conflict, in addition to Armenia and Azerbaijan.645 
 
CIS mediation  
The CIS was another large international organization committed to resolution of the Nagorno-
Karabakh problem. After the founding summit of the CIS in Almaty in December 1991, the 
organization began to seek ways to solve a conflict among its members.646 As earlier as 30 
December 1991 heads of the CIS states called for Armenia and Azerbaijan to continue 
negotiations.647 On 20 March 1992 at the Kiev summit the heads of states agreed on the proposal 
by Yeltsin and Nazarbayev to send a group of CIS observers and CIS collective peacekeeping 
forces to the Nagorno-Karabakh region should Armenia and Azerbaijan request the CIS to do so, 
and signed the CIS agreement on military observers and collective peacekeeping forces.648 At 
the summit the CIS leadership also decided to keep the UN, CSCE and other international 
                                                 
643 Ibid, 28-35. 
644 Official Kremlin International News Broadcast, 8 April 1992. 
645 Kazimirov, Mir Karabakhu, 33. 
646 Azerbaijan ratified the CIS founding “Almaty Declaration” of December 1991 only in September 1993, but 
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Azerbaijan’s delegation signed the agreement with the reservation that it will become enforced only after parliament 
ratification, which never happened. 
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organizations informed and cooperate with them. Nazarbayev frequently made references to the 
CIS in relation to the conflict, likely caused by his desire to use the Commonwealth’s platform to 
back Almaty’s efforts. At the same time, the CIS efforts had become integrated in Russia’s 
mediation attempts and they are often considered as the joint mediation process.649  
 
Kazakhstani peace initiative 
President of the Kazakh SSR as a peacemaker 
The Nagorno-Karabakh peace initiative was one of the very few of diplomatic affairs that 
Kazakhstan had started before its independence was proclaimed in December 1991 and, with a 
short break, pursued by the republic in its new sovereign status. The origins of the Kazakhstani 
mediation initiative can be traced back to the last months of the existence of the Soviet state. On 
17 August 1991 Yeltsin (the President of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic) 
visited Nazarbayev (the President of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic) in Almaty to discuss 
the immediate future of the USSR and the text of the new treaty of the Union of Sovereign 
States. It was yet another venue for the presidents to share their concerns about the outgrowth of 
inter-ethnic conflicts that plagued many Soviet regions – e.g. the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict, 
clashes in Osh and Ingushetia, and, of course, the Armenian-Azerbaijani confrontation in 
Karabakh. Not only did these conflicts jeopardize the fate of the proposed new treaty of the 
Union, but they had also called in question the stability of the ethnic situation in Kazakhstan and 
Russia. While in Kazakhstan the Slavic population outnumbered Kazakhs in the entire northern 
part of the republic, in Russia there was a problem of ethno-nationalistic secession movements 
like the one in Tatarstan. Both Nazarbayev and Yeltsin had reasons to be concerned about the 
spill over effect of the inter-ethnic clashes that could endanger the stability of their republics. 
These concerns were reflected in the topics and texts of the joint statements the presidents 
made at the conclusion of their August meeting. These statements were made in the form of a 
                                                 
649 See Kazimirov, Mir Karabakhu, 239-254. 
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petition to the Union’s president Mikhail Gorbachev. In one petition Nazarbayev and Yeltsin 
told Gorbachev that they view the territorial integrity of the Kazakh republic and the Russian 
Federative as the principal warrant to prevent the “catastrophic disintegration of the Union and 
its member-states.”650 In another statement the two presidents requested Gorbachev to intensify 
measures to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Nazarbayev and Yeltsin blamed central 
authorities (i.e. Moscow) in the absence of cohesive policy, which had led, in their view, to 
notable political mistakes and loss of chances to deescalate the conflict, and proposed their 
services as mediators to Gorbachev and to the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan.651 It is during 
that meeting that Nazarbayev and Yeltsin had finalized their decision to get involved in the 
conflict resolution in the Nagorno-Karabakh region. Eventually, their proposal to visit the 
troubled region in September and host negotiations was accepted both by Gorbachev and local 
leaders. 
Although the mediation initiative was formed as a joint mission, each president made his 
own preparations. Nazarbayev relied on his staff in Almaty as well as in Moscow, where the 
plenipotentiary representation of the republic served as a liaison office with both the Union and 
the Russian Federation’s authorities. As part of the preparation of Nazarbayev’s visit to Armenia 
and Azerbaijan, the plenipotentiary envoy to the Union Saudabayev wrote a memorandum to the 
Kazakh president where he suggested that the recognition of the Nagorno-Karabakh 
Autonomous Region could complicate the upcoming negotiations; he also advised to prepare, 
jointly with Yeltsin, an address to the conflicting sides to establish a moratorium on combat 
activities for the period of their visit; meet with Yeltsin on neutral territory to elaborate a 
coordinated programme of mediation (Mineralnie Vody was suggested and Zheleznovodsk was 
later chosen as the venue); and to arrive at the Nagorno-Karabakh capital Stepanakert 
simultaneously with Yeltsin.652 The official delegation of the Kazakh SSR headed by 
Nazarbayev to Zheleznovodsk included Zhukeyev, who was then the Deputy Chairman of the 
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State Council, several staff members of the president’s apparatus and the Supreme Soviet 
deputies. Aboard the president’s plane en route to the region, Nazarbayev told journalists: “We 
need to approach both sides as atheists. Only in this case our approach, neutral in its form, would 
not exclude the possibility of solving this problem in its essence. I think it is too early to count 
on some global success. We have a more feasible task – to seat leaders of both republics on one 
table.”653 With him Nazarbayev had a draft of the speech on the Nagorno-Karabakh problem that 
reflected the main points of the joint appeal to Gorbachev, particularly in regard to the 
immediate cease-fire and a form of the governance of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous 
Region, which was prepared to him by his staff members.654 
In four days between 20 and 23 September 1991 the two presidents travelled to Baku, 
Gyanja, Stepanakert, and Yerevan. They were able to convince leaders of Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
and Nagorno-Karabakh to meet on 23 September 1991 in the southern Russia’s town of 
Zheleznovodsk where they had eventually signed the Zheleznovodsk Communiqué.655 The 
meeting was the first attempt to resolve the conflict and a departing point for the consequent 
international mediation efforts to facilitate the negotiation process between the fighting sides. At 
the conclusion of the visit Nazarbayev got a sense of the complexity of the problem and 
developed a personal interest in helping the peoples of Armenia and Azerbaijan. In an interview 
to the official Soviet newspaper Izvestiia Nazarbayev told reporters: “It would be naive to expect 
any expedient results from this visit. The reconciliation process is complex and long, and we 
have to realize this fact. [I am] a middleman, a man who stands in the middle, assisting 
conflicting sides to meet and produce an agreement.”656 
Upon the return to Almaty after brokering the Zheleznovodsk agreement the president 
officially formed a group of observers to be dispatched to Nagorno-Karabakh. On 8 October 
1991 Nazarbayev signed the executive order “On the formation of temporary working group of 
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observers from the Kazakh SSR on the regulation of the conflict in NKAO in accordance with 
the ‘Joint Communiqué on the Results of the Mediating Mission of the Presidents of the RSFSR 
and the Kazakh SSR’ dated 23 September 1991.”657  
The Zheleznovodsk agreements, however, could not stop the fighting. In November 1991 
the helicopter carrying observers from Kazakhstan and Russia accompanied by military and 
political authorities of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region of the Azerbaijani SSR was 
shot down, killing, among others, the deputy minister of the interior of the Kazakh SSR Sailal 
Serikov. This effectively put an end to any hopes arising from the Zheleznovodsk Communiqué 
and the Kazakh SSR’s involvement in the matter. Soon the Soviet Union fell, the fighting 
intensified, and Nazarbayev’s attention was brought to the pressing international issues of a 
much larger scale. 
 
Republic of Kazakhstan’s peace initiative 
Despite the fundamental internal and external political changes resulting from the independence, 
the Nagorno-Karabakh problem was still a matter of personal concern for Nazarbayev and he 
would soon return his attention to this issue. His first post-Zheleznovodsk public statement on 
the Nagorno-Karabakh issue was the signal to the CIS and broader international community that 
Nazarbayev had renewed his interest in the problem. In the aftermath of tragic events in Khojaly, 
on 4 March 1992 the president delivered a special TV statement devoted to the Nagorno-
Karabakh problem.658 This speech is important in terms of understanding the Kazakhstan’s 
leadership earlier vision of the problem and the foreseen role the republic would play in solving 
it. The statement clearly showed Nazarbayev’s position in relation to the conflict and 
disseminated his ideas about involvement of the CIS in settling the conflict. In his speech 
Nazarbayev reminded the audience about his role in the 1991 attempt to bring the sides to peace. 
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With regard to this Zheleznovodsk mission Nazarbayev made two important points. First, the 
president publicly accepted the fact that the Zheleznovodsk mission had failed: “The efforts at 
mediation which Russia and Kazakhstan earlier undertook, the document signed in 
Zheleznovodsk and the participation of other neighbouring states has not led to the necessary 
result, and the escalation of military actions is continuing.” Second, the president showed his 
personal commitment to end the conflict: “When we heard what had happened in the town of 
Khojaly – earlier we all suffered over what happened in Stepanakert – I was unable to remain 
unconcerned, because president Yeltsin and I took certain obligations [to facilitate the peace 
process].” This speech also revealed the fact that Nazarbayev’s personal involvement continued 
after 1991 as he told the audience that he had initiated telephone conversations both with the 
leader of Armenia, Ter-Petrosyan, and with the leader of Azerbaijan, Aiaz Mutalibov. At this 
stage Nazarbayev was clearly in favour of multi-lateral efforts within the CIS framework: “I 
think that no one should remain unconcerned amongst the inhabitants of all the states which we 
now call the Commonwealth of Independent States, because this concerns them all, and we 
should not be unconcerned.” This appeal, however, received moderate reaction from the 
Armenian and Azerbaijani authorities and neither side took subsequent actions. 
Nevertheless, Nazarbayev’s personal interest in the matter did not go unnoticed for his 
close associates. In June 1992 Nazarbayev received an analytical memorandum (possibly 
prepared by Zhukeyev) about the Armenia-Azerbaijan relations in the view of the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict.659 Nazarbayev found the information interesting and in turn instructed the 
author to elaborate Kazakhstan’s own position on this problem “without delay.”660 By this time 
it was clear for Almaty executives that Nazarbayev wanted to renew his involvement in the 
peace process.  
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On 29 June 1992 deputy minister Tokaev prepared a letter addressed to the president 
informing him about such possibility (which was signed by Suleymenov as the author).661 
Nazarbayev was told that, “according to the received information,” the Western nations would 
approach Kazakhstan and Russia at the upcoming CSCE summit in Helsinki (9-10 July 1992) 
with the request to re-start the mediation mission to settle the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. 
Suleymenov suggested Nazarbayev to make a public statement “On the situation around 
Nagorno-Karabakh” before the CIS summit in Moscow (6 July 1992). In case the president 
agreed, the foreign ministry would issue its own statement and start a mass-media campaign 
articulating the president’s concern about the conflict. Suleymenov added that the president’s 
initiative could be presented to the public as being modelled after the Soviet mission that resulted 
in the Indian-Pakistani peace talks in Tashkent in 1966. The proposed presidential statement 
included the following: 
Tragic events around Nagorno-Karabakh cause a special soreness in the interethnic 
Kazakhstan….On behalf of the people of the Republic of Kazakhstan I call presidents of 
Armenia and Azerbaijan to meet at the nearest time on the ‘neutral territory’ and reach an 
agreement on the immediate stop of the combat actions. I believe that the regulations of the 
Zheleznovodsk Communiqué of 23 September 1991, still actual and positively appraised by the 
international community, are a good basis for the dialogue. Almaty is ready to host you…. If 
you consider the acceptance of the invitation possible, I will endeavour to personally facilitate 
the successful meeting.662 
 
For some reason Suleymenov decided not to release either of the proposed statements – the 
handwritten note on the attached draft MFA statement reads: “The decision was made (by 
comrade Suleymenov T.S.) to temporarily refrain. 27.07.”663 It is possible to presume that 
Suleymenov had thought that the time had not come to approach the president with this proposal 
and neither the letter or draft statements were sent to the president.  
 In the foreign ministry, the moment was considered propitious a few weeks later, in 
August 1992, when Suleymenov finally approached the president with the idea to initiate 
unilateral mediation efforts by sending direct messages to Armenian and Azerbaijani presidents 
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and inviting them to Almaty.664 Simultaneously Nazarbayev was advised to address the UN 
General Secretary Boutros Boutros-Ghali with the proposal to support the initiative and take part 
in the Almaty meeting. Suleymenov’s message to the president read: 
The military standoff around Nagorno-Karabakh between Armenia and Azerbaijan 
convincingly shows that there is a threat of the loss of control over situation in the 
Transcaucasian region. Mediation efforts of the international community, CIS member-states, 
and number of bordering countries brought no feasible results….The MFA, after analyzing the 
situation, is brining forward the proposal to send addresses on your behalf to the presidents of 
Armenia and Azerbaijan. The essence of our policy towards the armed conflict between these 
states will be that Kazakhstan will undertake mediation efforts by inviting presidents of 
Armenia and Azerbaijan to Almaty.665 
 
The foreign minister’s intuition worked – time was ripe and Nazarbayev welcomed his 
idea. It is possible that the president was moved by Suleymenov’s information about the lack of 
progress of mediation efforts by Russia and the CSCE. Nazarbayev saw the opportunity to 
initiate his own mediation mission, as the international peace process, not monopolized by any 
actor, stalled.666 A related point can be made that Nazarbayev felt that, in the absence of other 
realistic alternatives, his contribution could break a stalemate and bring the conflicting sides 
closer to a peace agreement. In addition, two high-ranking Kazakhstani diplomats at the time 
stated in interviews with the author that Nazarbayev decided to assist the conflicting sides in 
reaching a ceasefire agreement, mainly because of humanitarian considerations and of a desire to 
gain political prestige for the nation on the international arena.667 Speaking about Kazakhstan’s 
motives, both interviewed diplomats highlighted the fact that Kazakhstan “did not have any 
strategic interests” in the region. Kazakhstan was neither a large power nor inclined to any side’s 
position. The absence of strategic interests of Kazakhstan came in contrast with the Russian 
position, thus for Armenia and Azerbaijan it was “politically appropriate” to welcome another 
mediator apart from Russia. 
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It is hard to judge which of these motives played major or minor roles, but Nazarbayev 
agreed to the MFA’s proposal and sent addresses to the Armenian and Azerbaijani presidents, 
inviting them to Almaty to discuss terms of a ceasefire.668 The working group was formed in the 
MFA, headed by deputy minister Tokaev. On 27 August 1992, the Armenian and Azerbaijani 
representatives arrived in Almaty. Instead of the heads of states, the delegations were led by 
foreign ministers. Despite this obvious downgrade of the level of the meeting, Nazarbayev had 
personally met with both ministers behind closed doors to facilitate the talks. The Armenian 
diplomat quotes Nazarbayev’s remark when foreign ministers started to argue about the role the 
UN should play in the conflict resolution: “Kazakhstan is closer [to Armenia and Azerbaijan] 
than the UN. I just cannot sleep when I think about all things happening [in the Nagorno-
Karabakh region].”669 At the end of the day, after lengthy consultations, guests, together with 
their Kazakhstani colleague Suleymenov, signed the trilateral ‘Almaty Memorandum’ whereby 
Armenian and Azerbaijani ministers “confirmed the readiness of their states to suspend military 
actions in accordance with the appeal of the Minsk Group of September 1, 1992 and undertake 
practical measures for the realization of its provisions,” effectively establishing a ceasefire on the 
Armenia-Azerbaijan border.670 The Almaty meeting was a significant breakthrough in the 
international mediation of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and came as a complete surprise to the 
international community.671 For the first time since the unsuccessful Tehran ceasefire agreement 
of 7 May 1992 both sides met and produced a ceasefire agreement.672 
To further institutionalize the role of Kazakhstan in the Nagorno-Karabakh peace 
initiative Nazarbayev appointed two experienced diplomats to be his personal representatives in 
the capitals of Armenia and Azerbaijan. The head of the International Department of the 
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Apparatus of the President Kasymov and the head of the Cultural Department of the MFA Asan 
Kozhakov were dispatched to Baku and Yerevan respectively to monitor and coordinate the 
implementation of the Almaty Memorandum, as well as to liaise Kazakhstani authorities directly 
with presidents Mutalibov and Ter-Petrosyan. They were provided with offices in the respective 
presidents’ offices with access to the military high-frequency communication line, which they 
used to send cables to the deputy minister Tokaev.  
On 3 September 1992 Armenia and Azerbaijan representatives, together with 
Nazarbayev’s personal envoys, signed the “Idzhevan Protocol”, confirming the preliminary 
implementation of the Almaty Memorandum provisions.673 The main provisions of these 
documents were that Armenia and Azerbaijan would agree to a ceasefire along the de jure state 
borders.674 The de facto border of the self-proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh republic was out of the 
provisions of the agreements, but even so, the facts that two sides have finally met and signed the 
memorandum and protocol were considered as significant steps towards peace reconciliation by 
the Kazakhstani leadership. The ceasefire agreement was more or less observed to the effect that 
tensions along the Armenia-Azerbaijan border were reduced in the immediate subsequent period. 
After the signing of the Idzhevan Protocol Kasymov and Kozhakov returned home to await 
further developments. Their enthusiasm was soon to diminish, however, as news reports from the 
field in late September-October showed that the fighting broke out again. 
Two weeks after the signing of the Idzhevan Protocol, on 17 September 1992 the 
Kazakhstani MFA working group met with the Armenian and Azerbaijani diplomats to discuss 
the possibility of reversing the negative tendencies in the region and of hosting the summit of the 
three presidents.675 The good news for Almaty was that the role of the republic was praised by 
both Armenia and Azerbaijan representatives, who expressed their willingness to continue a 
dialogue with each other through Kazakhstan’s mediation. For them, Nazarbayev’s mission was 
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more effective in comparison to the Minsk Group’s one – as an illustration for this point 
Armenia and Azerbaijan diplomats referred to the failure of the Minsk Group meeting in Rome 
on 7-10 September 1992. The bad news was that the meeting did not advance Kazakhstan’s 
peace initiative. According to Suleymenov, “the negotiations went hard and tenaciously, with 
Armenia’ and Azerbaijan’s representatives constantly arguing, exchanging accusations and 
reproaches.”676 This meeting also signalled to Almaty that it might not be able to achieve any 
further tangible results in brokering the peace agreement. Suleymenov frankly warned the 
president: “Negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan are gaining a protracted 
character….There are no visible mutually acceptable conflict resolution options yet.”677 Suren 
Zolian, an Armenian diplomat present at the meeting, later recalled that for all participating 
countries the main agenda of the meeting was not so much to discuss the Almaty peace process 
but to “find a decent way of putting the matter to rest.”678 
Given these disappointing developments Suleymenov suggested to Nazarbayev to refrain 
from resending the president’s representatives to Baku and Yerevan for some time. However, 
knowing the symbolic importance of the previously envisioned presidential summit for 
Nazarbayev’s international prestige, Suleymenov at the same time told the president that his 
ministry would be working to get the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan to come to Almaty 
to meet with Nazarbayev in a trilateral forum. As Suleymenov reported to the president: “The 
work on positions’ rapprochement will constantly continue at the level of the ministers and 
deputy ministers….The MFA intends to endure the line of continuing the negotiation process 
and to steadily work up for the meeting of the heads of states.”679 
As the subsequent events demonstrated, the August foreign ministers’ meeting that 
resulted in signing the Almaty Memorandum and later the Idzhevan Protocol, was the 
culmination of Kazakhstan’s mediation effort and further diplomatic actions gradually declined 
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thereafter. The three presidents’ summit never took place.680 Such an unfortunate course of 
events for Kazakhstan’s peace initiative was prompted by the developments in the conflict 
region, where the fighting continued up the escalation spiral, and by the constraints imposed by 
the international environment. 
 
Changing international context 
Almaty peace process 
During the initial period of the “internationalization” of the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process, 
the international missions were run independently from one another, often overlapping in timing 
and peace mechanisms proposed: “The result was confusion as the two sides were being 
encouraged to ‘shop around’ for whichever mediation effort suited them best.”681 When 
Kazakhstan launched its own unilateral mediation effort in August 1992 it ran parallel to other 
initiatives. At the same time, Nazarbayev from the start clearly wanted to gain legitimacy and 
support of his mediation efforts from the international mediation community. The Minsk Group 
and Russia were the main protagonists of the conflict resolution process and their attitudes 
towards Nazarbayev’s diplomacy had greatly affected the role Kazakhstan had played in this 
process.  
Although the Almaty peace initiative was unilateral in format, Kazakhstan continuously 
expressed its desire to conduct the initiative under the auspices of the UN and CSCE. The text of 
the Alma-Ata Memorandum explicitly signals this intention:  
On 27 August 1992 in Almaty the meeting of the delegations headed by the ministers of 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan took place. The meeting was initiated by the president of 
Kazakhstan. Mediation efforts of the Republic of Kazakhstan were undertaken within the 
context of the CSCE, its Minsk Group, in conformity with the spirit and principles of this 
organization.682  
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In the letter addressed to the Minsk Group chairman Raffaelli, Tokaev informs his 
colleague about the follow up meeting of the trilateral working group on 17 September. Tokaev, 
highlighting the importance of the international support, writes to Raffaelli:  
As you know, Kazakhstan’s mediation efforts are undertaken within the context of peace 
efforts of the CSCE and its Minsk Group, in accordance with the spirit and principles of this 
organization. We request you to send your representative to take part in the working group 
meeting in Almaty.683 
 
In autumn 1992 Kazakhstan wanted to join the Minsk Group with Moscow’s assistance 
requesting the Russian foreign ministry to initiate the motion in the Minsk Group.684 
 
Unexpected reaction of the West 
Western diplomats on several occasions boldly rejected Nazarbayev’s ambitions to integrate 
Almaty’s initiative in the international mediation process and to complement the process with his 
personal contribution. The UN General-Secretary declined the invitation to join the trilateral 
talks in Almaty in September. The CSCE leadership, although having noted Kazakhstan’s efforts 
during the Zheleznovodsk process in its February 1992 “Interim Report on Nagorno-Karabakh,” 
nonetheless did not invite Kazakhstan to join the Minsk Group when it was being founded in 
March 1992.685 The CSCE leadership was also against granting a CSCE mandate to observers 
whom Almaty wanted to send to the region in autumn 1992.686  
As for the Minsk Group, at the earlier stage the Group neither opposed Nazarbayev’s 
actions nor supported them – the attitude of the Western countries continued to be neutral until 
Kazakhstan unilaterally brokered a ceasefire agreement at the August trilateral meeting in 
Almaty. Almaty’s advance was greeted with envy by the Minsk Group.687 The Group’s 
discontent with Almaty’s involvement in the Nagorno-Karabakh problem resulted in its devotion 
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to exclude Kazakhstan from the international peace process. This intention manifested both in 
public statements and in behind-the-scenes diplomacy of the Minsk Group leadership.  
As it was said, the fundamental change of the Minsk Group’s attitude towards 
Nazarbayev’s initiative happened after the Almaty trilateral meeting in August 1992. The signing 
of the Almaty Memorandum came as a surprise to the Group’s Chair Raffaelli.688 As the reaction 
of the Group’s diplomats later demonstrated, the surprise was an unpleasant one. Even the 
moderate achievements reached at the Almaty meeting greatly contrasted with the Minsk 
Group’s lack of progress. As recalled by Kazimirov, the heaviest critique came from the 
Americans and Italians who were concerned about the Group’s prestige and their own personal 
roles in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolution.689 The Group’s diplomats explicitly showed 
their frustration about Nazarbayev’s unilateral initiative. The Italian delegation expressed 
concerns about a confusion in the mediation process created by the Almaty peace agreement; and 
Kazakhstan was blamed by the Minsk Group for putting the entire conflict resolution process at 
risk and for the erosion of Group’s credibility.690 Minsk Group representatives even expressed a 
view that Kazakhstan is not a legitimate mediator.691 Kazimirov recollects that the US delegate 
John J. Maresca shared his opinion with the participants of the Rome meeting that only the 
Minsk Group could reach a peace agreement and that Almaty should either step aside or become 
an observer in the Group.692 However, as Kazimirov recalls the diplomatic communication, 
when in January 1993 Kazakhstani foreign minister Suleymenov requested to officially sen
observer to the Minsk Group meeting, Italy and the USA, without informing other members of 
the Group, denied the republic’s request, “even though Kazakhstan had twice entered the peace 
d an 
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process.”693 This fact, however, did not serve as a predicament for Finland and Switzerland, who 
were later easily accepted as the full-fledged members of the Minsk Group, Kazimirov adds.694  
Zolian writes that Russia was not happy either about signing of the Almaty 
Memorandum, because, for Moscow, Nazarbayev’s success challenged Russia’s leading role in 
the CIS.695 Furthermore, Zolian writes that both Armenia and Azerbaijan authorities were 
subsequently confronted by the similar negative reaction of the international mediators, which 
led them to withdraw from the Almaty peace process.696 These facts unequivocally demonstrate 
the Minsk Group’s exclusive attitude towards non-Western international mediation efforts, as 
well as the Russian suspicion of Nazarbayev’s moves. Such a treatment of Kazakhstan’s 
initiative becomes more understandable against the general background of the post-Soviet 
geopolitics. 
 
Russia-West rivalry  
The establishment of the Minsk Group, run mostly by the Western diplomats, led the peace 
process in Nagorno-Karabakh to be interrelated with the larger context of West’s interactions 
with Russia.697 This has certainly complicated the mediation process. Illustrative of this point are 
the reflections of the US representative Maresca and the Russian chief mediator Kazimirov. 
Maresca notes that the failure of mediation efforts in 1992-1993 was partly caused by the 
Russian policy aimed at isolating the issue from international, and mainly Western, 
participation.698 According to the American diplomat, this policy was part of a broader strategy 
aimed at preserving Moscow’s dominance over the post-Soviet territories: “Russian 
unwillingness to accept a reasonable compromise based on a significant, but not controlling, role 
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in an international peacekeeping force, has been particularly striking evidence of neo-imperialist 
intentions.”699 For Maresca, the principal point of non-concurrence in mediation approaches was 
that Russia wanted to send its own or CIS “separation forces,” which was “directly competing 
with and undercutting the international proposal for a CSCE force.”700 Meanwhile, Kazimirov 
argues that the involvement of the CSCE in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict “corresponded to the 
interests of USA and other Western powers.”701 For the Russians, the first year of the Minsk 
Group’s work showed that it was not capable to act as mediator – in Kazimirov’s view the 
achievement of a ceasefire and the end of hostilities, the primary goal of the Russian mediation 
mission, was a secondary goal for the Minsk Group. 
We continued our activities within the Group trying to redirect its course and resist the 
westernerns’ attempts to use its format in their geopolitical interests, mainly to reduce 
influence of Russia in Transcaucasus. In this situation we had to boost our own [unilateral] 
mediation attempts, to more actively communicate with the leaders of the conflicting sides on 
our own.702   
 
While the West could not ignore Russia’s importance and involvement in the matters on 
the post-Soviet territory, its attitude towards CIS was completely different. CIS’s activities were 
met with jealousy from the Minsk Group.703 Kazimirov recollects: “Western nations and the 
CSCE organs, including the Minsk Group have never answered the CIS appeals to cooperate on 
the Nagorno-Karabakh problem and to support CIS efforts.”704 This could have been caused by 
the Western suspicion towards the structure: 
In most of these case studies of peacekeeping and peace enforcement on former Soviet territory 
Russia has sought to present the operations undertaken as being in some way CIS-led rather 
than Russian-led. This reflects a belief that the CIS umbrella could offer greater legitimacy, or 
at least respectability, to these operations and serve to some extent to spread the financial and 
military burden borne so far principally by Russia.705 
 
It is therefore understandable why were Nazarbayev’s frequent appeals to engage the CIS 
structures in the peace process not welcomed by the West. For example, when in October 1992 
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Kazakhstan asked the CSCE to confer its mandate to Kazakhstani observers who planned to be 
sent by the CIS to the conflict zone, Vienna refused: “The CSCE leadership is expressing doubts 
about the eligibility of issuing the CSCE mandates for the CIS observers.”706 
At the same time, while Russia’s own attitude towards other mediators was publicly 
promoted as open and welcoming, the Kazakhstani foreign office could not fully count on 
Moscow’s support for its initiative. Officially, the Russian mission adopted a conception of 
complementary and mutually supported efforts of all interested parties.707 Nonetheless, 
Kazakhstani diplomats did not feel that Moscow was welcoming Nazarbayev’s peace initiative 
since the Russians rarely coordinated their activities with Almaty, even though promises were 
made to do so; as a result, Kazakhstani diplomats were instructed by their superiors not to 
discuss in detail with the Russians the upcoming Almaty meeting.708 As Kazimirov recalled his 
conversation with the Kazakhstani diplomat:  
On 25 August [1992] Kazakhstan’s deputy foreign minister Kurmanguzhin in the confidential 
V-CHe conversation informed me about the initiative of his president and the upcoming 
meetings of Armenia and Azerbaijan….But he evidently did not want to share with me detailed 
information and to cooperate closely on that matter.709 
 
Zolian’s observation about Moscow’s negative reaction to the signing of the Almaty 
Memorandum, noted above, suggests that there were grounds for the Kazakhstani hesitation with 
Moscow.710  
Eventually, Kazakhstan’s independent peace initiative by autumn 1992 began to be 
perceived as an unwelcome and confusing development that unnecessary complicated the 
geopolitical game between the West and Russia around the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Signs of 
progress demonstrated by Nazarbayev’s unilateral activities only questioned other mediators’ 
abilities. Hence, the international environment, which seemed so promising and permissive for 
Nazarbayev in August, had soon become inhospitable for Almaty’s peace endeavour. As a result, 
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military force. See Roy, The New Central Asia: The Creation of Nations (London: Tauris, 2000), 197. 
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Kazakhstan’s actions had progressively received less and less attention and support of other 
participants in the international mediation process. At some point, a high-ranking authority told 
Nazarbayev that Kazakhstan “is losing face.”711 Achieving no further advances in the 
implementation of the Almaty Memorandum, Kazakhstan recognized the changing nature of the 
international context and started to look for alternative variants to remain in the international 
peace process. 
 
The endgame 
At this stage an attractive option of remaining involved in the process on a high international 
level was to link Almaty’s efforts with the Minsk Group activities. Realizing that the Group’s 
Western leadership might not be willing to cooperate with Kazakhstan, Almaty approached 
Russia with the request to back its intentions. In mid-October, Kazakhstan proposed for Moscow 
to jointly convene a Minsk Group meeting. Suleymenov explained to Nazarbayev the motive 
behind this proposal: “This, we think, will provide more legitimacy to Kazakhstan’s efforts 
within the CSCE context. At the Minsk Group meeting there could be considered … Almaty 
Memorandum and Idzhevan Protocol as documents, concluded in line with the CSCE 
actions.”712 Almaty had also asked Moscow, as the member of the Minsk Group, to initiate the 
procedure of accepting Kazakhstan as the observer to this organization.713 
It is hard to point to particular reasons why Kazakhstan’s ambitions to side with the 
Minsk Group were not realized, but the facts tell that already by winter 1992 Almaty was left on 
the roadside of the international resolution process. This situation was fully recognized by 
Kazakhstani policymakers as the previous enthusiasm quickly faded. In February 1993, at the 
foreign ministry’s collegium, the former president’s personal envoy to Armenia Kozhakov 
sounded a bitter reminder to his colleagues about the past peacemaking ambitions of Kazakhstan:  
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The whole thing died out. We have stopped proposing options for the conflict resolution, did 
not enter the CSCE Minsk Group. Meanwhile Russia started to work, to fill the occurred gap. 
In personal contacts with the Armenian diplomats they asked me what is to be done next? 
Unfortunately, from our side silence was the only reply. It is not understandable why, with 
what aim the initiative was endeavoured?714 
  
The minister’s reply was: “The mediation initiative is complicated. It is not only about 
documents. The Nagorno-Karabakh problem is complicated in itself. Yes, it did not work out, 
but not because of Kazakhstan’s fault. The problem’s knot is too complex, historically, 
ethnically.”715 In the 1993 letter criticizing the MFA, former president’s personal envoy to 
Azerbaijan Kasymov referred to the unsuccessful Nagorno-Karabakh initiative: “For example, 
Kazakhstan, having initiated the Karabakh problem resolution, due to the MFA’s passivity did 
not enter the CSCE Minsk Group and in general became an onlooker of the mediation 
process.”716 
Interestingly, for some reason, in April 1993 Nazarbayev asked Suleymenov whether it 
would be possible to reinvigorate Kazakhstan’s peace initiative. The minister told Nazarbayev 
that it was possible to renew mediation efforts and suggested several ideas towards this end.717 
Among them Suleymenov proposed Nazarbayev to initiate the summit of the Armenian and 
Azerbaijani presidents on Kazakhstani territory but now with the participation of the Russian 
delegation. Another suggestion was made to appeal to the conflicting sides to continue 
negotiations under the aegis of the Minsk Group with the participation of the representative of 
Kazakhstan. These two points indicate that Almaty had again relied on the same recipes it had 
last year – to side with the Minsk Group and seek Moscow’s support.  
Nazarbayev forwarded Suleymenov’s proposals to Zhukeyev asking his opinion of the 
prospects of restarting the peace mission. Zhukeyev prepared an elaborated review in which he 
took a critical stand to the MFA’s ideas and proposed to pull back from the peace initiative 
delegating future activities to Russia.718 In particular, he told the president: 
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Perspectives for the regulation of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict seem to be distant.…In the 
current situation it would be most rational not to take active steps to renew the Kazakhstani 
mediation mission; at the same time it is desirable to work on the legitimization of the 
republic’s participation in the international peace process by entering the Minsk Group. Hardly 
do we need to demonstrate peaceful intentions without having secured solid guarantees of their 
success and jeopardize the republic’s leadership prestige. It is preferable to work within the 
framework of the CSCE.719 
 
Zhukeyev advised Nazarbayev to restrict Kazakhstan’s participation to a public statement on 
behalf of the MFA that would be very general in its content. The president agreed with 
Zhukeyev’s opinion and instructed Suleymenov to limit Kazakhstan’s involvement to oral 
propositions on the level of foreign ministries. Hence the story of the first Kazakhstani 
international peace mission was over.  
 
Conclusion 
The episode of Kazakhstan’s peace initiative must had raised mixed emotions among Almaty 
policymakers. On one hand, some success on the ground and corresponding international 
recognition was achieved by Kazakhstan. This was one of the first instances through which 
Nazarbayev consolidated his image of the global diplomat. Therefore, the MFA, whose ideas and 
commitment made a major contribution to the initiative, could accordingly count on president’s 
benevolence. The achievement was especially noticeable since the peace initiative was seen by 
Kazakhstani diplomats to be a “brave move, considering that we did not have any prior 
experience in international conflict resolution.”720 On the other hand, the mediating mission 
could be a lesson of disillusionment in the benign nature of the international environment for the 
republic’s policy makers. After all, it is the Minsk Group’s direct and indirect pressures on 
Almaty that had eventually led to the decision to cease its peace initiative.  
The reticence of Kazakhstani diplomats in this episode comes in contrast with their 
assertiveness in the previous two cases. Presumably, the reason why Almaty did not attempt to 
insist on its involvement in the peace process, either under the auspices of the Minsk Group or 
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jointly with Russia, was that the Nagorno-Karabakh issue did not constitute a vital foreign policy 
problem. The fact that Nazarbayev’s contribution was mainly limited to making initial and final 
decisions on the policy proposals put forward by Suleymenov and Zhukeyev, with the occasional 
presence at the August trilateral talks in Almaty, reflects the relevantly low level of importance 
of this issue to the Kazakhstani leadership. This is not to say that the matter was a routine foreign 
policy act. The peace mission was duly discussed and analyzed at considerably high levels of the 
foreign policymaking bureaucracy. To recall, the idea to initiate the peace process was the 
product of the MFA’s decision-making and the proposal to terminate the initiative was 
thoroughly justified by State Counsellor Zhukeyev. Here, Nazarbayev had just endorsed both 
proposals, without much contribution on generation or coordination of the peace mission. The 
chief protagonists in this episode were the two authoritative policymaking actors, the MFA and 
the State Counsellor.  
 
The Nagorno-Karabakh episode is the last of the three empirical inquiries undertaken in this 
study. Generalizations and conclusions from the gathered evidence will be drawn in the 
following conclusive chapter that presents key findings of this study and discusses possible 
future avenues for the research on the phenomenon of Kazakhstani foreign policy. 
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Conclusion 
 
If an involuntary act is one preformed under compulsion or 
as a result of ignorance, a voluntary act would seem to be 
one of which the originating cause lies in the agent himself, 
who knows the particular circumstances of his actions. 
Aristotle, Ethics.  
 
This thesis was undertaken with the goal to construct a plausible understanding of the 
abnormalities in Kazakhstan's external behavioural model in the first half of the 1990s. The 
principal inquiry that guided the research project was: 
What was the role of agency, if any, behind the formation of Kazakhstan’s foreign behavioural 
model? 
In particular, the thesis sought to elucidate reasons as to why Kazakhstan did not 
bandwagon with or balanced against its powerful neighbours; decided to relinquish its nuclear 
arsenal; and pursued an inconsistent Nagorno-Karabakh peace mission, thereby confounding the 
deterministic logic of the systemic theories of international relations. The neoclassical realist 
theoretical framework was selected to assess the validity of the central argument of this thesis 
that the presidential foreign policymaking element could have played a crucial role in moulding 
foreign policy strategies realized by Almaty, thus potentially holding important explanatory 
power at the unit level. 
Neoclassical realism integrates international and domestic milieus in one analytical 
argument by hypothesizing that pressures from the international system are translated into a 
foreign policy output through some unit-level factors which act as an “imperfect transmission 
belt.”721 Adaptations of the neoclassical realist paradigm find various domestic factors to distort 
signals from the international environment. This thesis argued that in the case of Kazakhstan, the 
Almaty’s policymaking element could be the unit-level variable that accounted for the 
peculiarities of the republic's foreign affairs. The focus of the analysis was therefore shifted from 
the systemic challenges, overwhelming Kazakhstan immediately after independence, to the 
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examination of decision-making processes and structures in operation during each of the 
episodes under investigation. Given the prominence of Nazarbayev in post-independence politics 
of Kazakhstan, the methodology of studies of the presidential group decision-making was 
employed to draw a portrayal of the republic's policymaking apparatus in a manner that allowed 
for the integration of this aspect of strategy formation into a comprehensive historical narrative. 
Empirical findings presented in the thesis confirm the initial presumption that 
Nazarbayev’s policymaking was an essential link in the causal chain underlying the initial 
systemic circumstances and an actual policy response, thus supporting the relevance of the 
application of the neoclassical realist lens to this inquiry. In two cases (Chapters IV, V) Almaty 
policy makers demonstrated remarkable defiance of the overwhelming political and security 
pressures. In one case (Chapter VI), the assessed documents showed how Kazakhstan initiated a 
unilateral peace initiative and eventually reversed its course, having acquiesced to the constraints 
imposed by the international environment. Both types of policy responses were steered to 
significant degrees by carefully planned and intended activities on the part of policymakers 
signalling the presence of agency behind foreign policy. To recall Calder’s discussion of 
properties of reactive external policies, where the “reaction prevails over strategy,” in 
Kazakhstan’s case, the opposite claim that the “strategy prevails over reaction” can be supported 
by this study. 
 
Reconstructing foreign policy decision-making 
Primary materials produced by the policymaking apparatus during the evolution of these three 
episodes supplement each other, and each provide insights of their own, helping to compose a 
generalized vision of policymaking of the initial post-independence era. Empirical chapters 
provided an insider's view on how the foreign policy was made in the republic and what rationale 
was steering policymakers in their activities. Documented evidence of the strategic policy 
planning undertaken by Nazarbayev and his key advisers, who wanted to devise an adequate 
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policy which would enable Kazakhstan to avoid the hegemonic pitfalls emanating from the 
geopolitical pressures of Russia and China (Chapter IV), and to maximize the republic’s benefit 
in the face of the recognized necessity to renounce nuclear status (Chapter V) convincingly 
demonstrate two characteristics of the policymakers. On the one hand, policymakers were 
sensitive to the foreign security and sovereignty threats, and on the other, they were committed 
to defending the national interest of the young republic. Highly skilled diplomacy exercised by 
Nazarbayev and his leading diplomats in negotiations with Beijing, Moscow, and Washington, 
reveal the president’s profound personal contribution to the outcome of foreign policy 
manoeuvring. The records of the president’s evasive personal nuclear bargaining specifically 
reinforce the view of Nazarbayev as a visionary statesman motivated by the desire to maximize 
the interest of the nation.  
At first glance, the Nagorno-Karabakh case (Chapter VI) appears to infringe the thesis’s 
argument in favour of elements of agency and defiance of systemic pressures. After all, it was 
the growing Minsk Group hostility that led to Almaty’s disengagement from the peace process, 
essentially damaging the country’s international prestige. In this case, Kazakhstan’s actions 
closely correlated with the dynamics of systemic opportunities and constraints, a finding that 
should be associated more with the deterministic logic as the underlying cause for this episode’s 
developments. On the other hand it is worth remembering that this issue did not have the nation’s 
security and sovereignty at stake, a fact that could possibly explain Almaty’s submissiveness to 
the external pressure. At the same time, this small-scale episode demonstrated the same high 
degree of policymakers’ sensitivity and adaptability to the international context as in two other 
cases, albeit with different type of policy response. Moreover, this case in general portrays 
Kazakhstan not as a vulnerable object of international pressures that is statically waiting for the 
new challenges to come and then trying to react to them, but as a proactive nation ready to 
initiate a policy, contribute its limited resources and put its international prestige at risk, thus 
supporting the argument in favour of agency behind the republic’s foreign policy outlook.  
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In all investigated cases the policy planning involved limited number of actors, all of 
them belonging to the executive branch and showing high levels of correspondence of their 
perceptions to Nazarbayev’s vision. The chronicles of the limited turf war between the foreign 
ministry and the International Department of the president's apparatus (Chapter IV), as well as 
the insignificance of manifestation of the policy debate between “doves,” “hawks” and 
“bargainers” on the issue of nuclear weapons (Chapter V) make it possible to deduct that 
Kazakhstan’s foreign policy outlook was neither affected by the conflicting developments among 
the highest ranking decision-makers, nor by the attitudes of the general public. Some 
counterfactual arguments can be made to support this finding. The fact that the International 
Department’s head Kasymov did not question the viability of the foundational principles of the 
strategic outlook in his bureaucratic charge on the foreign ministry, gives grounds to reason that 
the turf war neither did, nor, if the tables would have turned in Kasymov’s favour, could entail 
serious foreign policy implications. Similarly, the impact of supporters and criticizers of the 
nuclear status on Nazarbayev’s decision was equally minimal, causing only minor concerns for 
policymakers who enjoyed a considerable degree of autonomy from the society in their 
deliberations. Kasenov’s observation that the Supreme Soviet ratified the Lisbon Protocol 
without any preliminary parliamentary discussion only supports the argument on the consensual 
and exclusive character of decision-making. In other words, a conclusion can be made that 
neither bureaucratic politics nor necessity in acquiring public support mattered through the 
course of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy. 
It appears that from the outset of sovereign policymaking, the consensus had been 
established on the ends and means of the republic’s external strategy among the leadership (not 
least to the effect of how these ends and means were formulated in policy papers and analytical 
memorandums). Nazarbayev, his advisers and the diplomatic corps often appeared to have 
prioritized matters of independence and security, and to have worked towards this goal as one 
team, not being compromised by manifestations of ideological divisions. From the assessed 
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material, however, it remains unclear if such uniformity in strategic perceptions was caused by 
the concentration of the policymaking in the hands of Nazarbayev, who had an exclusive 
privilege to decide on strategic foreign matters, or by congruence in the views of the president 
and his key advisers. These two assumptions are not necessarily mutually exclusive. The 
assessed materials illustrated how policymakers’ opinions were communicated, in one form or 
another, to the president, who then cognitively aggregated them and subsequently informed his 
subordinates what the finalized policy stance should be.  
Here the thesis is not able to give a definitive answer in regard to what exact cognitive 
and organizational mechanisms were in place when Nazarbayev arrived at specific policy 
choices. As much as it was a corroborative enterprise, it still was someone’s particular 
contribution of ideas that laid the foundation for a foreign policy act. How much was there an 
influence of the president at the beginning of the decisional phase is debatable. For example, 
were the principles of balancing and multivectorism the original ideas authored by deputy 
minister Tokaev, as Starr contends, or did Tokaev just reflected on the president’s worldviews 
and conceptually formulated them in the form of a strategic concept? The archival documents 
can only give a tentative conclusion that the advice and information flow was reciprocal – 
Nazarbayev both confirmed the soundness of his decisions with his team of advisers and 
benefited from the policy advice received from them. The precise answer to the question, if 
attainable at all, requires the employment of different sets of methods of investigation that could 
supplement the information from archival materials and interviews. 
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Nazarbayev’s advisory group in each of the cases under review demonstrated different 
prevailing functional patterns of group decision-making models, as conceptualized by Hart et al. 
The elaboration of the balancing strategy aimed at securing the nation’s sovereignty and 
territorial integrity, when each of Nazarbayev’s advisers had developed his own version of the 
strategy in the forms of policy papers and strategic concepts, was a process closely resembling 
the “think tank” model. Here, the information was processed and policy solutions generated at 
the top by several high-ranking authorities, albeit sometimes with the assistance of the cadre of 
the institutions they headed. At the same, given the salience of the issues the republic’s 
leadership had faced, the “command centre” model that presumes the contraction of the authority 
at the highest level seems relevant. Only a handful of Nazarbayev’s innermost associates was 
involved in charting the strategic balancing course and coordinated its subsequent realization. 
 The solution of the nuclear dilemma set forward a somewhat different agenda for 
Nazarbayev’s advisory group. At that point, the tasks for the president’s advisors were not 
limited to the analysis of the information and the provision of the policy advice (i.e. the “think 
tank” model) and to the elaboration of the nuclear strategy in intensive informal meetings (i.e. 
the “command centre”). One of the possible roles the advisory group fulfilled in this case was to 
buttress the president’s decision to relinquish the nuclear arsenal and therefore to serve a 
“sanctuary” role. Nazarbayev had frequently shown his hesitation about disarmament and 
controversial positions on the republic’s nuclear status, both in public and behind closed doors. 
Certainly, to some degree this evasiveness and dithering could be accounted for by the 
intentional strategy of protracting the denuclearization, the inevitability of which the president 
had realised at some stage. At the same time, this could reflect the scale of Nazarbayev’s 
personal contemplations about the fate of the nuclear arsenal and its role in the republic’s future. 
Here, the unanimous support of his eventual position by close associates (who were also well-
informed about the amount of international pressure put on the president) could certainly 
reaffirm Nazarbayev’s decision and was likely to be sought by the president.  
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The functional patterns of the advisory group during the Nagorno-Karabakh peace 
mission clearly stand out from the other two episodes. Here, the bulk of the decisions were made 
by the foreign minister Suleymenov and the State Counsellor Zhukeyev. The president’s 
contribution to the process was clearly much less manifest than in the previous two cases. 
Whereas the “think tank” model here seems appropriate, the lower salience of the issue had 
correspondingly led to the delegation of the decisional authority to a lower level and therefore 
the “command centre” role, performed by the advisory group during the elaboration of the 
balancing strategy and the nuclear episode, was not evident in the Nagorno-Karabakh case. To 
be sure, this assessment of the advisory group’s roles is only preliminary and precise functions of 
each actor and nuanced details of their interaction with the president remain undisclosed. 
Setting the clear conceptual boundaries in regard to Nazarbayev’s preferred format of 
management of his advisory group is equally problematic. The attribution of George’s three 
models of the presidential decision-making – formalistic, collegial, and competitive – to this 
study produces confusing results, because different decisional dynamics had manifested during 
the studied period. Across the cases under review, the superiority of the president’s view on what 
was deemed an optimal policy and the centrality of his character in the policymaking apparatus 
were explicit, suggesting the formalistic nature of the decision-making. At the same time, 
Almaty policymakers saw the maintenance of the esprit de corps as the principal operational 
feature of their activities, which suggests some degree of collegiality. To recall, in times when 
Almaty policymakers were tasked with the charting of the balancing strategy, resolution of the 
nuclear issue, or initiating a peace agreement in Nagorno-Karabakh, all concerned policymaking 
actors were viewing the situations through one perceptual lens. The success of Almaty’s foreign 
policy acts was by a substantial degree backed by the commonly shared policymakers’ inner 
confidence and intelligence in ascertaining national interests in talks with their colleagues 
representing tremendously more powerful international actors. The same combination of self-
confidence and competent style of handling foreign relations had also helped in gathering a 
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breakthrough peace conference in Almaty that brought at one table the fighting Armenians and 
Azerbaijanis. Moreover, while Nazarbayev had encouraged competitiveness and overlapping 
responsibilities among different actors by soliciting separate policy advice in a non-regular 
manner from each policymaking actor – the foreign ministry, the International Department, the 
CSS, and State Counsellor Zhukeyev – he had fiercely commanded Kasymov to stop intrigues 
around the foreign ministry thereby signalling his intolerance to any direct inter-institutional 
confrontation.  
Nonetheless, some tentative findings can be made in regard to dominant dynamics of 
intra-group interactions during the three episodes. Here, again, the group decision-making on 
two high-salience issues (the balancing strategy and the nuclear dilemma) differed from the low-
salience issue (the Nagorno-Karabakh episode). The variable is the level of the president’s 
involvement. In the two former cases, Nazarbayev had actively participated in generating the 
republic’s policies together with his associates, which is a strong collegial characteristic. In the 
latter case, Nazarbayev delegated the responsibility to produce the Nagorno-Karabakh policies to 
Suleymenov and Zhukeyev, the policymakers, who at a later phase made two opposing proposals 
to the president in regard to the republic’s further participation in the endeavour. The president’s 
role during this episode was mainly limited to making final decisions on whether to initiate, and, 
subsequently, continue or seize the peace mission – hence, the formalistic management style 
appears to be pertinent.  
Ambiguities in Kazakhstan’s presidential decision-making dynamics and performances 
are similar to the ones found by Haney in American history, and by Hart et al. in other countries, 
where characteristics of different models of presidential advisory systems have overlapped. 
Since the policymaking process was only emerging at the time, the ambiguous manner of the 
presidential policymaking in Kazakhstan is not a surprising incidence. What can be concluded 
with a higher degree of confidence is that Nazarbayev was the central policymaking character 
throughout the studied period. He was being kept informed, consulted and asked for endorsement 
 222 
 
in every decisional situation. At the same time, the variety of decision-making models indicates 
the sophisticated nature of the phenomenon and suggests that Kazakhstan’s foreign policy cannot 
be characterized only in terms of deterministically reactive policy responses, in which case the 
decision-making could have been less complex and diverse than is observed.  
 
Shifting conceptual paradigm 
As it was noted in Chapter II, several observers, such as Dannreuther, Cooley, and Cummings, 
criticize the deterministic approach to the study of Kazakhstan’s foreign affairs where the 
republic is portrayed as a “simple reactor” to the pressures of the external actors. The empirical 
evidence assessed in this study demonstrates the correctness of this critique since documents 
confirm that at least in two cases when the republic’s statehood and security was threatened, 
Almaty had been manoeuvring between international constraints in an attempt to transcend the 
systemic limitations instead of acquiescing to them. In other words, Kazakhstan in practice had 
been doing precisely what Cooley called “draw[ing] ‘local rules’” and what was so 
sympathetically accounted for by Starr and Gleason in their depictions of the republic’s foreign 
strategy. Echoing these authors’ premises, this thesis exemplifies the validity of the inside-out 
approach to the study of the subject matter, where Almaty’s policies are conceptualized not as 
much as (re)actions in response to systemic forces, but also as actions to defy them and similarly 
calls for a shift of the epistemological paradigm.  
The potency of this approach does not, however, mean that conclusions drawn from other 
perspectives are irrelevant to the understanding of the phenomenon. After all, it is the conceptual 
model a researcher applies that determines “what the analyst finds puzzling, how he formulates 
his question, where he looks for evidence, and what he produces as an answer.”722 To be sure, 
scholars have been able to accurately reconstruct the geopolitical context within which 
Kazakhstan was situated and to correctly infer the policymakers’ perceptions of the strategic 
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security and independence challenges. For example, the great sense of vulnerability from Russia, 
hypothesized by Olcott and Cornell to be one of the main drivers of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy, 
has been very closely reflected in the policy documents. At the same time, in some nuances, 
presented evidence may provide more viable estimations of the leadership’s motives and 
rationale that informed the nation’s external outlook than the one found in the literature. As such, 
Olcott’s assumptions about Nazarbayev’s willingness to trade sovereignty in exchange for 
Moscow’s support appear to be speculative in the light of the content of the assessed internal 
policy documents, which revealed the virtually sacred importance of the independence for the 
republic’s leadership and a very cautious approach to Russia in the beginning of 1990s. For the 
same reasons, Passolt’s conjecture about the policy advice contribution from foreign nationals in 
the sphere of external relations, seems to be an unlikely occurrence in the actual practice of 
policymaking, and Bukkvoll’s argument about Nazarbayev’s personal interests overriding the 
nation’s interests seems not to be accurate either. 
Throughout the initial post-independence period, Kazakhstan’s leadership tended to be 
explicit and sincere in the motives underlining the nation’s strategy. Laumulin’s metaphorical 
portrayal of the strategic dilemmas imposed on Kazakhstan closely corresponds to the actual 
calculations of the leadership reflected in the foreign policy planning documents. The 
policymakers’ beliefs and ideas regarding international issues that they have publicly raised and 
articulated, for example the nuclear dilemma or the Chinese border problem, have been almost 
verbatim iterated in the internal policy documents and substantially reflected in the minutes of 
the meeting with foreign leaders and diplomats. As far as the strategic issues pertaining to the 
national interests were concerned, it is unlikely that there was a hidden agenda either internally 
among the leadership or in negotiations with external actors – policymakers worked on the exact 
same circle of issues pertaining to the ascertainment of national interests that was known to the 
public and no secret deals were likely to be brokered during this period. Across cases, patterns of 
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close correlation between policymakers’ articulated beliefs and subsequent foreign policy 
behaviour were discernible. 
 By nature of its argument, this thesis seeks to advance the scholarly understanding of 
Kazakhstan’s policymaking. The assessed material allows adding additional empirical 
information to the accumulated knowledge of this subject. As such, Kasenov’s estimates about 
the insignificance of the International Department and the Supreme Soviet can be supported. In 
the light of the reviewed documents, the Supreme Soviet’s role can be seen as minimal, and the 
turf war’s outcome points to the reasons as to why the International Department subsequently 
lost its authority. Abazov was able to grasp the underlining collegial atmosphere in which the 
policymaking was conducted. Indeed, the collective work on strategies formulation was often a 
prominent format of decision-making. At the same time, the thesis’s materials do not support 
Abazov’s argument about the importance of the internal policy debate and a habitual pursuit of 
consensus. The policymakers have mostly concurred on the foreign policy goals and strategies at 
the earlier decisional stages, so the nature of their personal interactions is unlikely to have 
impacted the nation’s strategic outlook, at least not by a greater degree than the “external 
pressures and inputs” recognized by these policymakers.  
In general, this thesis demonstrates that an examination of policymaking can complement 
and support the existing structural and domestic explanations of Almaty’s foreign policy 
behaviour by illuminating Kazakhstani policymakers’ rationale to pursue a specific strategy and 
thereby rendering a better and more comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon. How the 
decisions were made tell a great deal about beliefs, thoughts, and calculations of the republic’s 
leadership. Here, the utility of primary sources, particularly the archival documents, as noted by 
Larson, cannot be overestimated. It is only through the investigation of primary materials that it 
becomes possible to reveal what exactly guided Nazarbayev and his key advisers in their 
diplomatic endeavours. In turn, it has been proven by this thesis that their interpretation of the 
ends and means of the nation’s foreign policy greatly impacted Kazakhstan’s relations with 
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external actors – the finding that supplements otherwise mosaic approaches to Kazakhstani 
politics where usually only one level of variables is included in the analysis. 
 
Appraising neoclassical realism 
This thesis was impelled by an a priori assessment that Kazakhstan’s foreign policy presents a 
paradox from the neorealist perspective. The general perception of the environment as hostile, 
and specific concerns about overwhelming power capabilities of neighbours – motivations 
generic to systemic realism – have not resulted in the realization of the deterministic assumptions 
about internal or external balancing behaviours. Even though the survival of the state was 
blatantly articulated as the main foreign policy goal of the beginning of the 1990s, the 
Kazakhstani leaders have chosen strategies distinct from systemic realism theorizing. The 
neoclassical realist school is interested in explaining such empirical puzzles of anomalous 
foreign policy responses, where international pressures do not lead to the expected responses. 
The application of the neoclassical realist theoretical framework to the empirical puzzle of 
Kazakhstan’s foreign policy has allowed the construction of a viable understanding of the 
phenomenon. 
One principal theoretical implication can be derived from this research. Despite the fact 
that the thesis successfully demonstrated how the pressures of the international system were 
transmitted through the filter of policymakers’ perceptions and calculations, thereby following a 
generic causal sequence conceptualized by Rose, Kazakhstan’s case was not an instance of a 
normatively suboptimal strategy akin to Schweller’s understanding of the anomalous policy that 
eventually results in damaging outcomes for the nation. In particular, Chapter IV depicts 
Kazakhstan’s unwillingness to seek a defensive alliance with other nation(s) against either 
Russia or China, which would be treated as suboptimal underbalancing from the Schweller’s 
perspective. This reluctance was not caused by leadership’s misperceptions about the threatening 
nature of neighbours or by a failure to adopt prudent protection policies; nor did it eventually 
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lead to detrimental consequences. On the contrary, Kazakhstan devised an innovative strategy of 
balancing, allowing minimal geopolitical risks, which nevertheless still goes against the grain of 
the neorealist theory prescription. Hence, this study shows that a foreign policy does not need to 
be ineffective to constitute a case for a deviant external behaviour, thereby calling for the 
possibility of expanding the universe of empirical cases susceptible to a neoclassical realist 
explanation. 
The thesis also confirmed the potency of the integration of the decision-making element 
to the neoclassical realist agenda, echoing a critique by Tang on the importance of analysis of 
policymakers’ impact on foreign policy output. This research exemplifies the case where 
domestic processes of policy formulation were neither flawed, nor inhibited by internal political 
dynamics, or dependent on policymakers’ autonomy from other domestic actors. It was the well 
operating Kazakhstani foreign policymaking machinery that made an instrumental contribution 
to the country’s strategic outlook under pressing international challenges. 
This is not to mean that the presidential decision-making component was an isolated 
endogenic factor affecting Kazakhstan’s foreign posture. The systemic pressures, at least to the 
effect of how they were perceived by Nazarbayev and his key advisers, did exert a profound 
influence on the resulting policy. The foreign policymaking apparatus was likely to play a direct 
but secondary role, while the systemic context played an indirect but primary role affecting the 
profile of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy – the causal dynamics consistent with Sterling-Folker’s 
theorizing. After all, the Kazakhstani policies were not irrational in the sense that policymakers 
have always correlated their strategies with the realities of the international structure, 
internalized the environmental context, and sought to ascertain the nation’s benefit rather than to 
serve parochial interests of the elites. For example, Nazarbayev was not tempted by secret offers 
of financial assistance from Libya to retain the nuclear arsenal, opting instead for securing good 
relations with the West as followed in Chapter V; neither did he consider it possible to trade 
sovereignty to Russia in exchange for the external legitimization of his regime as revealed in 
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Chapter IV. This thesis instead demonstrated how systemic forces, pressing for a specific 
behavioural pattern, were transmitted by the decision-making element in a way that allowed the 
retaining of a significant degree of agency in the course of state’s external strategy.  
 
Opportunities for future research 
The foreign policy analysis of Kazakhstan’s external behaviour is still in its nascence so there are 
plenty of research avenues to follow. The thesis assessed the republic’s foreign relations only in 
the part relating to presidential decision-making. This work constructed only one plausible 
explanation in the foreign policy analysis tradition, leaving many alternative readings out of the 
research scope due to the author’s intention to focus limited timing and resources on the single 
specific facet of the phenomenon.  
Among other possible research projects on foreign policy analysis, three appear to be 
particularly interesting and potent for the advancement of a more comprehensive understanding 
of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy, both supplementing this research and yielding new alternative 
explanations of the phenomenon. First, the prominence of Nazarbayev’s role in policymaking, as 
revealed in this work and recognized by observers elsewhere, makes a psychological profiling of 
his personality to appear as a very promising inquiry. The aggregated volume of primary and 
secondary materials on the president’s actions and verbal record should be sufficient to utilize 
the assessment at-a-distance methods in order to reconstruct Nazarbayev’s personality traits and 
their impact on foreign policy decisions.  
The second research prospect is to conduct a comparative analysis of the Central Asian 
nations’ foreign policies, with the emphasis on the roles played by regional leaders in defining 
the countries’ external outlooks. Whereas the prominence of the region’s presidents is likely to 
constitute the principal similarity pattern, levels of pragmatism and consistency in the region’s 
foreign policies vary. It seems appealing to explore whether these foreign policies are the 
products of presidents’ choices or whether other factors may affect them as well. Here, the 
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analytical framework of this study may be helpfully applied in order to understand how exactly 
the Central Asian leaders come to arrive at foreign policy decisions.  
The third opportunity is unfolded by this thesis. Since this research has established a 
temporal reference for future research, it may be possible to follow the same neoclassical realist 
framework to study subsequent Kazakhstani policies. Here, research questions may be based 
along the temporal dimension, such that the dynamics of continuity and change in the republic’s 
external behaviour may be examined in reference and juxtaposition to the historical period 
studied in this work.  
 
The initial post-independence period was an interesting and challenging epoch to the nations in 
the former Soviet space, which historical developments continue to influence global politics 
today. Foreign policy behavioural trends, instituted during this extremely complicated formative 
period, forged the substance of Kazakhstan’s strategic outlook for many years to come. With the 
growing importance of Central Asia on the world political map, the knowledge of the 
foundations of foreign affairs of regional nations seems to be essential for policymakers and 
scholars alike. To this end this thesis offered an insightful story of the foreign policy incepted in 
Almaty on 16 December 1991. 
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Appendix I: List of interviews  
 
in chronological order 
 
Diplomats and experts 
 
Laumulin, Murat. Senior research fellow at the Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies under 
the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 15 September 2010, Bishkek; 20 June 2013, 
Almaty. 
 
Kasymbekov, Makhmud. The Head of the Chancellery of the President of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan, 24 November 2011, Astana. 
 
Suleymenov, Tuleitai. The former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 7 
December 2011, Astana. 
 
Kurmanguzhin, Salim. The former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan, 10 February 2012, Almaty; 2 March 2012, Almaty. 
 
Kozhakov, Asan. Personal representative of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan in 
Azerbaijan in September 1992, 27 April 2012, Almaty; 24 March 2013, Almaty. 
 
Sher’iazdanova Klara. The Head of the CIS Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan in 1992, by telephone, 13 November 2012, Almaty. 
 
Satpaev, Dosym. Regional expert, 27 March 2013, Almaty. 
 
Zhumaly, Rasul. Former diplomat at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan, 28 March 2013, Almaty. 
 
Confidential 
 
High-ranking government official, name withheld by request, 25 October 2011, Astana. 
 
Former official at the Administration of the President of Kazakhstan, name withheld by request, 
30 November 2011, Astana. 
 
Former diplomat, name and place withheld by request, 10 September 2012. 
 
Former diplomat, name and place withheld by request, 20 February 2012. 
 
Kazakhstani diplomat, name and place withheld by request, 15 December 2012. 
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Appendix II: Ethical considerations and UTREC approval 
 
 
Considering the reservations about the sensitivity of the research topic, some interviewees raised 
concerns about the possibility of career repercussions for them or political consequences for the 
country in case the provided information could be attributed to them. These interviewees were 
willing to participate in the interviews only confidentially. To warrant the confidentiality in 
instances when it was requested, interviewed individuals are not identified by their names; exact 
positions held in the past or at the moment of an interview; and, occasionally, by the city of an 
interview (Almaty or Astana), as the latter information could also facilitate the identification of 
the position of the individual. Only general information about past or present professional 
affiliation of the interviewee and the date of the interview is given.  
 
These measures are taken in accordance with the provisions of the University of St. Andrews 
Teaching and Research Ethics Committee concerning the anonymous collection of data and the 
maintenance of the confidentiality and trust between the participant(s) and researcher. 
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Appendix III: Note on transliteration 
This thesis followed the US Library of Congress Romanisation tables for the Russian and 
Kazakh languages, which was adapted for regular QWERTY keyboard layout. Some 
conventionally used names for individuals and geographical locations do not conform to the 
Romanisation tables (e.g. Azerbaijan). In these cases conventional alternatives of spelling in 
English are used. 
